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OVERVIEW 
This thesis centres around the design of electricity distribution network tariffs for residential 
consumers. Distribution network tariffs are paid by consumers to contribute to the recuperation of the 
distribution network. The distribution network is needed to deliver electricity locally. In most 
countries, distribution network tariffs were designed assuming consumers to be rather passive and 
fully reliant on the supply from the electricity network to satisfy their electricity needs.  
 
However, due to strong cost reductions in the investment cost of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), 
consumers can now fulfil part of their electricity needs with their own generated electricity, better 
control their use of electricity and even inject electricity into the network when their onsite generation 
exceeds their demand. They become so-called active consumers. Consequently, the physical electricity 
flows in the distribution network are changing. A change in the physical flows also has an effect on the 
financial flows; in this context, the allocation of the distribution network costs among consumers. The 
distribution network tariff design which was historically in place is therefore challenged. How to re-
design the distribution network tariff to deal with this new reality has elicited the interest of 
practitioners, policymakers and academics in the electricity sector and is the focus of this thesis. The 
thesis consists of this overview, four chapters and a conclusion. Each chapter represents a paper which 
stands on its own.  
 
The first chapter is an introductory chapter. The chapter starts by introducing the importance of 
network charges in the final electricity bill and describes how distribution network tariffs are designed 
today. Then, the reader is reminded that the distribution network tariff is not the only way to recover 
grid costs: other ways are through connection charges, possibly distribution locational marginal pricing 
(DLMP) and general taxation. After, the main principles of distribution network tariff design are 
discussed, guiding the reader from the (theoretical) first-best distribution network design all the way 
to why current practices were chosen. Further, issues with current practices are discussed, and 
possible tools to overcome these challenges are briefly introduced. The chapter ends with a summary 
of the current state of the European debate on distribution network tariff design. 
 
This first chapter is published as a chapter in:  
 T. Schittekatte & L. Meeus (2018), ‘’Introduction to network tariffs and network codes for 
consumers, prosumers and energy communities’’, FSR Technical report. DOI: 10.2870/934379.  
This technical report served as a course text for an FSR online course the aim of which was to empower 
representatives of consumer organisations, energy communities and NGOs. The course took place from 
2 
 
12 to 26 April 2018. The course counted 88 participants from 22 different countries of which 45% were 
senior professionals. 58% of the course participants came from NGOs, 30% from consumer 
organisations and 12% from energy communities. The course was set up in collaboration with ENTSO-
E, BEUC and RESCOOP. 
 
The second chapter of the thesis illustrates how consumer adoption of solar PV and batteries affects 
the cost-efficiency of current distribution network tariff design and can have redistributional impacts. 
The distribution network tariff design problem is modelled as a mixed-complementarity problem 
(MCP), i.e. a non-cooperative game between consumers. In the game, the availability and costs of the 
two aforementioned technologies strategically interact with distribution network tariff structures. 
Four ‘states of the world’ for users’ access to technologies are distinguished, and three tariff structures 
are evaluated. The assessed distribution network tariff structures are volumetric network charges with 
net-metering, bi-directional volumetric network charges for both injection and withdrawal, and 
capacity-based network charges. A key assumption in the second chapter is that all grid costs are sunk. 
This implies that changes in the electricity consumption patterns due to DER adoption by certain 
consumers have no impact on the total grid costs to be recovered. Under that assumption, the 
distribution network tariff design has mostly an allocative function, i.e. spread the network costs over 
the different consumers in an acceptable way while limiting the possible induced distortions. 
 
This chapter is published as:  
 T. Schittekatte, I. Momber & L. Meeus (2018), ‘’Future-proof tariff design: recovering sunk grid 
costs in a world where consumers are pushing back’’, Energy Economics 70, 484-498. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.01.028.  
Further, this paper also won the 2nd prize for doctoral student papers at the French Association for 
Energy Economists (FAEE) in October 2017.  
A policy brief based on the paper is published as:  
 Schittekatte, T., & Meeus, L. (2017), ‘’How future-proof is your distribution grid tariff design?’’, 
FSR Policy brief 2017/03, DOI: 10.2870/27688 
This paper was also presented at: 
 5th International Conference of the Armand Peugeot Chair – Electromobility: Challenging 
Issues – Paris, December 2017  
 
In the third chapter, different grid cost scenarios or ‘states of the grid’ are considered, including the 
scenario for which many grid investments need to be done. These future grid investments are assumed 
to be driven by the peak consumption aggregated over all consumers. In that case, the network tariff 
design does not only have an allocative function but also the cost-reflectivity of the network tariff 
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becomes important. In this chapter, the model introduced in the previous chapter is extended by 
turning it into a bi-level optimisation problem and is further reformulated as a mathematical model 
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The upper-level welfare maximising regulator can decide which 
distribution network tariff design to implement while anticipating the reaction of the lower-level 
consumers to the chosen design. The regulator can choose between the traditional distribution 
network tariff options: fixed charges, volumetric charges, capacity-based charges or any combination 
thereof. The modelling formulation is used to assess how to design a least-cost distribution tariff under 
two constraints that regulators typically face. The first constraint is related to difficulties regarding the 
implementation of cost-reflective tariffs. In practice, so-called cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy 
for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution grids. The second constraint has to do with fairness. There 
is a fear that active consumers investing in DER might benefit at the expense of passive consumers.  
 
This chapter is published as:  
 T. Schittekatte & L. Meeus (2018), ‘’Least-cost distribution network tariff design in theory and 
in practice’’, FSR RSCAS Working Paper 2018/19.  
Currently, the manuscript is resubmitted to The Energy Journal after a ‘’Revise and resubmit’’ decision 
in August 2018.  
A policy brief based on the paper is published as:  
 Schittekatte, T., & Meeus, L. (2018), ‘’Limits of traditional distribution network tariff design and 
options to move beyond’’, FSR Policy brief 2018/13, DOI: 10.2870/863622.  
This paper was also presented at: 
 World Congress for Energy and Resource Economists (WCERE) – Panellist of policy session – 
‘’Smart grid for a carbon free energy future: the role of electricity pricing and distributed energy 
resources’’ – Gothenburg, June 2018  
 International Conference of the International Association of Energy Economists (IAEE) – 
Groningen, June 2018 
 
The topic of the fourth and last chapter is the interaction between distribution network tariff design 
and the business case of residential electricity storage. A new solution method is proposed for the 
MPEC introduced in the third chapter, based on the strong duality theorem. The model is used to 
analyse whether different distribution network tariff designs align the business case of storage with 
wider system benefits. Three distribution network tariff designs are evaluated: volumetric charges with 
net-purchase, bi-directional volumetric charges for both injection and withdrawal capacity-based 
charges. The outcomes under these distribution network tariff designs are compared to a first-best 
benchmark. The benchmark is a central planner who can decide unilaterally about the consumers’ 
investment decisions in batteries. Besides the network tariff design, also time-varying energy prices 
are an important enabler for the business case of storage. Therefore, the impact of time-varying energy 
4 
 
prices on the business case of storage and the interaction between different energy pricing schemes 
and the evaluated network tariff designs is described. 
 
This chapter is written without co-authors and serves as a draft for a working paper. The additional 
finding regarding the interaction between different energy pricing schemes and the evaluated network 
tariff design might be omitted in the final version of the working paper. The reason for this is that this 
finding is expected to serve as a starting point for further research after the submission of the thesis. 
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at: 
 
 Workshop storage taskforce SmartEN– Brussels, Belgium, 9 October, 2018  
 DIW: SET-Nav Modeling Workshop - Two-stage decision making and modelling for energy 
markets– Berlin, 11 October 2018  
 Conference on storage business models, organized by EASE and Vlerick Business School– 
Brussels, Belgium, 30 November 2018 
 3rd AIEE Energy Symposium –  Milan, Italy, December 10-12, 2018 
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CHAPTER 1: DISTRIBUTION NETWORK TARIFF DESIGN: CONTEXT, MAIN 
PRINCIPLES AND CURRENT CHALLENGE 
Abstract  
This chapter starts by introducing the importance of network charges in the consumer bill and 
describing how distribution network tariffs are designed today. Then, the reader is reminded that 
the distribution network tariff is not the only way to recover grid costs, other ways are through 
connection charges, possibly distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) and general taxation. 
After, the main principles of distribution network tariff design are discussed, guiding the reader from 
the (theoretical) first-best distribution network design all the way to why current practices were 
chosen for. After, issues with current practices are discussed, and possible tools to overcome these 
challenges are briefly introduced. The chapter ends with a summary of the current state of the 
European debate around distribution network tariff design. 
 
Keywords: Distribution Grid Cost Recovery, Distribution Network Tariff Design, Connection Charges, 
Harmonisation 
 
This first chapter is published as a chapter in:  
 T. Schittekatte & L. Meeus (2018), ‘’Introduction to network tariffs and network codes for 
consumers, prosumers and energy communities’’, FSR Technical report. DOI: 10.2870/934379.  
This technical report served as a course text for an FSR online course the aim of which was to empower 
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 The electricity bill: the components and who’s responsible for what? 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of consumer electricity bill in capital cities across Europe. It can be seen 
that the electricity bill broadly consists of three components: energy costs, taxes and levies and 
network charges.  
 
Figure 1: Breakdown of incumbents’ standard offers for households in EU capital cities and total bill 
– November–December 2016 (ACER and CEER, 2017a) 
Energy costs represented on average 35% of the final bill in 2016 but have declined (at least relatively) 
every year since 2012 as shown in Figure 2. Energy costs depend on the wholesale electricity market. 
In this market, electricity retailers buy electricity on behalf of their contracted customers. The final 
energy price a consumer sees will reflect the market conditions to a certain extent. Depending on the 
arrangement with the retailer, the final price for the consumer, expressed in euros per kWh, can be 
either time-varying or invariant to time.  
 
Figure 2: Weighted average of the electricity post-taxes total bill (POTP) and breakdown of 
incumbents’ standard offers for households in EU capitals and Oslo – 2012–2016 (ACER and CEER, 
2017a) 
Taxes and levies represented on average 38% of the electricity bill in 2016. Value-Added Tax (VAT), 
averaging 15% in the EU, is added as a percentage of the final electricity bill. Levies in the electricity 
bill are increasing yearly as shown in Figure 2 and made up about 23% of the bill in 2016. Levies are 
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recuperated through the consumer bill to pay for example for energy policy costs such as renewable 
subsidies or surcharges. Levies are paid, in most cases, in proportion to the electricity volume 
consumed, i.e. in euros per kWh or by a fixed charge per consumer. The high-cost burden of energy 
policy and how these costs are spread across different types of grid users has provoked intense public 
debate, see e.g.  Bohringer et al. (2017) discussing the German case. The allocation of these costs and 
whether they should be recovered through the electricity bill at all is up to the government. This debate 
is not the focus of this thesis. 
 
Probably even more discussed today is how to design the distribution network (access) tariff, which is 
currently the main method of recovering distribution network costs from consumers. In 2016, the 
proportion of total network charges in electricity bills averaged around 27% in the EU. The largest 
chunk of network charges in a consumer bill are the distribution network charges. Distribution network 
charges varied between 16 % and 48% of the bill, while for transmission network charges these 
percentages ranged between approximately 0% to 9%. For simplicity, throughout this thesis, when we 
refer to network charges, we mean distribution network charges. The reason that distribution network 
tariffs are discussed profoundly today is in most cases not because they are increasing strongly lately. 
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of network charges in the bill has been relatively stable over the 
last years. Instead, the discussion has more to do with their design. Figure 3 shows the way distribution 
network tariffs are designed for households in the EU in 2016. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution network cost recovery in Europe by Compass Lexecon (2016) based on 
European Commission (2015) 
The first thing to notice in Figure 3 is that methods of grid costs recuperation and the structures of 
distribution tariffs are not harmonised across Europe. Similarly, as for transmission tariffs, the shares 
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of volumetric/capacity component for distribution tariffs vary significantly across EU countries. A  
second important fact demonstrated in Figure 3 and also described in a report by the European 
Commission (EC) (2015), is that the majority of distribution grid tariffs mainly consist of volumetric 
charges. The EC report specifies that 69% of the revenue from households, 54% for small industrial 
consumers and 58% for large industrial consumers are recuperated through volumetric tariffs. The 
Netherlands is an exception as there is no volumetric component in the distribution network tariff for 
households. 
 
As the network tariff is regulated, it is the National Regulatory Authority (NRA), not the market, that 
has the final say on the distribution network tariff design. In some EU countries, the NRA is solely 
responsible for the tariff design; in other EU countries NRAs and DSOs share the responsibility, e.g. the 
NRA decides on higher level principles, while the DSO proposes the tariff structure and level which 
need to be approved by the NRA (EC, 2015 and recital 36 of Directive 2009/72/EC).  
 Other ways than access tariffs to recuperate distribution network costs 
In the debate about the recovery of distribution grid costs, the focus is mostly on the distribution 
network access tariff, i.e. the one you pay as part of your monthly or semestrial electricity bill. Besides 
the network access tariff, network connection charges and distribution locational marginal pricing 
(DLMP) are other ways to (partly) recuperate distribution grid costs. In practice, at least today, 
distribution grid costs will be recovered by a combination of the connection charges and the 
distribution network access tariff.  
2.1 Connection charges 
Connection charges, as the name indicates, are (in most cases) a one-time charge paid for the 
connection to the grid. In general, three types of connection charges can be distinguished: super-
shallow, shallow and deep connection charges. The degree to which connection charges fully reflect 
the incremental cost of providing a user with a new or upgraded connection to the network depends 
on the type of connection charge.  
 
With super-shallow connection charges basically no costs are charged for the connection. Shallow 
connection charges imply that grid users pay for the local infrastructure connection costs (the cable 
between a house and local feeder and other necessary equipment); these costs are easily attributed 
to a specific user. Deep connection charges consist of the shallow charges plus possibly incurred costs 
for wider network reinforcements needed to accommodate the connection request. Deep connection 
9 
 
charges intend to fully reflect the incremental cost of providing a user with a new or increased 
connection to the network.  
 
Shallow connection charges solely recover the connection from the user to the grid. Shallow 
connection charges generally do not ‘steer’ consumer behaviour, i.e. whether you connect your house 
or shop to a point in the distribution grid where there is very little or significant congestion, it does not 
affect your connection charge. On the other hand, deeper connection charges do send a signal to grid 
users. Namely, you will have to pay a different connection charge whether or not you connect to a 
point in the grid where there is already significant congestion. Deep connection charges will ‘guide’ 
grid users to connect to less congested points of the grid.1 A main issue with deep connection charges 
is that new entrants will pay more than users already connected to the grid. Grid investment happens 
in practice in discrete (‘lumpy’) steps, a grid user connecting at the moment the grid is utilised near its 
maximum would have to pay the entire upgrade. Another difficulty with this type of charge is that the 
costs inflicted on the network by the user need to be estimated before actual grid usage.  
 
Ofgem (2017a), the Great-Britain (GB) regulator, describes a practical implementation of distribution 
connection charges. They state that in GB the distribution connection charging regime is referred to as 
‘shallow-ish’. Besides the full cost of assets that will be used solely by the connecting customer2, 
connection charges can also recover a portion of the deeper reinforcement costs to the existing 
network needed to provide the user with firm access to the system. However, charges paid for the 
deeper reinforcement of the wider grid seem to be limited. Namely, in Ofgem (2014), it is reported 
that 95% of connections between 2011-2014 have not triggered any network reinforcement. 
Additionally, where a connection project triggered reinforcement, the connecting customer paid 59% 
of the associated costs. The other 41% of the costs were socialised through the network access tariff. 
2.2 Distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) 
Another way to recuperate grid costs is through DLMP, meaning that different locations (in the 
extreme case: nodes) in the network can reflect different energy prices at a certain point in time. The 
principle applied in DLMP is borrowed from transmission grid cost recovery and could, in theory, be 
                                                          
1 An innovative tool in that regard are network capacity maps indicating the available hosting capacities at different points in 
the distribution network see e.g. http://www.westernpower.co.uk/connections/generation/network-capacity-map.aspx and 
https://www.capareseau.fr/  
2 Ofgem (2014) describes that the cost of the assets solely used by the connecting consumer will be based on the ‘minimum 
scheme’.  The minimum scheme is the solution designed solely to provide the capacity needed for the new connection at the 
lowest overall capital cost. A DSO may design an enhanced scheme (e.g. additional assets to accommodate a larger capacity 
or assets of a different specification) but the cost to the customer will not exceed that of the minimum scheme. The customer 
can also request works in excess of the minimum scheme, when it thinks this would be more beneficial. 
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also applied to distribution networks to recover part of the costs.  In Figure 4 a simple example of 
locational pricing applied at nodal level is shown. 
 
Figure 4: Simple example of locational marginal pricing. Left, no congestion. Right, congestion. 
The left side of Figure 4 shows a situation without congestion (meaning the line is not utilized at its full 
capacity) between the two nodes N1 and N2. The price of the two nodes will be the same if we assume 
no energy losses. In this case, there is no congestion rent or income for the owner of the line. The right 
side of Figure 4 shows a situation where there is congestion between the two nodes. A price difference 
between the nodes occurs now. Electricity will always flow from the node with the lower price to the 
node with the higher price. The congestion rent, i.e. the income for the line owner, is calculated as the 
capacity of the line multiplied by the price difference between the nodes. Each market time unit (e.g. 
1 hour or 15 minutes), the situation can change, i.e. congestion can occur or disappear depending on 
the electricity flows resulting from electricity trade. Thus, by applying distribution locational prices very 
short-term price signals are sent, informing grid users about the underlying network constraints. 
 
The concept of locational marginal pricing is applied in European electricity markets at the transmission 
level. Namely, the European electricity market is organized as a set of bidding zones, which in most 
cases overlap with national borders. The network within these bidding zones is seen as a copper plate 
- no congestion is assumed-  implying that within a bidding zone the electricity price is always uniform. 
However, the different bidding zones are connected through transmission lines (‘cross-zonal 
interconnectors’) for which the scarce capacity is taken into account by the market; a mechanism called 
implicit cross-zonal transmission capacity allocation. This means that if the interconnectors between 
two bidding zones are not congested at a certain point in time, the electricity price will be equal over 
the two bidding zones (so-called market coupling). If the interconnectors are congested, the electricity 
price in the two bidding zones will diverge (so-called market splitting).3 Figure 5 illustrates price 
convergence between different bidding zones within certain regions in the EU. For example, the Baltics 
consist of three bidding zones representing respectively Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. During 2016 the 
(day-ahead) electricity price between those three countries converged about 70% of the time. 
                                                          
3 For more information, see e.g. Meeus and Schittekatte (2018), Section 2.2, in which the concept of bidding zones is explained 
more profoundly and Chapter 5, which describes the way cross-zonal capacity is allocated and calculated. 
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Figure 5: Day-ahead price convergence in the EU by region as % of hours, 2011-2016 (ACER and CEER, 
2017b) 
This also means that 30% of the time at least one bidding zone had a different price as one or multiple 
interconnectors were congested. This implies that during those moments congestion rent was 
generated. This revenue is raised from the day-ahead auction in which the electricity prices in the 
different bidding zones is jointly determined as illustrated with an example in the box below.  
 
Suppose that the day-ahead market auction for a certain hour results in a price in zone A of 50 
€/MWh and a price in zone B of 60€/MWh. The satisfied demand in zone A is 100 MW, the satisfied 
demand in zone B is 150 MW and the interconnector capacity allocated for trade between the two 
zones was 50 MW. As there is a price differential between the two zones, it implies that the cross-
zonal interconnector capacity is fully utilized, i.e. the total electricity flowing through the 
interconnector is 50 MW.  Electricity flows from the low price zone (A) to the high price zone (B). 
 
 Price Demand Generation Demand cost Generation cost 
Zone A 50 €/MWh 100 MW 
150 MW 
(demand zone A + 
interconnector) 
€ 5,000 € 7,500 
Zone B 60 €/MWh 150 MW 
100 MW 
(demand zone B - 
interconnector) 
€ 9,000 € 6,000 
    € 14,000 € 13,500 
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The total amount collected by generation over the two zones is €13,500 while the total amount 
spent by demand equals €14,000. The difference between the two is the congestion rent of €500 
equalling the price differential between the two zones (€10/MWh) multiplied by the capacity of the 
line (50 MW). This congestion rent is transferred to the TSO(s) owning the interconnector.  
 
In Figure 6 the average annual congestion revenue and how it was spent per country over the period 
of 2011-2015 is shown. 
 
Figure 6: Average annual congestion rent and allocation of the rent per country for the period 
between 2011 and 2015 (ECN et al., 2017) 
There are precise rules specifying how the obtained congestion revenues should be spent. More 
specifically, Art. 16 (6) of the Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity states that priority should be given to use this money to 
guarantee the actual availability of the allocated capacity or to maintain or increase cross-zonal 
interconnection capacity. However, if the revenues cannot be efficiently used for those purposes, they 
can be used to lower the (transmission) network tariffs up to a maximum amount decided upon by the 
relevant NRA. Remaining money should be saved to use for priority purposes when necessary in the 
future. 
 
Obstacles would have to be overcome to apply the locational marginal prices (LMP) to distribution 
networks in order to recover part of the grid costs. There are two main issues: a public acceptance 
issue and a technical issue. First, if locational pricing is applied at the distribution level, it would mean 
that different areas of a distribution network would see different energy prices at certain points in 
time. This could be perceived unfair because this price difference is mainly created by the investment 
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decisions in infrastructure by DSOs in the past and not by consumers who happen to live in an area 
which could see a rise in prices. The technical issue has to do with the fact that the number of lines 
and nodes at the distribution level is much higher than at the transmission level. Applying locational 
pricing at the transmission level is computationally already challenging, with the number of zones and 
the temporal granularity being the main parameters affecting the time to compute all prices. If a similar 
calculation would be done at the distribution level, innovations in algorithms and computational power 
will be needed. Also, real-time information about all flows in the lines as well as about the injection 
and withdrawal of electricity at all nodes is required. This is a very challenging task and will entail 
significant investments in IT necessary to turn the distribution grid into a ‘smart grid’.  
 
Abdelmotteleb et al. (2016) explain that the major difference between LMP used in transmission and 
distribution are the losses and congestion portions. In distribution networks, losses have a more 
relevant role than in transmission.4 Moreover, congestion is rarer in DLMP calculations since 
distribution network topology is generally radial and feeds energy from one point. Abdelmotteleb et 
al. (2016) also add that even if DLMP would be implemented, complementary network charges are 
needed to recover the network costs fully and to send efficient long-term signals to network users. 
 Principles and theory of distribution network tariff design 
After distilling relevant literature, three general principles for distribution network tariff design were 
distinguished. Namely, a tariff should be cost-reflective, allow the recovery of efficiently incurred grid 
costs and be fair. 
3.1 Cost-reflectiveness 
An important principle of distribution network tariff design is cost-reflectiveness. Cost-reflectiveness 
implies that the cost a consumer inflicts on the network should be reflected by the network tariff. In 
short, one should pay the price for her own actions. In theory, by having a cost-reflective tariff the 
consumer is informed to decide whether to use the network at a certain time (for which she will pay 
the inflicted cost) or whether to change her consumption behaviour for which she will have attributed 
a value or for which she has to invest in Distributed Energy Resources (DER).5 If network charges are 
not cost-reflective, it means that consumers will not see the correct trade-off between utilizing the 
network or adjusting their consumption at a certain point in time. Two situations can occur: 
                                                          
4 Losses in distribution can vary widely and are typically in the order of 4-10 % of the total energy offtake (see e.g. MIT Energy 
Initiative (2016a)). In transmission losses are around 1-2 % of the energy offtake (see e.g. Elia). 
5 In this section we assume the consumer to be the decision-maker, this is not always the case. An example can be a less 
affluent family renting a flat in the city with little to say on which investments to make in the building, including the heating 
system, let alone solar panel on a roof. Fairness and inflexible/passive consumers are further discussed in Subsection 3.3.   
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 First, the network tariff can be too low, meaning that the consumers’ actions inflict more cost 
than the network charges they would have to pay. This means that we end up in a situation 
with an overly expensive grid as the consumers are not incentivized enough to adapt their 
actions, leading to a higher total system cost. An example would be that consumers who have 
an intelligent heating system driven by a heat pump command their house to be heated at 
moments when the electricity (including the grid) is priced cheaply even when the network is 
near congestion. If many people do so, it would eventually mean that the network needs to be 
expanded, while this would not have been the case if the network tariff was cost-reflective 
thus incentivizing the consumer to program their heating at times when the utilization of the 
grid was low. In the end, all consumers will have to pay back the cost of this (avoidable) 
network expansion through the tariff. 
 
 Second, the network tariff can be too high, meaning that the consumers’ actions inflict less 
cost than the network charges they have to pay. Using the same example, if network charges 
are too high, it could mean that consumers opt for gas heating instead of electric heating. Even 
though, if the network charges would be designed as cost-reflective, electric heating could 
have been a cheaper option as the electricity network could accommodate the extra load 
without problems, under the condition that the heating would be correctly programmed. This 
would mean that we end up in a situation with overpriced actions by the consumers and an 
underutilized grid, leading again to a higher total system cost for the final energy service than 
if the network tariff was designed properly. 
 
In short, the idea is that a cost-reflective tariff will lead a cost-efficient outcome. What is meant with 
a cost-efficient outcome is that the cost-reflective tariff will lead to the overall lowest final cost for 
serving the electricity needs of all consumers. 
 
When wanting to design a cost-reflective tariff, we need to know what cost to reflect, in other words, 
what drives the grid cost. Generally, it is agreed upon in the literature that the main cost driver of an 
electricity network, whether it is distribution or transmission, is the maximum peak demand 
aggregated over all consumers, also called the ‘coincident peak demand’.  A line or feeder is 
dimensioned to cope with the maximum power in kW or MW it is expected to carry at a certain point 
in time, not by the volume in kWh or MWh it is expected to transmit over a certain time period. This is 
very similar to highways or telecom lines. Other cost drivers could for example include losses or the 
penetration of solar PV which could induce bi-directional flows and thus requires investment in 
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additional electronics (e.g. protection and voltage regulation) in the grid. For more information see 
also the Future of Solar Report by the MIT Energy Initiative (2015) and chapter 9 of IEA (2016). 
 
So what does such a cost-reflective tariff look like in theory? For example, the Utility of the Future 
report by the MIT Energy Initiative (2016a) explains that a cost-reflective distribution network tariff 
consists of a forward-looking peak-coincident capacity charge. The capacity-based charge should be 
computed as the incremental cost of the network divided by expected load growth, the so-called long-
run marginal cost (LRMC) of the network. However, there are constraints making the introduction of 
this tariff more difficult in reality; we divide them into two groups: implementation constraints (due to 
a lack of information and fairness concerns) and a cost-recovery issue. 
 
First, implementation constraints, LRMC pricing is not so easy to implement in distribution grids. 
Gómez (2013) describes the distribution networks as follows: ‘’A friend of mine who worked in a 
distribution company likened electric power generation and transmission to a bull and distribution to a 
beehive. Whereas generation and transmission comprise comparatively few and very large-scale 
facilities, distribution involves a much larger number and wider variety of equipment and components.’’ 
In other words, it is hard to get a complete picture of the distribution network. Plus, there is a lack of 
information about the network flows in real-time requiring significant investments in IT infrastructure 
in most countries. Without this information, it is almost impossible to truly reflect the grid costs in the 
tariff as it is not clear what is really going on in the network.  
 
Even if all information would be known, such tariff should have a very fine locational and temporal 
granularity. In the extreme case, in order to apply it perfectly, it would almost be a user-by-user tariff. 
However, generally, a tariff per region or DSO area is applied in Europe (European Commission, 2015a). 
This is mostly done for reasons of simplicity and fairness.6 Batlle et al. (2017) explain that in reality, 
such fine granularity is impossible and that some degree of consumer clustering is required. The 
authors continue that in the electricity sector, consumers have traditionally been grouped by voltage 
level, node location, consumption category (residential versus industrial), or even according to the 
occurrence of their peak load if a time‐differentiation is applied. It is clear that each grouping 
                                                          
6 Imagine you live in a district which did not see an update of grid infrastructure in the last decade and local demand is 
increasing. If a cost-reflective network tariff with finer locational granularity would be applied, it is possible that grid tariffs 
suddenly become substantially higher at certain times in your neighbourhood. This would happen to incentivise grid users to 
adjust their electricity withdrawal and injection patterns at times the grid is stressed in order to avoid or postpone costly grid 
reinforcements. Another district could have been upgraded just a couple of years before the implementation of such a tariff 
with finer locational granularity. This district could then see fairly low and constant grid tariffs as there is little need for 
reinforcements. The difference in grid tariffs would be caused mainly because of choices of the DSO in the past on which 
affected grid users had little influence. Very location specific tariffs could indeed increase cost-efficiency but they remove a 
certain ‘socialisation’ of grid costs. 
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alternative represents an (arbitrary) approximation of the LRMC and the timing of the peak, that may, 
to a greater or lesser degree, affect the overall cost-efficiency of the methodology.  
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is demonstrated that if the regulator, setting the tariff, does not anticipate 
inaccuracy in the proxy of the network cost driver, self-interest pursuing active consumers can make 
sub-optimal decisions in terms of DER investment, possibly leading to consumer investing more in DER 
than the level of grid and energy costs that are avoided; thus a worse outcome in terms of overall 
welfare. If the regulator anticipates this inaccuracy, the welfare loss can be reduced. 
 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, it is demonstrated that if many future grid investments are expected and 
no truly cost-reflective network tariffs are implemented, consumers might possibly under-invest in 
batteries compared to what would be optimal from a system point of view. Also, batteries would be 
operated in a sub-optimal manner. Fewer grid costs are avoided that would be possible in a cost-
efficient manner; thus potential welfare gains are missed out. More advanced network tariffs are 
needed, complemented with other mechanisms as implementation issues always remain to a certain 
extent. 
 
Besides an implementation issue, there is a cost-recovery issue. It is well known (see e.g. Borenstein 
(2016); MIT Energy Initiative (2016) and Ofgem (2017a)) that purely cost-reflective charges do not 
guarantee full cost recovery of the efficiently incurred grid costs. Actually, what is done by cost-
reflective network charges is to send a signal to the grid user to optimally make use of the network, 
leading to a cost-efficient outcome for all. However, cost-efficiency is decoupled from another 
objective, namely to recover all grid costs. In reality, there will always be residual part of the grid costs 
which are sunk, i.e. grid investments done in the past to meet future electricity demand and of which 
the total amount of costs is unaffected by the way the network is utilised. Therefore, a cost-reflective 
tariff, which is, in theory, the first-best solution from a cost-efficiency point of view, needs to be 
complemented with another charge to recuperate these sunk costs. This leads us to the second 
principle of distribution network tariff design, cost-recovery. 
3.2 Cost-recovery 
The idea behind the cost-recovery principle is that the Distribution System Operator (DSO), the 
company responsible for maintaining, developing and operating the distribution network, must be able 
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to recuperate its ‘efficiently incurred grid costs’.7 It should be reminded that the DSO is a natural 
monopoly, meaning that it is cheaper to have one company building and operating the distribution 
network than to have multiple companies, duplicating the necessary lines and competing for 
consumers to connect to their network. What this implies is that the tariff for using the network is not 
set by the DSO. Instead, it is the NRA who will assess how high the allowed revenue of a DSO should 
be and accordingly determine the network tariff. An exception is Spain where allowed revenues are 
set by the Government (European Commission, 2015a). 
 
In general, incentive regulation should aim to guide DSOs to find an optimal balance between costs 
associated with investment, operation and maintenance, and energy losses on the one hand, and the 
quality of service provided on the other hand. Greater costs must be incurred to achieve higher quality 
and vice versa. However, the NRA can judge that some DSO expenditures were incurred inefficiently 
meaning that these costs cannot be recuperated through the tariff. For more information on incentive 
regulation of distribution grids see for example the chapter of Gómez in the Regulation of the Power 
Sector book by Pérez-Arriaga (2013). A recent detailed description of incentive regulation of electricity 
network companies can also be found in the first two chapters of the book by Meeus and Glachant 
(2018). In the first chapter, Rious and Rossetto (2018a) describe the history of incentive regulation in 
the British energy sector which was a front-runner in this respect. In the second chapter, Rious and 
Rossetto (2018b) discuss the implementation of monopoly regulation in Continental Europe. They 
explain that the choice of the best regulatory tools depends on the characteristics of the specific tasks 
of the regulated company and is constrained by the competency and resources of regulators. 
 
The (simplified) cost-recovery process occurs as follows. First, it is the NRA that determines the allowed 
revenue for x amount of years, the regulatory period.8 Then the tariffs are set by the NRA, possibly 
jointly with the DSO, anticipating future usage of the network and aiming to recover exactly the 
allowed revenue from the consumers. Imagine, for example, that the NRA decides that in the next 
years a DSO should be allowed to recover €1000 per year through access charges, the network tariffs 
are volumetric (€/kWh) and the expected electricity volume consumed by its connected consumer is 
20,000 kWh per year. In that case, the network tariff for the next year should be set at 0.05 €/kWh. 
However, when checking the real consumption after the year has passed, it could be that the actual 
consumption was higher, meaning the DSO recuperated too much money, or lower, meaning the DSO 
                                                          
7 The DSO can own the distribution network assets. Alternatively, these assets can also be owned by third parties (often 
municipalities) but managed by the DSO. In some jurisdictions the DSO is referred to as the Distribution Network Operator 
(DNO). 
8 Usually the duration of the regulatory period lies between 3 and 8 years. 
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did not recuperate enough money. In the former case, the DSO will have to give a rebate to its 
consumers the next time tariffs are set, in the latter case, the DSO will be allowed to set tariff slightly 
higher the next time in order to recuperate the missing money. This example suggests that the DSO is 
indifferent about the tariff setting as they cannot keep more money than the allowed revenue which 
is set independent of the tariffs. However, this is only true if the tariff recovers the investment costs 
of the past. To the extent that the tariffs also influence the need for grid investment in the future, the 
future allowed revenue cannot be completely decoupled from the tariff design. 
 
So, how can the distribution network tariff be designed in the most cost-efficient way while making 
sure that all grid costs are recovered? In theory, the best way to design such minimal distortive charges 
is by applying Ramsey pricing. With this approach, the residual or sunk grid costs, the part of the grid 
costs not recuperated by purely cost-reflective charges, are assigned to consumers according to their 
elasticity to price. Inverse proportionality is followed; this means that a higher proportion of the 
residual network costs are allocated to those consumers who change their consumption behaviour the 
least in response to price changes. As such, the way the total grid costs are recuperated modifies as 
little as possible the optimal outcome compared to when consumer decisions are subjected solely to 
cost-reflective charges.  
 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the relative performance of different tariff designs other than Ramsey 
pricing is shown in terms of cost-efficiency and distributional effects among consumers under the 
assumption that all grid costs are sunk. Four different states of the world differentiated by the 
investment cost of DER technology, in this case solar PV and batteries, are tested and find that the 
introduced distortions by the different tariff designs are very sensitive to the costs of DER technology. 
 
Although cost-efficient, there is a critical issue with Ramsey pricing. Namely, it is often perceived as 
unfair as it discriminates users on the basis of their elasticity to prices (see e.g. Neuteleers et al. 
(2017)).9 For example, network tariffs can be designed as such that two consumers who share the same 
load profile but have a different willingness to pay for electricity, pay a different share of the residual 
grid costs.10 As mentioned above, the lower the elasticity, the higher the contribution to the residual 
grid costs. In the case of network tariffs, consumers with very low elasticity and thus bearing most of 
the residual costs could be passive consumers with little possibilities other than the grid to be supplied 
from electricity. Besides, to implement Ramsey pricing the price-elasticity of the different consumers 
needs to be estimated, something which is not easy to do. Therefore, strictly applying Ramsey pricing 
                                                          
9 It must be added that unfair does not does imply unlawful.  
10 With the same load profile is meant that they consume the same amount of electricity at the same time. 
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is unattainable in practice, leading us to the third principle of distribution network tariff design: 
fairness.  
3.3 Fairness 
The main reason fairness is a principle of network pricing and not of, for example, the pricing of your 
sunglasses is the fact that network charges constitute a significant chunk of the cost of electricity which 
is considered a basic service to which everybody should have access. The notion of fairness is broad 
and needs more explanation, in this text fairness encompasses distributional issues (inflexibility, 
affordability and non-discrimination), transparency (simple and predictable) and last but not least, 
graduality.11 In what follows, we describe the concepts one by one. Then we go over to the practical 
implication for network tariff design. Unavoidably, there will be a trade-off between fairness and cost-
efficiency when designing tariffs. Distribution network tariffs are in that sense no different than all 
practical pricing systems for basic needs. 
 
Regarding inflexibility, is using electricity at a certain time always a real choice? Not really, some 
electricity usage is rather inflexible. In that context, Bunzl (2010) uses the example of a hospital 
emergency room. It is not considered fair to charge higher network tariffs, even though cost-reflective, 
at times when consumers do not have a real choice whether to consume or not. 
 
Besides some electricity usage being rather inflexible, there is also an issue with affordability. As 
mentioned, electricity is considered a basic need. Some household simply cannot afford to pay the 
‘real price’ of their electricity usage. It would be deemed unacceptable to cut these consumers off. It 
could be argued that it is not unreasonable to include a ‘usage tag’ for different needs: basic needs 
such as heating versus luxury needs such as the charging of your electric car. Such pricing scheme is 
however not cost-efficient as different consumers would see a different price for a commodity with 
possibly the same cost. Also, such a system would be hard to implement. In some cases, it will be opted 
to supply vulnerable consumers with a cheaper tariff than the ‘real price’. This will unavoidably lead to 
inefficiencies as described in the previous subsection. There are other methods to obtain a similar goal 
in a more efficient manner, e.g. by exposing consumers to the ‘real price’ but at the same time offer 
them a fixed sum as a rebate on the total electricity bill. As such the consumer incentives are not 
distorted while electricity remains affordable.  
                                                          
11 In this context, fairness is often used as a synonym of public acceptability or equity. These terms do not imply exactly the 
same; equity can be defined as a (moral/ethical) principle, fairness as a perception (of a process or a decision) and acceptance 
as an evaluation (outcome) that someone judges based on his/her subjective and selective assessment. These definitions 
were provided by Eva Schmid, a participant of the FSR online course on network tariff design and network codes for 
consumers, prosumers and energy communities. 
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Third, non-discriminatory. It is deemed fair that one is charged the same amount for using the same 
good or service, regardless of the purpose for which it is used or any characterizations of the 
consumers. At first sight, there seems to be a contradiction between the having non-discriminatory 
tariffs and affordability. Indeed, when certain consumer classes such as the vulnerable consumers have 
a cheaper network tariff for reasons of affordability, the tariff is indeed discriminatory. However, in 
some context, such practice can be regarded as fair.  
 
Further, a network tariff should be simple as people have a limited amount of time. An overly complex 
tariff, even though cost-efficient, might take too much time for the consumer to understand it 
properly. Such practices lead to high transaction costs (in standard economics terminology) and 
frustration. When using a service or consuming a good, consumers want to know how much this action 
will end up costing them. Network tariff pricing should be predictable. Otherwise, a strong 
inconvenience for consumers can result. 
 
Finally, this text talks about redesigning tariffs to deal with evolutions at the consumer and network 
side. Redesigning implies that we do not start from scratch: there is a tariff in place, and consumers 
can perceive changes in what they pay for the network (in the extreme case: ‘bill shocks’) unfair. In 
some cases, (passive) consumers can see their electricity bill increase strongly without changing their 
consumption; others could have invested in DER, e.g. a solar panel, basing their business case partly 
on that network tariff regime in place. Changing the tariff could render their investment, when already 
irreversible, loss-making.  Neuteleers et al. (2017) describe that a price increase is acceptable if the 
underlying costs for that product have increased.12 Contrarily, using excess demand (e.g. scarcity 
because of weather conditions) or an increase in monopoly power (e.g. single seller in a particular 
community) to raise prices is perceived strongly unfair.  
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is demonstrated that with active consumers reacting to the way the grid 
is priced, taking fairness into account when redesigning the distribution network tariff can have a cost 
in terms of cost-efficiency. The proxy used for fairness in the paper is the increase in the network 
charges paid by passive consumers (e.g. consumers who do not have the financial means to invest in 
DER) due to actions of active consumers reacting to the way the network charges are designed; the 
larger the increase, the more unfair a network tariff is perceived. It is shown that results are sensitive 
to the grid cost structure, i.e. whether in a network most of the grid investments still have to be made 
                                                          
12 Neuteleers et al. (2017) adds that at the same time, people deem it acceptable that the price stays the same if costs 
decrease. Both refer to the entitlements of the seller: changing costs should not decrease the firm's reference profits. 
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or whether most grid costs are sunk. If the proportion of sunk grid costs is high and the tariff design 
options are limited, it is an almost impossible task for the regulator to recover all grid costs in a cost-
efficient way while limiting the distributional impact at the same time. More creative solutions might 
be needed to attain such goal; examples are differentiated fixed charges or specific low-income 
programmes. Another option could be to recover the sunk grid costs through general taxation instead 
of the electricity bill as also discussed in the MIT Energy Initiative (2016). 
 
Recently, the academic literature and debate focused on fairness between active and passive domestic 
consumers. However, also other important debates concerning grid cost allocation are gaining 
momentum: the cost allocation between grid users (residential and smaller/larger 
industrial/commercial businesses) connected to different voltage levels of the transmission and the 
distribution network and, related, the cost allocation between consumption and production connected 
to the same network or even voltage level.  
 
First, the cost allocation between voltage levels. Historically, electricity flowed from the high voltage 
levels all the way down. As a result, it was acceptable that transmission grid users did not pay for 
distribution while distribution grid users paid for transmission too. Also, within the distribution grid 
this cascading practice is applied with domestic grid users paying more than industrial clients 
connected to higher voltage distribution networks, see for example Brandstätt et al. (2015) explaining 
the German cascading principle. To the extent that the direction of the flows is changing, also this 
cascading principle could be challenged from a fairness (and a cost-efficiency) point of view. In some 
cases, for example in Germany in 2012-2013, certain large electricity users, often connected to higher 
voltage levels, were exempted from paying any network charges at all. Very recently the European 
Commission concluded that fully exempting certain large users from these charges was against EU 
State aid rules as it is an unfair advantage over firms in other countries and increases the financial 
burden on other electricity users (European Commission, 2018).  
 
Second, the cost allocation between consumption and production units. In transmission, this 
discussion goes back far in time. Ruester et al. (2012) describe that many countries simply tend to 
socialize transmission costs among consumers and that this is in part due to historical reasons.13 Only 
a few countries applied (non-significant) network charges to generation, a so-called G-component. For 
more recent data on the transmission network charges, please consult ENTSO-E (2017a) or the Sections 
                                                          
13 Ruester et al. (2012) explain that in the past, when transmission was still part of national vertically integrated utilities, 
transmission costs were in general simply socialized over all consumers since under cost-of-service regulation and centralized 
planning it does not make sense to charge generators anything. 
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3.3 and 3.4 of the report by Glachant et al. (2017). In distribution networks, only since recently 
significant (mostly renewable) generation capacity is getting connected to the network where before 
the large majority of grid users were solely consuming electricity. Also, prosumers, grid users 
withdrawing electricity at times while injecting electricity at other times, and large storage facilities 
become more common distribution grid users. The advent of these new players further complicates 
cost allocation between consumption and production. In this regard the principle of ‘symmetrical 
network charges’ as brought forward by Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017a) is relevant. What is meant with 
symmetrical tariffs is that an electricity injection in the network at a given time and place should be 
compensated at the same rate that is charged for withdrawal at the same time and place. This is an 
important guiding principle, and we expect this discussion to be an area of future research. 
 The current challenge 
Until recently, consumers connected to the distribution network were not able to react strongly to 
price signals; therefore, there was not much gain to be made by cost-reflective tariffs. The fact that 
volumetric charges are only slightly cost-reflective was less of an issue. The distribution network tariff 
had a rather allocative objective, recuperating all the network costs in an acceptable way, instead of 
‘guiding’ consumers to efficient grid behaviour. Also, volumetric distribution network charges were 
deemed fair as high-usage and thus higher network contributions correlated rather well with more 
affluent consumers. Further, such tariffs are predictable, simple and most meters were only capable 
of measuring the cumulated consumed volume thus making more advanced tariffs hard to implement.  
 
However, times are changing, and technological evolutions at the consumer-side are challenging the 
use of volumetric network charges. Specifically, volumetric charges with net-metering, implying that a 
consumer will be charged for the net consumption from the grid over a certain period (e.g. month), 
are deemed inadequate with the massive deployment of solar PV. 
 
An illustration of the issue: if a consumer consumes 300 kWh a month in her house and has a solar 
panel installed which generates 200 kWh in that month. The electricity consumption in the house and 
the generation by the PV panel will not always coincide, but the consumer will have a net consumption 
from the grid that month of 100 kWh for which she will pay network charges. Thus by installing a PV 
panel, the consumer lowered her grid charges to 1/3 of what she originally would have paid (100 
kWh/300 kWh). However, the consumer still relies on the distribution grid and her peak usage in the 
evening, the main cost driver of the network if coincident with the system peak usage, will not change 
much. Thus, the total grid costs do not lower in proportion to the reduced network charges paid by 
the PV adopter. Actually, this reduction in network charges could make the business case for solar PV 
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more attractive, thus, by the way the network charges are designed the adoption of this technology 
could be over-incentivised from a purely economic point of view.  Also, it would mean that if cost 
recovery is respected, other consumers, not having installed solar PV would have to contribute more. 
Note that support for solar PV or energy efficiency can be justified, but it is considered the better 
practice to provide direct support instead of via network tariffs. (CEER, 2017a) for instance, refers to 
the Dutch case for the disentanglement of network tariff design and energy efficiency goals. In 2009, 
fixed network charges were introduced for small electricity and gas users replacing volumetric tariffs. 
These charges were based on the connection capacity of a household. The consumer now paid less per 
kWh consumed, but the energy tax (also in €/kWh) was adjusted to compensate for reduced energy 
efficiency incentives. If more direct support for energy efficiency or renewables is politically sensitive, 
which is, for instance, more the case in the US, network tariffs could be used for these purposes 
Kolokathis et al. (2018). However, this is highly controversial among academics (see e.g. the blog post 
by Davis (2018)). 
 
Next to solar PV, there are also breakthroughs in (stationary) batteries, heat pumps, electric vehicles, 
smart appliances etc. Consumers can monitor their interaction with the grid through smart meters, 
and these new controllable technologies can have not only significant effects on the volumes 
withdrawn from the network (in kWh) but also on the timing of withdrawn or injection, i.e.  the 
network capacity utilised at each moment by a consumer (in kW).  
 
There are empirical studies and pilots which confirm that consumers do react to (distribution) tariffs 
by changing their consumption or investing in PV panels. For example, Faruqui et al. (2017) carry out 
a meta-analysis of the results from 63 pilots containing a total of 337 electricity pricing treatments in 
nine countries located on four continents. They focus on the complete electricity bill, not solely the 
distribution network tariff and show that customers do respond to price signals and that these 
responses are predictable. More specifically, they show that consumers do reduce their peak load in 
response to higher peak to off-peak price ratios. Another interesting work in this regard is the paper 
by Gautier and Jacqmin (2018). In their study, they focus on the differences between the distribution 
network tariffs in place for different municipalities within Wallonia, the Southern region of Belgium, 
and its effect on solar PV adoption. Applying an econometric model, they find that one euro cent per 
kWh of tariffs increase leads to, all else equal, an increase of around 5 % in the number of new PV 
installations. In short, we are just at the beginning of this consumer-centric revolution, and we can 
expect that consumers will be able to react more and more to the way the network is priced. Enabled 
consumer response can create opportunities but also risks regarding cost-efficiency and fairness. 
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 Cost-efficiency: We said that until recently there was not much gain to be made from cost-
reflective tariffs as consumers were not able to react strongly to price signals. 
 Opportunity: If an adequate cost-reflective tariff is set, consumers can adjust 
their consumption behaviour in a way that, for example, costly reinforcement 
can be avoided or postponed. A cost-reflective tariff will result in a benefit for 
active consumers and an overall lower total system cost. 
 Risk: wrong network pricing can have more severe consequences in terms of 
cost-efficiency as consumers can react stronger to the way the grid is priced. 
For example, high volumetric network charges with net-metering could over-
reward people installing solar PV and therefore overly incentivise the adoption 
of a technology leading to more of this technology installed than would be 
optimal from a system point of view. 
 
 Fairness: We said that volumetric network charges were perceived fair as high-usage 
correlated rather well with more affluent consumers. 
 Opportunity: If network charges are cost-reflective and consumers react to 
this tariff design, a reduction of the total cost to satisfy the electricity needs 
of all consumers could be realised. These gains could be shared with passive 
consumers thus actually leading to a situation where everyone is better off. 
 Risk: If the distribution network tariff is not cost-reflective and distortive, 
consumers can react to the way the tariff is designed and exploit privately 
beneficial opportunities without such actions having any system benefit. Such 
a situation would lead to a fairness issue as other grid users will have to 
contribute more in order to recuperate all grid costs as illustrated by the net-
metering example at the start of this section.  
 
Consumers being able to react to the way the network is priced also has implications regarding the 
third principle we addressed: cost-recovery. Until recently, with volumetric network charges in place, 
it was relatively easy to estimate the future consumption and thus to calculate the magnitude of the 
volumetric network charge needed to recover all the costs. With harder to forecast use of electricity 
and possibly more advanced network tariffs, the estimation of the tariff which will lead to the 
recuperation of the efficiently incurred grid costs is a more challenging task. Cost-recovery is also 
intertwined with the two other principles. The more consumers can actually reduce or increase the 
network costs due to their change in consumption, being it cost-efficient or not, the harder it becomes 
to determine what grid costs were efficiently incurred and thus to estimate the allowed revenue for 
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the DSO. Also, political actions aimed at reducing fairness concerns which could result from an 
inadequate network tariff design could put grid cost recovery in danger. 
 
Now, how to adapt the network tariff to these changing conditions? It can be said that there are three 
dimensions of distribution network tariff design: 
 
 the what, the structure or format (in €/kWh, €/kW, and/or €/connection); 
 the when of electricity generation and consumption (temporal granularity); 
 the where of electricity generation and consumption (locational granularity).  
 
These three dimensions can be seen as the tools that can be used to construct a tariff. There are many 
possible variations within the tariff structures, and the boundary between the different structures is 
not strict. Below in Table 1, several examples of more simple or advanced tariffs, categorised by tariff 
structure but with different implementation or temporal granularity are summarised. Please note that 
also combinations (so-called multi-part tariffs) can be opted for. 
Table 1: Examples of implementations and different tariff structures with possible different 
temporal granularity 
Volumetric Capacity Fixed 
With net-metering The connection (kVA) Per connection 
Gross withdrawal or bi-directional 
charges 
The max capacity over a period (ex-ante 
determined or ex-post measured) 
Per income of 
household 
Increasing (progressive) or decreasing 
block pricing 
Multiple measured max capacity in 
different periods ≈ Time-of-use pricing  
Per square meters of 
property 
Time-of-use pricing … … 
…  
 
Another innovation in distribution network tariff design is Smart Connection Arrangements (SCA). 
Anaya and Pollitt (2015) describe that an SCA implies that grid users, mainly new connections for 
distributed generation such as a windmill connected to the distribution network, have interruptible 
connections rather than the conventional non-interruptible or firm connections. The idea is that grid 
users engaging in an SCA would have to pay fewer grid charges as they allow the DSO to curtail their 
connection a pre-determined number of times. By limiting these connections at times of possible 
network congestion, the DSO can avoid or postpone reinforcement. Thus a win-win situation results. 
Anaya and Pollitt (2015) show that the smart connection option is by far the best option when 
compared with Business as Usual (BAU) connections. Hadush and Meeus (2018) discuss another 
alternative to deal with congestion in distribution grids, namely tradable access rights between TSOs 
and DSOs or other borders in the distribution grid. 
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 What is the EU debate about? 
On 30 November 2016, the European Commission presented a new package of measures with the goal 
of providing the legislative framework needed to facilitate the clean energy transition – and thereby 
taking a significant step towards the creation of the Energy Union. This package was called the EU 
Clean Energy Package (CEP), also known as the Winter Package. As expected, distribution network 
tariffs are covered by the CEP. In Article 16(10) of the proposal by the EC for the Regulation on the 
Internal Market for Electricity (IME) it is said that (EC, 2016a):  
 
‘Charges applied by network operators for access to networks, including charges for connection to the 
networks, charges for use of networks, and, where applicable, charges for related network 
reinforcements, shall be transparent, take into account the need for network security and flexibility and 
reflect actual costs incurred insofar as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally 
comparable network operator and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. In particular, they shall 
be applied in a way which does not discriminate between production connected at the distribution level 
and production connected at the transmission level, either positively or negatively. They shall not 
discriminate against energy storage and shall not create disincentives for participation in demand 
response. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, those charges shall not be distance-related. 14’ 
 
Also, the CEP brings new proposals for distribution tariffs harmonization and links them to the 
transmission tariffs harmonization process. While the harmonization of transmission tariffs has been 
debated in the past (see e.g. ECN et al. (2017) and Glachant et al. (2017)), the harmonisation of 
distribution tariffs has not had a similar focus over the last years. The EC argues that harmonising the 
principles for distribution tariffs will help the establishment of a well-functioning internal market and 
limit its cross-border distortions. More precisely, the EC (2016a) states that widely divergent 
distribution tariff regimes may affect the development of the internal market as they affect the 
conditions under which Renewable Energy Sources (RES) or other generation resources can access the 
grid and participate in the national and cross-border energy markets. 
 
In the CEP, the EC proposal for the Regulation on the IME suggested new rules for the harmonisation 
of the distribution tariffs (EC, 2016a). Concretely, in Article 55(1)(k) the harmonization of distribution 
tariffs is added to the areas to be covered by Network Codes:  
 
                                                          
14 Paragraph 3: ‘’Where appropriate, the level of the tariffs applied to producers and/or consumers shall provide locational 
signals at Union level, and take into account the amount of network losses and congestion caused, and investment costs for 
infrastructure.’’ 
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Article 55: ‘1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 63 
concerning the establishment of network codes in the following areas: 
… 
(k) harmonised transmission and distribution tariff structures and connection charges including 
locational signals and inter-transmission system operator compensation rules;’ 
…. 
 
Further, for the progressive convergence of transmission and distribution tariff methodologies, Art. 16 
(9) of the EC proposal for the Regulation on the IME states that ACER shall provide a recommendation 
addressed to NRAs within three months of the Regulation entering into force (EC, 2016a). Several 
questions should be addressed in the recommendation such as the ratio of tariffs applied to producers 
and to consumers, temporal and locational signals and the relationship between transmission and 
distribution tariffs. 
 
In the meantime, the Council of the European Union published a provisional position on this proposal 
which forms the basis for the negotiations with the European Parliament (EU Council, 2017). It is 
important to note that in this proposal the adoption of a network code for distribution network tariffs 
has been removed. Plus, it is stated that within three months of entering into force of the Regulation, 
‘the Agency shall provide a best practice report on transmission and distribution tariff methodologies 
while leaving sufficient room to take national specificities into account.’ A best practise report is 
expected to send a weaker signal for harmonisation than recommendations. 
 
Like the Council, not everyone agrees with drafting a network code for the harmonisation of 
distribution network tariffs. CEER (2017b) clearly opposes, stating: ‘The impact assessment published 
by the Commission (EC, 2016b) does not provide any justification that the benefits of further 
harmonisation of tariffs would outweigh the costs for implementation. We consider that harmonisation 
of both transmission and distribution tariffs at European level could be inefficient and not lead to the 
right outcomes for European consumers. NRAs are best placed to consider the best regulatory choices 
within the European framework. Implementing a “one size fits all” approach risks inefficient incentives 
for network use on a Member State level, particularly with the emergence of more local energy models.’ 
EDSO, one of the main organisations representing the DSOs in Europe, agrees with CEER on this point 
by stating: ‘Network and geographical characteristics are very diverse throughout Europe, leading to 
diverging best practices in terms of network tariffs structures. Network codes do not seem to be the 
right tool to efficiently enhance distribution tariff structures at European level.’ 
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Another stakeholder, REScoop (2017), representing  energy communities in Europe, provides a more 
nuanced view about the harmonisation of distribution grid tariff by saying: ‘the Electricity Directive 
should provide national regulators with a duty to ensure that network tariffs for DER are calculated 
according to an objective and transparent long-term cost benefit analysis (CBA) that takes into account 
the wide range of benefits of DER to the energy system, society and the environment. To ensure a 
holistic approach towards such an analysis, the Electricity Directive must provide a definition of DER.’ 
Finally, BEUC (2017) the consumer voice in Europe, recommends the following: ‘Network tariffs should 
better reflect real use of the grid. They should be redesigned in order to reward flexibility and trigger 
contribution of ancillary services by consumers who engage in self-generation or demand-side 
flexibility. However, the redesign of network tariffs must not unduly increase the financial burden of 
households with a low level of electricity consumption or households living in remote areas.’ 
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CHAPTER 2: FUTURE-PROOF TARIFF DESIGN: RECOVERING SUNK GRID 
COSTS IN A WORLD WHERE CONSUMERS ARE PUSHING BACK 
Abstract 
Traditional analysis of distribution network tariff design assumes a lack of alternatives to grid 
connection for the fulfilment of consumers’ electricity needs. This is radically changing with 
breakthroughs in two technologies: (1) Photovoltaics (PV) enable domestic and commercial 
consumers to self-produce energy; (2) Batteries allow consumers and self-producers to gain control 
over their grid energy and capacity parameters. Contributing to the state of the art, the grid cost 
recovery problem for the Distribution System Operator (DSO) is modelled as a non-cooperative game 
between consumers. In this game, the availability and costs of the two named technologies 
strategically interact with tariff structures. Four states of the world for user’s access to technologies 
are distinguished and three tariff structures are evaluated. The assessed distribution network tariff 
structures are: energy volumetric charges with net-metering, energy volumetric charges for both 
injection and withdrawal, and capacity-based charges. Results show that in a state of the world with 
new technology choices for grid users both efficiency and equity issues can arise when distribution 
network charges are ill-designed. 
 
JEL classification : C7, D61, L94, L97, Q41, Q42 
Keywords: Batteries, optimisation, distribution network tariff design, non-cooperative behaviour, 
photovoltaics 
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 Introduction  
In Europe and the USA there is an observable trend towards volumetric network tariffs (in €/ kWh) 
being gradually replaced by capacity-based network tariffs (CEER, 2017a; European Commission, 
2015a; Hledik, 2015). Especially a volumetric tariff accompanied with net-metering15, the network 
tariff design historically in place, is challenged both in the media16 and in academic circles (e.g. Comello 
and Reichelstein (2017); Darghouth et al. (2011); Eid et al. (2014) and Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017a)). 
Volumetric network charges with net-metering are inefficient as they over-incentivise PV adoption. 
Namely, under net-metering active consumers installing PV panels see their electricity bill decrease 
not only because of lesser electricity consumption, but also because of significantly lowered network 
charges. This is an issue as their costs inflicted on the network do not necessarily change. Net-metering 
is also perceived unfair; the total network costs need to be recuperated, and therefore passive 
consumers without PV panels see their electricity bill increase by the network charges that active 
consumers manage to offset. In this paper, a game-theoretical model is applied to address the 
following two research questions: 
 
(1) Do capacity-based network charges solve the efficiency problems experienced with volumetric 
charges with net-metering? 
 
(2) Do capacity-based network charges allow active consumers, investing in PV and batteries when 
incentivised, to be better off at the expense of passive, sometimes vulnerable, consumers? 
 
It is shown that the answers to both research questions depend on the technology cost scenario. The 
answers are further nuanced as a result of the chosen modelling approach. Conventionally, papers 
analysing network tariff design (e.g. Borenstein (2016); Brown et al. (2015); Hledik and Greenstein 
(2016a) and Simshauser (2016)) discuss qualitatively or exogenously consider the interaction between 
the adoption of in Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and network tariff design. In this paper, the grid 
cost recovery problem for the DSO is represented as a non-cooperative game between consumers. In 
this game, active consumers can strategically opt out of part of the grid use by investing in DER. Their 
investment in DER is endogenous and differs depending on the grid tariff design in place. By opting out 
of part of the grid use, active consumers shift grid costs to passive consumers and at the same time 
compete to reallocate the grid costs to one another. The added insight obtained from this modelling 
                                                          
15 Net-metering is the practice by which consumers are accounted solely for their net electricity consumption from the grid 
when distribution charges are determined. 
16 E.g.: Pyper, Julia. 2015. “Ditching Net Metering Is in the ‘Best Interest’ of Solar, Say MIT Economists.” Greentech Media. 
Accessed on 15/04/2017. www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/MIT-Economists-Say-We-Should-Ditch-Net-Metering  
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approach is that it considers uncoordinated investment decisions by active consumers. Uncoordinated 
consumer decisions can result in an overall efficiency loss when price signals, in this case network 
charges, are not designed properly.  
 
The reallocation effect is not captured by Borenstein (2016); Brown et al. (2015); Hledik and Greenstein 
(2016a) and Simshauser (2016). Hledik and Greenstein (2016a) and Simshauser (2016) argue that 
capacity-based charges (in € per kilowatt (kW) peak) are an attractive option to replace volumetric 
network tariffs. These authors contend that capacity-based grid charges would avoid inequitable bill 
increase and allow for better cost reflection. However, not everyone agrees. Borenstein (2016) reasons 
that challenges arise as a significant part of the network costs are residual or sunk costs.17 He states 
that there is no clear guidance from economic theory on how to allocate such costs as cost causation 
is unclear. He argues that almost surely a combination of higher fixed charges and an adder to time-
varying volumetric charges would be the least bad policy option. Similarly, Brown et al. (2015) do not 
identify any single best option for the recovery of residual costs. They state that the recovery of 
residual costs through fixed charges would result from prioritising the principle of efficient prices. 
 
Typically, models with a similar mathematical structure as in this paper have been used to analyse 
imperfect competition in (power) markets (see e.g. Gabriel et al. (2012); Gabriel and Leuthold (2010)). 
In such equilibrium problems, the numerous optimisation problems are connected, e.g. via either an 
equilibrium constraint (supply equals demand) or the inverse-demand function in each agent's 
objective function. In the past, there was no need to apply a similar modelling approach when studying 
distribution network charges as consumers had little means to react strategically to the tariffs imposed 
on them. However, this assumption does not hold true anymore. This is mainly due to the sharply 
decreasing costs of two technologies: photovoltaics (PV) and batteries (see e.g. Lazard (2016b, 2016a); 
MIT Energy Initiative (2016a) and RMI (2015)). These two technologies allow grid users to react to the 
way electricity supplied by the grid is priced. PV enables consumers to self-produce energy and lowers 
the net energy need from the grid, while batteries enable self-producers to regulate both their grid 
energy flows and capacity parameters. Suddenly, network tariff design has become a concern. As 
described by Pollitt (2016): “The rise of distributed energy resources (DERs) offers increased 
opportunities to exploit the existing system of network charges in ways that were not originally 
envisaged.“ If network tariff design does not anticipate the new sets of actions available to consumers, 
grid cost recovery for the DSO and a fair allocation of costs are at risk. 
 
                                                          
17 This is especially true in networks experiencing low or no load growth for which costs occurred in the past to dimension 
distribution grids to the expected peak capacity needed in the local system (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 2014). 
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In this new setup, instead of an equilibrium constraint or inverse-demand functions, the optimisation 
problems are linked by introducing a ‘grid cost recovery (equilibrium) constraint’. More precisely, the 
stylised game-theoretical optimisation model presented in this work consists of linked individual 
optimisation problems of consumers which are minimising their cost to satisfy their electricity demand. 
The individual optimisation problems are linked with a ‘grid cost recovery constraint’, stating that the 
total network charges paid by all consumers should equal the total network costs to be recovered by 
the DSO. By doing so, the optimisation problem of one consumer is impacted by decisions of other 
consumers. An equilibrium is found when the grid costs are recovered by the DSO and the consumers 
have no incentive anymore to change their reaction to the network tariff. 
 
Three illustrations have inspired this paper: Zugno et al. (2013), Momber et al. (2016) and Saguan and 
Meeus (2014). Zugno et al. (2013) build up a game between an electricity retailer and consumers who 
are reacting to the electricity price set by the retailer by shifting their load. Similarly, Momber et al. 
(2016) model an aggregator which takes decisions on optimal bidding strategies in the electricity 
market and on the retail price, while being subjected to decisions of cost-minimising electric vehicle 
(EV) owners. Saguan and Meeus (2014) introduce a competitive equilibrium model to calculate the 
cost of renewable energy in four states of the world, i.e. with renewable trade versus without 
renewable trade, and with national transmission planning versus international cooperation on 
transmission planning. 
 
The remaining parts of the paper are structured as follows. In Section 2 the methodology of the paper 
is highlighted. In Section 3, the proposed model is described in detail. In Section 4, the setup of the 
numerical example, data and the technology cost scenario matrix is presented. The results are 
discussed in Section 5. Lastly, a conclusion is formulated and possibilities for future work are 
summarised. 
 Methodology: three tariff structures, two metrics and four states of the world 
Three different tariff structures (TS) are analysed:18 
 TS1: Volumetric network charges with net-metering. 
 TS2: Volumetric network charges without net-metering, bi-directional metering is applied. 
Network charges are paid for both each kWh withdrawn and injected and at the same rate.  
                                                          
18 No time or locational variation in the rates is assumed, solely the ‘structure or format’ of the tariffs differ. See Pérez-Arriaga 
et al. (2017a) for a discussion more focussed on the time and locational granularity of distribution tariffs. 
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 TS3: Capacity-based charges based on the observed individual peak power withdrawal or 
injection from the grid over a certain duration (e.g. hourly or quarter-hourly).19 
 
The outcomes of the tariff structures are benchmarked with the application of fixed network charges. 
Fixed network charges serve as a reference as they do not distort the volumetric (€/kWh) and capacity 
(€/kW) price signal and grid costs are assumed sunk. 20 Going entirely off-grid is not considered an 
option for consumers in this paper. This is not a strong simplification as Hittinger and Siddiqui (2017) 
find that the financial case for grid defection is limited or non-existent given current costs and 
prevalent policies. Two metrics are introduced to quantify the results. Firstly, a proxy for (in)efficiency 
is used to quantify the increase of the total system cost as compared to the reference case with fixed 
network charges. Secondly, a proxy for equity is introduced by looking at the allocation of the sunk 
costs for different consumer’s types under the different tariff structures.  
 
A ‘Technology costs matrix’, with four extreme states of the world, is set up to analyse the impact of 
dropping investment costs in PV and batteries (Lazard (2016b, 2016a); MIT Energy Initiative (2016a) 
and RMI (2015)). This matrix is displayed in Table 2. Each state of the world represents a unique 
combination of costs related to the technologies. 
Table 2: Matrix representation of the four states of the world related to technology costs 
Technology cost 
matrix 
 Capital cost PV (€/kWp)  
 High Low  
Capital cost  
batteries (€/kWh) 
High The past? Today?  
Low Unlikely? 
The 
future? 
 
 
In the past, a consumer did not have much means to react to electricity prices as DERs were too 
expensive to invest in. Today, residential PV becomes more and more competitive with electricity 
supplied from the central grid, while batteries are still relatively expensive. Nevertheless, a scenario 
with low PV and battery investment costs can be expected to materialise soon as pointed out by many 
studies (Lazard (2016b, 2016a); MIT Energy Initiative (2016a) and RMI (2015)). As an illustration,  in 
the Utility of the Future Study by the MIT Energy Initiative (2016a) it is quoted that PV developers and 
industry analysts expect the installed cost of utility-scale PV to fall below $1000 per kW before the end 
                                                          
19 Currently, in most cases, low voltage users are being billed by the contracted capacity, and not through an observed 
maximum capacity. However, with the envisioned mass roll-out of smart meters accurate maximum capacity charging of 
network users will be enabled (Eid et al., 2014).  
20 Other quantitative work on network tariff design (Brown et al., 2015; Hledik and Greenstein, 2016; Simshauser, 2016) 
assume ‘revenue neutrality’ for the network operator when assessing different tariff structures with a consumer database. 
Assuming revenue neutrality is from a modelling perspective not different than assuming grid costs are sunk. 
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of this decade, and that one major US automaker projects that lithium-ion battery cell costs will drop 
below $100 per kWh by 2022— an order of magnitude less costly than 2010 costs.  
 Model: approach and mathematical formulation 
In this Section, the modelling approach is presented. This Section is split up into three Subsections. The 
first subsection explains the high-level functioning of the model shortly. Also, the limitations of the 
modelling approach are discussed. A second Subsection describes the mathematical formulation of the 
model. A third subsection explains the solution method applied. 
3.1 Modelling approach 
The stylised game-theoretical optimisation model consists of several individual optimisation problems 
which are linked by an equality constraint that needs to be satisfied, the so-called ‘grid cost recovery 
constraint’ in this context. The optimisation problem of one consumer is impacted by decisions of other 
consumers, as all optimisation problems are linked. For example, under volumetric charges with net-
metering, if a consumer installs PV, it would mean that the total net volume of electricity requested 
from the grid is reduced. Consequently, the total amount of network charges paid would reduce. In 
reaction, the volumetric rate of the network charge must now be increased to allow total cost recovery 
for the DSO. This rate increase makes it possibly interesting to install additional capacity of PV and so 
forth. An equilibrium is found when the sunk costs are recovered and the consumers have no incentive 
anymore to change their reaction to the network tariff.  
 
 The formulation is split up into two parts: 
 The grid cost recovery constraint: This equality represents the cost-allocation problem of a 
DSO. The sunk grid costs to be recovered by the DSO need to equal the network charges 
collected from the consumers. The network charges are set perfectly anticipating the reaction 
of the consumers to these charges. 
 The optimisation problems of individual consumers: The consumers are split up as active and 
passive consumers and have the objective to minimise their electricity costs. Active 
consumers have the possibility to invest in solar PV and batteries, while passive consumers do 
not. The network charges are the variables linking all individual optimisation problems 
through the grid cost recovery constraint. 
 
It should be added that this modelling approach has certain limitations. Firstly, the investment 
decisions by the consumers and the setting of the network tariffs are treated as a ‘single-shot problem’, 
instead of multi-stage. Further, no stochasticity in the parameters is accounted for. Returns for 
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consumers from investment in DER might be uncertain. Also, eventual future decline in DER 
investment costs could be anticipated by consumers; there is an option value for waiting. An example 
of a paper tackling these issues is the risk-constrained multi-stage stochastic programming model 
proposed by Baringo and Conejo (2013). Addressing these limitations in this context could be a line for 
further research. Alternatively, an agent-based modelling approach could be used, see e.g. Saguan et 
al. (2006) for a discussion between equilibrium and agent-based modelling to study imperfect 
competition in electricity markets and Weidlich and Veit (2008) for a critical survey of agent-based 
wholesale electricity market models. 
3.2 Mathematical formulation21 
In this Subsection, the two parts of the mathematical formulation and how they are connected are 
described in more detail. Firstly, the grid cost recovery constraint of the DSO is described. Secondly, 
the optimisation problem of the individual consumers connected to the distribution network is 
described. 
(a) The grid cost recovery constraint 
The cost recovery constraint of the simplified DSO is displayed by Equation 1. The equation states that 
the total network costs to be recovered have to equal to the total network charges collected by the 
DSO to recover their costs.22 This equation should hold while minimising the coefficient of the 
volumetric (𝑣𝑛𝑡) or capacity-based (𝑐𝑛𝑡) network tariff. By minimising the coefficients of the network 
charges, the increase in network cost reallocated to passive consumers, not installing DER, are most 
limited. By assuming grid costs to be sunk, the change in aggregated consumption/injection behaviour 
of the active consumers connected to the distribution grid does not have an influence on the total 
network costs to be recovered. In other words, costs occurred in the past, anticipating future usage. 
The sunk cost assumption will be relaxed in future work. To ensure full cost recovery for the DSO, the 
coefficient of the network tariff will increase in almost all cases when having consumers installing DER 
when compared to a default situation where all consumers fulfil their electricity needs solely with 
power from the grid. This increase is minimised by this formulation, while cost recovery is ensured.  
 
The total network charges collected from the consumers are calculated by the right-hand side of the 
equation. The network charges can be volumetric, capacity-based or fixed charges. α, β and NM 
                                                          
21 Variables are represented by italic lower case Latin letters, for parameters upper case Latin or lower case Greek letters are 
used.  
22 For computational reasons, an error margin δ (e.g. 1% of the network costs) is applied, allowing for a limited deficit or 
excess.  
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parameterise the different tested tariff structures. Please find an overview of all notations in Appendix 
A. 
Network costs = ∑ [Ni ∗ (α ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ NM)𝑡 ∗ WDT + β ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 + (1 − α − β) ∗ FNT )]𝑖  (1) 
With minimal vnt or cnt 
 
 
The parameter Ni stands for the number of consumers represented by representative consumer i.
23 
Representative consumers standing for homogenous groups are used to limit the computational time. 
The variables set by the grid cost recovery level are 𝑣𝑛𝑡 the coefficient of the volumetric charge in 
€/kWh, and 𝑐𝑛𝑡 the coefficient of the capacity-based charge in €/kW. Depending on the tariff 
structure, a coefficient can be forced equal to 0. Further,  𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 represents the energy withdrawn from 
the grid at time step t by consumer i,  𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖  the energy injected into the grid at time step t by consumer 
i. WDT is a scaling factor for the annualization of all costs. 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 is the peak use of the network by 
consumer 𝑖. It is a proxy for the maximum capacity required to service consumer i’s network 
requirements. Finally, FNT is a parameter and represents the fixed network charge per connection, 
uniform over all consumers. 
 
In Table 3 the different network tariff structures and their parameter settings are displayed. In cases 
where TS1 or TS2 are applied, the second term of the summation on the right-hand side of Equation 1 
will equal zero as 𝑐𝑛𝑡 is forced to zero. The third term of the equation, representing fixed network 
charges, will also be zero as α equals 1. By setting parameter NM to 1 the power withdrawn from the 
grid (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖) is netted out with the power injected into the grid (𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖), representing net-metering. If NM 
is set to -1, no netting out takes place, and both power withdrawal and injection are subjected to 
network charge 𝑣𝑛𝑡.  When applying TS3 𝑣𝑛𝑡 will be forced to zero and again the third term of the 
summation will equal zero as β is set to 1. Lastly, when fixed network charges are applied the first two 
terms of the summation will equal zero as α and β are set equal to zero. Please note that other 
implementations can be tested with this model, for example a 3-part network tariffs with a volumetric, 
a capacity and a fixed component. This can be done by setting α and β to a value between 0 and 1, 
with the sum of α and β being less (3-part tariff) or equal to 1 (2-part tariff, no fixed component). In 
this work, we chose to report the more extreme implementations. 
 
                                                          
23 Alternatively, proportions of consumer groups relative to all consumers connected could be used. In that case, the total 
network costs are scaled accordingly. 
Fixed Capacity Volumetric 
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Table 3: The different network tariff options - description and parameter settings for Equation 1 
 Network tariff 
structure 
Description α 
Volumetric 
β 
Capacity 
NM 
Net-
metering 
TS1 Volumetric charges 
with net metering 
Only the net consumption is used to calculate the network 
charges to be paid by the consumer. 
1 0 1 
TS2 Volumetric charges 
without net metering 
The sum of the withdrawal and injection into the grid is 
used to calculate the network charges paid by the 
consumer. Charge for withdrawal and injection is equal. 
1 0 -1 
TS3 Capacity-based 
charge 
The withdrawal or injection peak (in kW) measured over 
the length of the full-time horizon is used to calculate the 
network charges paid by the consumer. 
0 1 0 
Ref. Fixed network 
charges 
The fixed charge is uniform and equal to the sunk cost to 
be recovered divided by the number of consumers. 
0 0 0 
      
(b) Optimisation problem of consumers 
The consumer’s optimisation problem is a linear programme (LP). The objective function is presented 
by Equation 2. Each consumer minimises its (annualised) total cost of servicing its electricity 
requirements. The total costs consist of four parts; the energy costs, the network charges and other 
charges that constitute the electricity bill, and the investments costs in DER technology.24 In the case 
where a consumer is passive, the investment costs will always be zero. For an active consumer, 
investment costs might be positive. This will be the case if additional investment costs are lower than 
the decrease in the electricity bill due to the DER investment. With ‘other charges’, e.g. RES levies are 
meant. It is assumed that these charges are paid as a fixed fee, and do not influence the optimisation 
problem of an individual consumer. 
Minimise  𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 (2) 
With: 
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 = ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT𝑡  (3) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 = ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ NM) ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ WDT 𝑡 + 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 + (1 − α − β) ∗ FNT   (4) 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ ICS ∗ AFS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ ICB ∗ AFB  (5) 
Equation 3 describes the calculation of the energy cost. EBPt represents the price paid by a consumer 
for withdrawing one kWh of electricity at time step t from the grid, excluding the network or other 
charges. EBPt can be thought of as the wholesale electricity price plus a retail margin. ESPt stands for 
the price received for injecting one kWh of electricity into the grid. Depending on the country context 
ESPt may be labelled the feed-in tariff, again excluding possible network other charges. The energy 
costs are annualised using a scaling factor WDT.  
 
                                                          
24 No costs for operation or maintenance of DER technology is assumed. 
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In Equation 4 the network charges paid by consumer i are calculated. Depending on the applied tariff 
structure, two of the three terms of the summation will be forced to zero. When TS1 or TS2 is applied, 
only the first term will be greater or equal than zero, in the case of TS3, the second term can be positive 
and finally when TS4 is applied the third term will be greater than or equal to zero. 
 
The investment costs of DER installed by a consumer are described by Equation 5. 
Variable 𝑖𝑠𝑖 represents the capacity of installed solar PV (kWp), and variable 𝑖𝑏𝑖 represents the 
installed battery energy capacity of the battery (kWh). In the case of a passive consumer both  𝑖𝑠𝑖 and 
 𝑖𝑏𝑖 are forced to zero. Capacities of PV and batteries are represented as continuous variables in this 
formulation, while in reality there may be only discrete choices. ICS and ICB are the investment costs 
per kWp solar capacity and kWh battery capacity respectively and AFS and ABS are the annuity factors 
for both technologies. 
 
Consumers are subjected to a set of constraints, shown by Equations 6-16. Equation 6 represents the 
demand balance, meaning that demand should equal supply at all moments. Dt,i is the demand of 
consumer i at time step t.25 The supply of electricity consists of the summation of electricity withdrawn 
from the grid, the electricity generated from PV and the energy discharged from the battery, minus 
the summation of the electricity injected into the grid and the electricity used to charge the battery. It 
is not possible to buy and sell electricity or discharge and charge the battery simultaneously. As such, 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 will be equal to zero if 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖  is positive and vice-versa and the same holds for 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 and 
𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖.
26 SYt,i stands for the time-varying PV yield in kWh per KWp PV installed, which depends on the 
observed irradiation and the efficiency of the PV panel. 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 and 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 are variables standing for 
the energy output and input respectively of the battery of consumer i at time step t.  
Dt,i = 𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ SYt,i + 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖     ∀ 𝑡 (6) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐1,𝑖 = 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛1,𝑖 ∗ EFC ∗ DT −  (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡1,𝑖 EFD)⁄ ∗ DT + SOC0  (7) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EFC ∗ DT − (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,𝑖 EFD⁄ ) ∗ DT + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡−1,𝑖 ∗ (1 − LR ∗ DT)   ∀ 𝑡 ≠ 1 (8) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖 = SOC0  (9) 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖+𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖  ≤ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖                           ∀ 𝑡  (10) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 𝑖𝑏𝑖                                              ∀ 𝑡 (11) 
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ BRD                           ∀ 𝑡 (12) 
                                                          
25 In this paper, the household power demand (Dt,i ) is an exogenous parameter and instead the way the demand is met (grid, 
solar panel or battery) is an optimised decision for a active consumer. In future work, also the household power demand 
could be modelled as a variable e.g. by introducing a price sensitivity of demand for electricity as in Van Den Bergh and 
Bruninx (2015). 
26 Binaries could be introduced to force this. In this paper, the validity of the LP solution is checked ex-post. 
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𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ BRC                              ∀ 𝑡 (13) 
𝑖𝑠𝑖 ≤ MSi  (14) 
𝑖𝑏𝑖 ≤ MBi (15) 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 , 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖 , 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 , 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 , 𝑖𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖𝑏𝑖 , 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0                                                                                          (16) 
Equations 7-9 describe the battery balance. 𝑠𝑜𝑐t,𝑖 stands for the state of charge of the battery of 
consumer i at time step t, SOC0 is the initial energy content of the battery, EFC and EFD are the 
efficiencies of charging and discharging respectively, LR is the leakage rate of the battery and DT is 
the length of time step as a fraction of an hour. By Equation 10 the peak withdrawal or injection 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 over all time steps is determined. Equations 11-13 limit the energy stored, power discharged 
at a time step and power charged at a time step respectively. The parameters BRD and BRC define the 
maximum rate of power discharged/charged over the energy capacity of the battery. The capacities of 
solar and batteries to be installed by a consumer i are capped by Equation 14-15. Equation 16 forces 
all consumer variables to be non-negative. This formulation of the optimisation problem of a consumer 
can be considered as a linearised version of a DER sizing problem with possibilities to invest in solar 
and batteries (See for example: Schittekatte et al. (2016)).  
3.3 Solution method: connecting the equilibrium constraint and the individual optimisation 
problems 
All individual consumers are connected to one another through Equation 1. An equilibrium is 
obtained if this equality holds and none of the consumers, for which the optimisation problems are 
described by Equations 2-16, has an incentive to adapt their electricity withdrawal and injection 
pattern from the grid by e.g. by installing more solar panels or using installed batteries in an alternate 
fashion.  
 
Different methods to solve the linked optimisations problems that are described by Equations 1-16 
exist. For example, the problem could be reformulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC) by transforming the equality described by Equation 1 into an upper level (UL) 
optimisation problem of a bi-level structure. The lower level (LL) problem, in this case the cost 
minimisation problems of consumers, can be completely recast as also described in Momber et al. 
(2016). This involves replacing the LL objective function with a set of optimality conditions, combining 
first-order stationarity with strong duality. Since the LL is linear and thus convex, its recast can be 
directly included as constraints of the UL. A single level non-linear MPEC would result. The problem 
can be linearized and reformulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) as for example described 
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in Zugno et al. (2013). The resulting MILP can be solved using commercial off-the-shelf optimisation 
software. For a complete treatment of different solution methods see Gabriel et al. (2012). 
 
In this paper, a solution is found through the application of an equivalent iterative approach. 
Depending on the tariff structure applied, the coefficient of the network tariff (𝑣𝑛𝑡 or 𝑐𝑛𝑡) is tuned 
until an equilibrium is attained. First, the consumer optimisation problems are solved for an initial 
value of the network tariff coeffient. Then, the optimised consumer variables, i.e. electricity consumed 
(𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖), electricity injected (𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) or the peak withdrawal or injection (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖), are plugged into 
Equation 1. If the equality described in Equation 1 holds, an equilibrium is found, if not, the network 
tariff coefficient is increased. By starting from an initial low value (typically 0) of the network tariff 
coefficient and incrementally adjusting this value, we find the equilibrium with the minimal network 
tariff coefficient under which cost recovery for the DSO holds. The flow chart of the algorithm 
underlying the proposed iterative approach is presented in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Flow of the calculations to obtain the equilibrium 
The computational time needed to obtain a solution is sensitive to the number of unique consumers 
modelled and the length of the time series used to represent demand and solar yield. The algorithm 
was formulated and solved in GAMS© BUILD 24.3.3 employing the CPLEX™ 12.6.0 solver on a standard 
laptop 64-bit with 8 GB of RAM and an Intel© Core™ i7-7600 CPU clocked at 2.8 GHz with 4 threads. 
The computational time to do one run with the setup and parameters assumed in the numerical 
examples is on average around one minute. 
 Numerical example, result metrics and data 
In this Section, firstly, the setup of the numerical example of the model is described. Secondly, the 
metrics to analyse the results are explained. Thirdly, the parameters which remain constant over all 
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four states of the world are presented. Lastly, the parameters which change over the four states of the 
world are presented in the form of a technology cost matrix.  
4.1 Setup 
For simplicity, only two consumer types are modelled: passive and active consumers. Both consumer 
types have the same original electricity demand from the grid. The sole difference between the two 
consumer types is that a passive consumer does not have the option to invest in solar PV and batteries, 
unlike an active consumer, who can opt to invest in DER. Passive consumers are uninformed about the 
possibility to invest in DER. They either do not have the financial means, are strongly risk averse or 
simply do not have space. Active consumers are economically rational, i.e. they minimise their costs to 
meet their electricity demand, and may invest in DER if optimal. Note that the relative proportion of 
each consumer type is an important parameter for the sensitivity analysis of the results.  
4.2 Proxies for efficiency and equity  
Depending on the network tariff design in place, active consumers can offset their contribution to the 
sunk grid costs by investing in DER. In this case, the avoided contribution is reallocated to the passive 
consumers. However, the total costs to be recovered by the DSO remains the same, only the allocation 
of the contributions changes.  
 
More precisely, if an active consumer invests in DER technology, its electricity bill reduces due to the 
avoided energy costs and/or network charges. The active consumer will invest in DER if the difference 
between the reduction of the electricity bill and the DER investment cost is positive. The net reduction 
in the total electricity cost will be exactly this difference. The passive consumer does not invest in DER 
technology and will possibly see its electricity costs increase with the sunk costs reallocated by the 
active consumer. As an illustration, assume one active and one passive consumer. When no one invests 
in DER, the total electricity cost of all consumers is assumed the same as the consumers are identical. 
However, when investment in DER is allowed for an active consumer, the respective change in 
electricity cost can be: 
 Change for active consumer = – avoided energy cost by the active consumer – avoided network 
charges by the active consumer + investment cost in DER 
 Change for passive consumer = + avoided network charges by the active consumer 
The net aggregated decrease or increase in total electricity cost for the two consumers, referred to as 
the change in system costs, will be: 
 Change system costs = – avoided energy cost by the active consumer + investment cost in DER 
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Price signals are distorted if the avoided energy cost by the active consumer is lower than the 
investment cost in DER. This would mean that the system cost increases. In simple terms, ‘the losers’ 
(passive consumers) lose more than ‘the winners’ (active consumers) win. The system cost is calculated 
in this model as the summation of the objective function of both consumer types weighted with their 
respective proportion Pi
27: 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ Pi ∗ (𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖)𝑖   (17) 
Fixed charges do not have a distortive effect in this model. Therefore, as a proxy for efficiency or ‘non-
distortionary’, the system cost for a tariff structure is benchmarked with the system cost when fixed 
network charges are applied. 
 
A proxy for the equity is introduced by looking at the allocation of the sunk costs to the two consumer’s 
types. It is assumed that in the most equitable situation the sunk costs allocated to both consumer 
types are the same, as their original electricity demand before installation of DER from the grid is 
identical. When an active consumer invests in DER part of the sunk costs can be reallocated to the 
passive consumer. The increase in network charges paid by the passive consumer compared to a 
situation where both consumer types pay the same fixed network charge serves as a proxy for equity. 
4.3 Data 
In this stylised example, the consumer demand and yield of a PV panel is represented using a time 
series of 24-hours with hourly time steps. (See Table 4 (middle and right)). The household demand for 
electricity shows a small peak in the morning and a stronger peak in the evening. The fulfilment of the 
demand is a hard constraint. The scaled annualised consumption of a consumer is 6.500 kWh with an 
annual peak of 3 kW. The relationship between the annual consumption and peak is based on Blank 
and Gegax (2014).28 As a reference, in Europe average annual electricity consumption per household 
in 2015 ranged from 20.000 kWh (Sweden) to 1.400 kWh (Romania) (ACER and CEER, 2016). In the 
same year, the average electricity consumption per household in the USA was about 10.800 kWh (EIA, 
2016). This is a stylised example, and the intention of this paper is not to analyse the impact of tariff 
design on consumers from a specific region. However, the adopted approach does not exclude such 
an analysis in the future. In Appendix B.1, the data used for the sensitivity analysis with longer time 
series and additional demand and solar yield profiles can be found. 
                                                          
27 The proportion of a consumer group is defined by the number of consumers represented by a consumer group i (Ni) divided 
by the total number of consumers connected to the distribution grid (N): Pi =
Ni
N
 
28 In that paper, a regression analysis using a small data sample of households in Alaska is done. The authors find that an 
increase in monthly energy use by 1,000 kWh would increase maximum monthly demand by 5.5 kW. For the sake of simplicity 
these findings are extrapolated to a yearly basis. 
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Table 4: Technical DER Parameters (left), original demand profile (middle) and PV yield profile (right) 
Parameters active consumer Value 
Lifetime PV 20 years 
Lifetime battery 10 years 
Discount factor PV and batteries 5 % 
Maximum solar capacity installed 5 kWp 
Maximum battery capacity installed No limit 
Efficiency charging & discharging 90 % 
Leakage rate 2 % 
Price received for electricity injected 
into the grid (% of wholesale price) 
90 % 
 
The yield per kWp PV installed scales up to 1160 kWh per year with the profile shown in Table 3 (right). 
This level is similar to the average yield in the territory of France (Šúri et al., 2007). As a reference, 
Formica and Pecht (2017) found a yield of 1300 kWh/kWp for a PV installation in Maryland, USA and 
Mason (2016) finds that in the UK the average yield equals 960 kWh/kWp. Remaining other relevant 
parameters are shown in Table 3 (left). Technical DER data is in line with Schittekatte et al. (2016). 
Finally, the price received for electricity injected into the central grid (also called the ‘feed-in tariff’) is 
set to 90 % of the assumed price paid for energy from the grid, excluding network cost or any other 
charges. The energy price paid for energy relates to the electricity wholesale price and includes a 
retailer margin. 
 
In Table 5 the composition of the consumer bill is presented. This is the consumer bill in the default 
setting, i.e. a situation without investment in DER technology by any consumer. If active consumers 
decide to invest in DER, the relative proportion and absolute values of the bill components will change 
for both the active and the passive consumer. The consumer bill is based on information from the 
market monitoring report for electricity and gas retail markets by ACER and CEER (2016). There, the 
breakdown of the different components of the electricity bill for an average consumer in the EU for 
the year 2015 is presented. The energy component of electricity prices in the EU in 2015 is estimated 
to be 37%. In nominal terms, this means a cost of 0.074 €/kWh. Further, 26 % of the bill consisted of 
network charges, and 13 % are RES and other charges. Finally, an important chunk (25%) of the bill 
consists of taxes. A value-added tax (VAT), averaging 15%, must be paid and additional (ecological) 
taxes, averaging 10 %, are raised on the use of power in some countries. 
 
Taxes are integrated into the remaining three components: energy costs, network charges and other 
charges. The default electricity bill of the consumer consists of 45% energy costs, 35% network charges 
and 20% other charges. The energy price is set at 0.08 €/kWh consumed.29 Other charges are recovered 
                                                          
29 In this work, the energy cost component is modelled exogenously. In cases with high PV adoption this might be a strong 
simplification as a higher penetration of PV can have a depressing effect on wholesale prices (see e.g. Darghouth et al. (2016)). 
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through a fixed fee and as such do not interfere with the analysis. However, this is not always the case, 
as described in Frondel et al. (2015). The question of how to collect such charges, or even whether 
they belong in the electricity bill at all, is out of the scope of this work. The network charges, the focus 
of this work, are recovered through the different network tariff designs. 
Table 5: Consumer bill for in the default case, when no investment in DER by any consumer is made 
Default consumer bill Proportion of the bill Cost per year Recovery 
Energy costs  45 %  520 €/year 0.08 €/kWh 
Network charges  35 %  404 €/year Through the different network tariffs 
Other charges  20 %  231 €/year Fixed fee (does not interfere) 
Total electricity cost  Average of 0.18 € per kWh delivered 1155 €/year  
The total annual electricity cost, including also the network and other charges, equals 1155 €/year or 
0.18 €/kWh delivered. This total cost is near to the average electricity cost for EU households in 2015 
that was estimated around 0.21€/kWh (Eurostat, 2016). In the USA the average electricity cost in 2015 
for residential use was lower, namely around 0.125€/kWh (EIA, 2016). 
 
Also, a typical consumer bill varies widely over time and, additionally, is country context dependent. 
The energy cost component in the EU has fallen since 2012, both in nominal terms, from 0.08 to 0.074 
€/kWh, and as a percentage of the final consumer bill (ACER and CEER, 2016). The proportion of the 
energy component of a typical residential electricity bill ranges from 78 % in Malta to solely 14-13 % 
in Norway and respectively Denmark. Not only the energy component but also the proportion of grid 
costs in the final bill was found to vary significantly. According to a recent European Commission (2015) 
report, the share of distribution cost paid by residential users in the EU ranges from 33% to 69% in the 
final consumer bill. High network charges are not always related to high costs of physical grids, but 
might be ‘artificially’ inflated. In some countries, costs have been added to the DSO’s costs that are not 
directly tied to providing an incremental kWh of electricity, e.g. costs for energy efficiency programs 
and subsidies for installing distributed generation (Borenstein, 2016; European Commission, 2015a; 
Huijben et al., 2016). In future work, the sensitivity of the results to the country context will be 
investigated. 
4.4 The technology cost matrix 
The values of the key parameters for the different states of the technology cost matrix are displayed 
in Table 6. The numbers for the investment cost in residential PV are coherent with the low and high 
estimates of prices found in RMI (2015). As the cost of a kWh generated by 1 kWp of PV installed is a 
function of several parameters, the levelised cost of energy (LCOE) is calculated as an additional 
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reference value.30 The LCOE for the high and low PV cost scenario is equal to 0.18 €/kWh, and 0.09 
€/kWh respectively and these LCOE estimates are in line with the ranges presented in Lazard (2016a). 
The same sources (Lazard, 2016a; RMI, 2015) are used to obtain the high and low investment cost 
scenario for lithium-ion battery packs. It is further assumed that the minimum time needed to fully 
(dis)charge the energy capacity of the battery is one hour. No investment subsidies for PV or batteries 
are introduced. 
Table 6: Main parameter settings of the technology cost matrix 
 High technology costs Low technology costs 
Investment cost PV 2600 €/kWp (LCOE: 0.18 €/kWh) 1300 €/kWp (LCOE: 0.09 €/kWh) 
Investment cost batteries 600 €/kWh (full (dis)charge in 1 hour) 200 €/kWh (full (dis)charge in 1 hour) 
Please note that high investment costs for PV panels could also be interpreted as installing those panels 
in parts of the world with less solar irradiance and vice-versa. It is harder to come up with a similar 
interpretation for the battery investment costs. However, the battery is used to shift power demand 
from the grid in time, a function which could also be provided by demand response.31  
 Results and discussion 
The results obtained for the different tariff structures are displayed in Figure 8. Figure 8 provides 
answers to the two research questions posed at the introduction of this paper, namely: 
 
(1) Do capacity-based network charges solve the efficiency problems experienced with volumetric 
charges with net-metering? 
 
(2) Do capacity-based network charges allow active consumers, investing in PV and batteries when 
incentivised, to be better off at the expense of passive, sometimes vulnerable, consumers? 
 
The answers to these questions depend on the quadrants in which the graph is split up, representing 
the four states of the world. The proportion of active consumers, able to invest in PV and batteries 
when economically rational is assumed to be 50 %. The proportion of active consumers is further 
discussed when the results are described. For each state of the world, the performance of the three 
tariff structures for the efficiency proxy is shown on the horizontal axis, and for the equity proxy on 
the vertical axis. The closer the result of a tariff structure is to the origin along one axis, the better its 
performance for the metric displayed on the other axis.  
                                                          
30 In the model applied, the LCOE of PV is a function of the investment cost of the PV panel, lifetime, discount factor, the PV 
system performance ratio and the solar irradiation profile. 
31 Demand response is not modelled. The cost of demand response would be dependent on the value a consumer attributes 
to the need of power at a particular time. Such an analysis is out of the scope of this work. 
46 
 
The results shown in the quadrant in Figure 8 are the ones computed for the numerical example. 
However, the absolute magnitude for the efficiency and equity metric can be overestimated or 
underestimated dependent on the data and the assumptions made. In Appendix B.2. the results for 
longer and additional time series for demand and solar yield are shown and discussed briefly. Overall, 
the intuition behind the results presented in the body of the paper is confirmed. For example, the 
impact of seasonality in PV yield is highlighted in Appendix B.2. It is illustrated that the dispatch 
decisions of an active consumer can differ depending on the season and that by using short time series 
and an average PV yield profile the synergistic value of batteries and PV can be assumed higher. This 
can lead to slight overestimations in the presented results. On the other hand, it assumed that other 
charges, e.g. including charges relating to support schemes for RES and other policy costs, are 
recuperated through a fixed charge, while often these charges are recuperated from consumers with 
volumetric charges or included in the distribution network tariff (see e.g. Borenstein (2016) or 
European Commission (2015)). By recuperating these charges with a fixed charge, the allocation of 
these charges among consumers does not distort consumer decisions. This assumption can lead to 
slight underestimations in the presented results. 
 
Figure 8: The results for the four scenarios of the technology matrix with 50 % active consumers 
connected to the grid. Results of the efficiency (horizontal) and equity (vertical) proxy are shown. 
The more the result of a tariff structure is situated near the origin along one axis, the better its 
performance for the metric on the other. 
The results for the different tariff structures can be compared to each other in a specific state of the 
world. Also, the relative performance of certain tariff structures in the different state of the worlds can 
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be assessed. This work does not attempt to discuss the trade-off between efficiency and equity. Only 
if a tariff structure dominates another tariff structure for both the efficiency and the equity metric, it 
can be said that one outperforms the other. In the next Subsections, the results are described per state 
of the world. The dynamics behind the results are described in detail for the ‘Maturing DER scenario’. 
This Section ends with a short discussion on the implementation of capacity-based charges.  
5.1 Immature DER scenario, the past? 
Two observations are made in this reference state of the world. Firstly, the results show that applying 
volumetric network charges with net-metering, the network tariff design historically in place, does not 
create efficiency or equity issues for the recovery of the sunk costs. The same result is found for 
volumetric network charges without net-metering. This can be explained by consumers not having 
means to react to prices as PV is simply too expensive to invest in. A second observation is that with 
capacity-based network charges some inefficiencies, but very limited equity issues arise. This can be 
explained by investment in small but expensive batteries by the active consumers to shave their peak 
consumption. As the batteries are small, only a small proportion of the sunk costs are reallocated to 
the passive consumers. 
5.2 Maturing battery and expensive PV scenario, unlikely scenario or not? 
A state of the world with high PV investment costs and low battery costs is rather unlikely. However, 
this state of the world with associated technology cost could be the thought of as the future for places 
where electricity generated by PV is too expensive due to low levels of solar irradiation combined with 
few government subsidies. Alternatively, an unexpected battery R&D breakthrough could bring 
forward this scenario. Two observations from this state of the world are described below. 
 
Firstly, results for volumetric charges with and without net-metering do not change. Net-metering 
does not incentivize investments in batteries for active consumers. 32 Under volumetric network 
charges without net-metering, there is an incentive to install batteries. A consumer must pay network 
charges both for withdrawal and injection of energy into the grid. This means that a consumer is 
incentivised to self-consume his electricity generated on-site by PV. Consequently, when a consumer 
installs PV, it can make sense to install additional batteries to limit the amount of electricity injected 
into the network when PV generation is high and demand low. The energy collected in the batteries 
can then be used to serve the electricity demand when the situation is reversed. As such, the exchange 
of electricity with the grid, and thus the network charges paid, will be limited. However, in this state 
                                                          
32 When energy prices or network charges would be time-varying also batteries adoption could result with volumetric charges 
without net-metering. 
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of the world PV is expensive and therefore no PV is installed by the active consumer. As no PV is 
installed, also no batteries will be installed, and therefore the results do not differ from those of the 
previous state of the world. 
 
Secondly, increased inefficiencies and a more severe equity issue resulted with capacity-based charges 
when compared with the previously described state of the world. The proxy for efficiency, the system 
cost, is a function of two forces: the capacity of batteries installed and their costs.  Active consumers 
install batteries with a higher capacity as these are rather inexpensive. However, since batteries are 
cheap, the increase in system costs is dampened. An equity issue results as the active consumers can 
shave their peak demand more significantly with the higher battery capacity installed per active 
consumer.  
5.3 Maturing PV scenario, today? 
Three observations can be made for this state of the world. Firstly, volumetric network charges with 
net-metering create severe equity issues and inefficiencies. Since active consumers install the 
maximum amount of PV of which the excess generation is fed into the grid, the netted-out electricity 
consumption of the active consumers from the grid is significantly lowered. Consequently, the network 
charge coefficient in €/kWh must increase to ensure cost recovery. This means that the network 
charges paid by the passive consumers increase strongly. Additionally, investment distortions are 
created with this network tariff structure. More precisely, the LCOE of PV for this scenario is slightly 
higher than the energy cost of electricity and the price received for injecting electricity into the grid. In 
the case a network tariff does not interfere with the volumetric (€/kWh) or capacity (€/kW) price signal, 
no investment in PV is expected from the rational cost minimising consumer. With volumetric network 
charges with net-metering in place, investing in PV becomes a lot more attractive as not only energy 
costs can be avoided but also network charges. These results confirm the findings of Eid et al. (2014). 
They concluded that net-metering creates significant equity issues for passive consumers and acts as 
an implicit subsidy for the adoption of PV. 
 
A second observation is that the result for volumetric network charges without net-metering almost 
does not change when compared to the previously discussed scenarios. PV is inexpensive, and if active 
consumers install PV, they will avoid paying network charges for withdrawing electricity from the grid. 
However, the electricity demand is not always at the same level as the PV production and vice-versa. 
Therefore, the business case for an active consumer to install a large capacity of PV is not attractive, 
and only a very limited capacity of PV is installed. Batteries can increase the amount of electricity 
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produced on-site that could be used for self-consumption. However, in this state of the world, these 
are expensive, and no batteries are installed. 
  
The last observation is that the performance of capacity-based charges is impacted by a change in the 
PV investment cost while keeping the battery investment cost constant. This effect can also be 
observed when comparing the two states of the world with low battery costs and different PV 
investment costs. Lowered PV costs incentivise investment in PV under this tariff structure and 
consequently also an investment in batteries becomes more attractive. This is rather surprising as can 
be seen from the demand and solar yield profile on Table 4 (middle and right) that the solar profile 
and peak demand are highly uncorrelated. This dynamic shows that there is added value in considering 
both investment possibilities in PV and batteries simultaneously when studying capacity-based charges 
in a setting with active consumers. Equity issues are limited as the capacity of batteries installed is 
small, and the correlation of the solar yield profile and the peak demand of the consumer is low.  
5.4 Maturing DER scenario, the future? 
Three highlights are described for this state of the world. To begin with, Figure 8 shows that the results 
for volumetric charges with net-metering in this state of the world do not change when compared to 
the previously described state. This is expected as the only parameter changing between those two 
states is the battery investment cost, and with net-metering and no time-varying prices in place, an 
active consumer has no reason to install batteries. 
 
Secondly, the results for volumetric charges without net-metering change slightly. In this state of the 
world, the active consumers invest in PV and batteries. Inexpensive batteries increase the amount of 
electricity produced by PV that can be used for self-consumption. As such, the total amount of network 
charges paid by the active consumer decreases. However, the amount of avoided network charges is 
limited, and the installed capacities of both PV and batteries remain very small. This tariff structure 
could be regarded as an extreme case of the British tariff design as described by Green and Staffell 
(2017). In their paper, the authors investigate the business case of batteries and self-sufficiency for 
domestic electricity consumers. The obtained results are in line with their conclusion for GB. Namely 
that, even with low-cost storage available and a (volumetric) tariff design that seems to encourage the 
technology, energy arbitrage does not make consumer-based storage economic.  
 
Thirdly, the results for capacity worsen significantly, both in terms of efficiency and equity, when 
comparing to the other states of the worlds. This result is elaborated on more deeply to demonstrate 
why this is happening. In Figure 9 the results for efficiency and equity proxy with sensitivity for the 
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proportion of active consumers connected to the grid is shown. For all three tariff structures, the 
magnitude of the inefficiencies and equity issues increases with an increased share of active 
consumers. This is relatively straightforward because there are simply more active consumers with 
distorted investment incentives who are trying to reallocate the grid costs to a smaller share of passive 
consumers. This dynamic could be labelled as an effect of big numbers and is also captured by more 
static quantitative models as Hledik and Greenstein (2016)33 and Simshauser (2016). 
 
Figure 9: Results for the efficiency proxy (left) and the equity proxy (right) with sensitivity analysis 
for the proportion of active consumers. 
However, a second effect makes the increase in inefficiencies and equity issues very non-linear and 
unpredictable. The origin of this effect is non-cooperative behaviour between consumers and the 
result is that the capacity of DER technology installed per individual active consumer can increase with 
an increased share of active consumers connected to the grid. In this scenario and under capacity-based 
charges, the optimal battery capacity installed per active consumer increased from 2.5 kWh with nearly 
no active consumers, to 5.5 kWh with 50 % active consumers connected to the grid.   
 
Figure 10 helps to further explain the adverse effect of non-cooperative behaviour on the efficiency 
and equity proxy. In Figure 10 the annual electricity cost of the two consumer types, relative to the 
baseline case with non-distortive fixed network charges, is shown. Additionally, system cost, calculated 
as the weighted average electricity cost and used as a proxy for efficiency, is shown.34 Please note that 
the scale of the vertical axis for the middle panel of Figure 10 differs from the other two panels. 
                                                          
33 In their paper, the authors develop a preliminary understanding of the relationship between capacity-based charges and 
storage. A battery with a certain size is assumed and the cost of the battery for the consumer is not accounted for. The 
optimal sizing of the battery and the interaction between the sizing and the proportion of active consumers connected to the 
grid is not attempted, however, mentioned to be a valuable area of research.  
34 Indirectly also the results for the equity proxy can be calculated from Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Difference in annual electricity cost per consumer type for the three network tariff 
structures compared to the application of non-distortive fixed network tariffs. Additionally, the 
weighted average electricity cost (or system cost) which serves as the proxy for efficiency is shown. 
When the proportion of active consumers connected to the grid is very limited, an active consumer 
can lower his electricity bill under all tariff structures. Active consumers can profit the most under 
volumetric charges with net-metering by installing the maximum capacity of PV. The decrease in the 
electricity bill of the active consumer, compared to the baseline case, is the result of the low DER 
investment costs. As the proportion of active consumers is limited, the total grid costs reallocated to 
the numerous passive consumers and the rate increase of the network charge needed to ensure cost 
recovery for the DSO is minimal. Therefore, the increase in the electricity cost for the passive consumer 
is limited. It can also be observed that the electricity cost of an individual active consumer increases 
with an increased share of active consumers connected. It is surprising to see that under volumetric 
charges without net-metering and capacity-based charges the electricity cost of the active consumer 
surpasses the electricity cost for that same consumer in a situation where all consumers are passive 
and do not invest in DER at all. On first sight, this outcome might seem counter-intuitive: Why would 
a consumer invest in DER when everybody, including himself, is better off when nobody invests in DER? 
  
This dynamic can be explained by the fact that cost-minimizing active consumers take uncoordinated 
investment decisions by following their own self-interest. The results of the model can be interpreted 
as a Nash equilibrium, defined as a solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players 
in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player 
has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy (Nash, 1951; Osborne and Rubinstein, 
1994). In this context, a Nash equilibrium implies that no consumer has anything to gain by changing 
only his own operational and investment decisions. Concretely, for a certain share of active consumers, 
an individual consumer would not install more DER as in this case the additional investment does not 
justify the decrease in network charges and/or energy costs. On the other hand, for the same share of 
active consumers, an individual consumer would also not install less DER as that would mean his total 
electricity cost goes up as he would have to pay more network charges and/or energy costs. In a setting 
where all active consumers would jointly make an investment decision, a lower amount of DER would 
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be installed than in the case they make an individual decision. This would be an optimal solution as the 
overall efficiency would increase. With the game-theoretical model applied in this work, it is possible 
to capture and quantify the adverse effect of non-cooperative behaviour between active consumers. 
 
Uncoordinated decision making does not only have an adverse effect on the aggregated electricity cost 
of all consumers but also on the electricity cost of the group of active consumers. In other words, active 
consumers are cannibalising their own ‘profit’ by competing against each other. This adverse effect, 
which leads to a race (to the bottom) of DER adoption, can be minimised or enabled by adequate 
network tariff design. For this scenario, the results show that capacity-based charges are more prone 
to enable this loop, which creates severe efficiency and equity issues. It can also be seen that this effect 
kicks in for volumetric charges without net-metering, however, less intense and delayed when 
compared to capacity based charges.35 The same effect does not affect volumetric charges with net-
metering for this scenario simply because the active consumer already had installed the maximum 
amount of PV capacity (5 kWp) when the proportion of active consumers was negligible.36 
5.5 Implementation matters: on limitations of capacity-based charges to recover sunk costs 
With capacity-based charges in place, investment in batteries and PV are strongly (over)incentivised in 
some scenarios. This network tariff structure is found to be prone to adverse effects of non-
cooperative behaviour, leading to an increased capacity of DER installed per individual consumer when 
the share of total active consumers increases. The reacting consumers are competing and try to 
reallocate the sunk cost burden to the passive consumers, but also to one another. Hledik (2014) and 
Hledik and Greenstein (2016)point out that there is no single type of capacity-based network charges, 
but that many variants exist. Depending on the implementation of the capacity-based charge results 
could resemble or depart from the outcomes presented. 
 
In this work, a capacity-based network charge measuring the observed peak demand during one hour 
was used. A 24-hour deterministic profile including the demand peak was used in this work and results 
were annualised. By doing so, it is assumed that the battery can perfectly anticipate when the peak 
demand takes place. Two design parameters of the capacity-based network charge can determine the 
level of (in)accuracy of the assumption of perfect foresight of the peak demand. Firstly, ‘the ratchet or 
billing cycle’ of a capacity-based charge, i.e. the peak demand is determined on a daily, monthly, 
                                                          
35 Additional sensitivity runs were conducted and strong adverse effects of non-cooperative behavior were found for 
volumetric charges without net-metering in a scenario with very high grid costs (€ 1000/consumer) and high energy cost (0.15 
€/kWh). These cases are further developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
36 For more details on the interaction between net-metering and PV adoption see e.g. Cai et al. (2013) and Darghouth et al. 
(2016). In those works, models are used to simulate PV adoption and rate adjustments over 20 and 35 years, respectively. 
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seasonally or annual basis to calculate the network charges. Logically, the longer the period over which 
the peak demand is observed, the more inaccurate perfect foresight of the peak demand would be. 
Secondly, the duration over which the peak demand is measured, i.e. instantaneously, averaged over 
fifteen minutes, averaged over one hour, or averaged over several hours, etc. The shorter the period 
over which the peak measurement is averaged, the more inaccurate a perfect forecast of the peak 
demand is. Shorter averaging period increases uncertainty around the forecast. Thus ‘badly designed’ 
capacity charges for sunk cost recovery, e.g. based on the hourly peak demand over a monthly period, 
could resemble the results of this analysis. While capacity based charges based on the peak demand 
during 15-minutes with a seasonal or annual ratchet would perform better than the results shown in 
this analysis. However, if the investment cost of batteries is low enough or grid costs to be recovered 
through the tariff are high, similar dynamics would result, independent of the design of the capacity-
based charge. 
 Conclusion 
Low-voltage consumers cannot be considered as passive anymore after two technology 
breakthroughs: (1) PV enables domestic and commercial consumers to self-produce energy; (2) 
Batteries enable self-producers to choose both their grid energy and capacity parameters. The 
availability and costs of these new technologies strategically interact with tariffs to recover grid costs, 
as active consumers will react with their profit-maximising actions to any network tariff charged to 
them. In this paper, a game-theoretical model has been applied to assess whether: 
 
(1) capacity-based network charges solve the efficiency problems experienced with volumetric charges 
with net-metering? And if, 
 
(2) capacity-based network charges allow active consumers, investing in PV and batteries when 
incentivised, to be better off at the expense of passive, sometimes vulnerable, consumers? 
 
Insights were gained with the help of three different distribution network tariff structures evaluated 
in four states of the world. This applied modelling approach allowed to capture the uncoordinated 
reaction of consumers to different tariff design by the adoption of DER technologies. Energy volumetric 
charges with net-metering, energy volumetric charges for both injection and withdrawal and capacity-
based charges were assessed with a proxy for efficiency and equity. A central assumption was that grid 
costs to be recovered by the DSO were sunk, i.e. the adoption of DER technology by consumers does 
not influence the total grid costs to be recovered. 
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Regarding the first question, the results confirm that in a world with an increasing share of consumers 
connected to low voltage distribution networks reacting to price signals, simple netted out volumetric 
network charges to recover grid costs cannot be considered as the adequate network tariff design. 
Net-metering is an implicit subsidy for the adoption of PV. However, depending on the state of the 
world and its implementation, also capacity-based charges can severely distort the investment 
decisions of consumers. These results nuance the findings of the pro-capacity-based camp, e.g. Hledik 
and Greenstein (2016) and Simshauser (2016) and add a critical note to the observed trend towards 
being capacity-based tariffs replacing volumetric tariffs.  
 
The observed dynamics confirm the suggestion made by Simshauser (2016), namely that if the 
capacity-based charge overstates the value of peak load, it may pull-forward battery storage and 
create a new dimension to the sunk cost recovery problem. Simply abolishing net-metering and 
applying so-called ‘bi-directional’ volumetric charges; an option also brought forward by Eid et al. 
(2014), can outperform capacity-based charges to recover sunk costs in a scenario of low technology 
costs with high proportions of active consumers. This tariff design is found to be more robust against 
the adverse effects of non-cooperative behaviour, and investment decisions are less distorted. 
 
Regarding the second question, both under volumetric charges with net-metering and capacity-based 
charges active consumers make uncoordinated investment decisions and push sunk grid costs to one 
another which can lead to overinvestment in DER and subsequently raise equity issues. Equity issues 
are found acuter under net-metering. However, paradoxically, under capacity-based charges, a 
situation can occur in which not only passive but also active consumers, end up paying more than in a 
situation where nobody invests in DER. This is due to competitive pressure among active consumers in 
allocating sunk cost. This effect was captured by modelling the grid cost recovery problem as a non-
cooperative game between consumers, unprecedented in the existing body of literature. 
 
By considering grid costs to be sunk, we focused on the limitations of capacity-based charges. 
Admittedly, this assumption presents a simplification in countries where the distribution network is in 
full expansion, and therefore it will be challenged in future work.  By doing so, the total costs to be 
recovered by the DSO will become a function of network usage. In that setting, with low sunk costs 
and high future demand-driven investment, intelligently designed capacity-based charges could be of 
use. Lowered future grid costs due to intelligent grid charges could dampen the effects of non-
cooperative behaviour. Another potential future research line would be to investigate the risk of grid 
defection when fixed charges would be increased strongly. Also, the effect of time-varying price 
signals, which would add value to the battery, would provide interesting insights. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEAST-COST DISTRIBUTION NETWORK TARIFF DESIGN IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE  
Abstract 
In this paper, a game-theoretical model with self-interest pursuing consumers is introduced to assess 
how to design a least-cost distribution tariff under two constraints that regulators typically face. The 
first constraint is related to difficulties regarding the implementation of cost-reflective tariffs. In 
practice, so-called cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution 
grids. The second constraint has to do with fairness. There is a fear that active consumers investing 
in distributed energy resources (DER) might benefit at the expense of passive consumers. We find 
that both constraints have a significant impact on the least-cost network tariff design, and the results 
depend on the state of the grid. If most of the grid investments still have to be made, passive and 
active consumers can both benefit from cost-reflective tariffs, while this is not the case for passive 
consumers if the costs are mostly sunk. 
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 Introduction 
Technological breakthroughs at the consumer-side are challenging the use of volumetric distribution 
network charges (€/kWh). Specifically, volumetric charges with net-metering, implying that a 
consumer’s network charges are proportional with its net consumption from the grid over a certain 
period (e.g. month), are deemed inadequate with the massive deployment of solar PV. Consumers 
with solar PV pay significantly lower network charges but still rely on the distribution grid as much as 
they did before. This means that if cost recovery is respected, consumers that have not installed solar 
PV would have to contribute more.  
 
There is no easy fix for distribution network tariff design. Regulators in many European countries are 
thinking to suspend net-metering and move more towards capacity-based (€/kW), fixed network tariffs 
(€/connection)  or a combination of both (CEER, 2017a). However, many practitioners as well as 
academics, e.g. Abdelmotteleb et al. (2017), Batlle et al. (2017) , Passey et al. (2017), Pollitt (2018), 
Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017) and Simshauser (2016), warn for possible issues constraining the 
implementation of improved or more efficient distribution tariffs. In this paper, we go one step further 
by demonstrating quantitatively how such constraints affect distribution network tariff design. We 
focus on two often-discussed constraints which are of a different nature: implementation issues with 
cost-reflective charges and fairness in the allocation of network costs among consumers. 
 
To capture the impact of these two constraints on network tariff design in this new reality with active 
consumers investing in DER, it is indispensable to consider how consumer incentives change as a 
function of network tariff design. Therefore, we introduce a game-theoretical model which closes the 
loop between network tariff design, incentives for self-interest pursuing active consumers, and the 
aggregate effect of consumer actions on the total network costs which again need to be recovered by 
the network charges. Although the rise of active consumers is rightly welcomed, the model takes into 
account the fact that it can also be a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, the more consumers have 
the ability to react to price signals, in this case network charges, the more welfare gains can be made 
from efficient consumer behaviour as an alternative to the historical practice of ‘fit-and-forget’ 
(Ruester et al., 2014). On the other hand, the more significant negative welfare impacts can result if 
these price signals are badly designed and are ‘guiding’ consumers in the wrong direction. In that case, 
the avoided network charges by active consumers will be simply transferred to more vulnerable 
passive consumers who see their electricity bill increase. The more consumers have the possibility to 
react to price signals, the more important it becomes to get the network tariff design right.  
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The mathematical structure of the presented model is a bi-level optimisation problem which is 
reformulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). In the upper-level, a 
regulator sets the distribution network tariff. Besides volumetric charges, the regulator has two other 
traditional network tariff design options: capacity-based and fixed network charges, or she can opt for 
a combination of the three. The regulator anticipates the reaction of the consumers represented in 
the lower-level and the network tariff is determined in a way that the total system costs (incl. network 
costs, energy commodity costs and DER investment costs by consumers) are minimised. The regulator 
is subject to the constraint that the total network charges collected need to equal the network costs.37 
Modelled consumers can be passive or active. Passive consumers are assumed not to react to prices; 
active consumers pursue their own self-interest, i.e. their objective is to minimise their cost to satisfy 
their electricity demand. They have the option to invest in two technologies: solar PV and batteries.  
 
Using a numerical example, we illustrate a trade-off between cost-efficiency, for which the proxy is the 
total system costs, and fairness, for which the proxy is the increase in grid charges for passive 
consumers compared to a baseline. We find that some cost-efficiency can be sacrificed to limit the 
distributional impact resulting from network tariff redesign and we show how this trade-off is 
impacted by the implementation issues with cost-reflective network tariffs. However, our main finding 
is that if the regulatory toolbox is limited to the three considered traditional tariff design options; it 
will be hard to design a distribution network tariff that is cost-reflective and future-oriented, while at 
the same time also fair in the allocation of costs between active and passive domestic consumers. We 
argue that other, more creative, regulatory tricks are needed to combine and satisfy different policy 
objectives. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the two considered constraints a regulator 
faces when designing the distribution network tariff and include relevant literature. In Section 3, we 
introduce the modelling approach. In Section 4, the setup and data for the numerical example are 
introduced. In Section 5 and 6, the two considered tariff design constraints are introduced, their 
modelling implication is described, and the results for the numerical example are presented to gain 
                                                          
37 We consider an institutional setting with a fully unbundled distribution system operator (DSO) that does not own or operate 
any generation assets. The consumer reacts to the aggregated electricity bill but the accounting of the cost components 
(retailer energy price and network charges but also taxes and levies) is separate. Namely, consumers buy electricity, the 
commodity, from a retailer who bought this energy in the wholesale market and sells it to downstream consumers for a given 
exogenous price. The network charges, on the other hand, are considered endogenous. These are set by the regulator and 
the revenues are collected by the DSO equaling its network costs. Finally, next to the retailer energy price and the network 
charges, a consumer also pays taxes and levies; it is assumed that the total level of these costs is invariant and that the way 
these are collected does not interfere with the analysis. 
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insights into their impact on network tariff design. In Section 7, we discuss the results and derive policy 
implications. Lastly, a conclusion is formulated, and future work is proposed. 
 Practical constraints when redesigning the distribution network tariff 
Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017)38 discuss and Abdelmotteleb et al. (2017) show with simulations and 
numerical examples that in a new world with active consumers the least-cost distribution network 
tariff consists of a forward-looking-peak-coincident capacity charge plus a fixed charge. If the capacity-
based charge is computed as the incremental cost of the network divided by expected load growth, 
the tariff is cost-reflective; consumers will make optimal choices with regard to the trade-off between 
their consumption levels and grid reinforcements. A fixed network charge complements the capacity-
based charge to collect the remaining residual network cost in a non-distorting manner.  
 
However, there are many difficulties which constrain the implementation of this theoretical optimal 
tariff, a first constraint relates to the implementation difficulties with cost-reflective tariffs. In practice, 
so-called cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution grids because 
it would be too complex to consider all of them or because we simply lack the necessary information. 
Gómez (2013) describes how a distribution network is more difficult to oversee than a transmission 
network as it involves a much larger number and a wider variety of equipment and components. Cohen 
et al. (2016) use actual load and load growth data to show that grid usage is very heterogeneous in 
California. They also show that the costs of accommodating incremental demand/injection can be very 
location specific. Passey et al. (2017) analyse a dataset of 3,876 residential consumers in the Greater 
Sydney Area in Australia and observe that demand profiles and the timing of the network peaks vary 
widely across networks and at different voltage levels, depending on the mix of consumers connected. 
Designing a truly cost-reflective capacity-based charge is a challenging task. The coincident-peak of a 
distribution system, identified as the main network cost driver, is hard to target. Targeting the wrong 
network peak implies an efficiency loss, e.g. DER adoption can be under- or over-incentivised without 
resulting in much change in the total grid costs.  
 
Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017) and Pollitt and Anaya (2016) agree that from an efficiency point of view, a 
network tariff with very fine temporal and locational granularity would be more optimal. Examples are 
critical peak-pricing (mainly temporal) or even user-by-user charges as an extreme case (temporal and 
locational). However, such dynamic charges with fine locational granularity are hard to attain in the 
current context. This is mainly true due to a lack of information about the network flows in real-time, 
                                                          
38 See e.g. also Box 4.6 (p. 115-116) in the Utility of the Future report by the MIT Energy Initiative (2016a).  
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requiring significant investments in IT infrastructure. Moreover, even if the distribution network 
became extremely ‘smart’, the implementation constraint could persist as in most countries regulation 
requires that a uniform distribution tariff should be in place on a regional level or per area operated 
by a Distribution System Operator (DSO) (European Commission, 2015a). This regulatory requirement 
is mainly based on arguments of simplicity and predictability for the consumer. Therefore, in this work, 
we limit ourselves to the application of the three traditional tariff design options: volumetric charges 
(€/kWh), capacity-based (€/kW) and fixed network charges (€/connection). Besides simplicity and 
predictability, fairness is an important regulatory requirement (e.g. Batlle et al. (2017) and Neuteleers 
et al. (2017)), thereby leading us to the second considered constraint in this paper. 
 
There is a fear that network tariff reforms, which aim to increase cost-efficiency, will result in an unfair 
allocation of the network costs, i.e. passive, often smaller or poorer, consumers would see their 
electricity bills increase. Pollitt (2018) notes that under some conditions, e.g. where there is an over-
dimensioned network combined with low load growth, a limited possibility to fully disconnect from 
the grid and when all externalities are incorporated into the other components of the electricity bill, 
then it can be optimal from an efficiency point of view to recover a large share of the network costs 
through fixed network charges. However, in many countries, there is strong opposition to high fixed 
network charges. This concern is not unique to the electricity sector but is acute in all markets with 
large fixed costs, such as energy, water, transportation, and telecommunications. For example, 
Borenstein and Davis (2012) use relevant microdata to characterize the effect of a transition to 
marginal cost pricing from volumetric charges which were on average about 30 % higher in the U.S. 
residential natural gas market. Marginal cost pricing does not guarantee cost recovery and 
consequently fixed monthly fees would need to be raised to recuperate the residual infrastructure 
costs.  
 
It is often argued that if fixed network charges replaced the historic volumetric network charges, 
network costs would be shifted from often richer high-usage consumers to often poorer lower-usage 
consumers. Kolokathis et al. (2018) analyse German electricity demand data and show that, by 
introducing a high uniform fixed network charge, low-usage consumers can pay up to two and a half 
times as much per unit of electricity compared to high-usage users. Such discrepancies in price per 
kWh could raise acceptability issues. As a consequence, increases in uniform fixed network charges are 
often rejected or capped.39 Although increased fixed network charges could be welcomed by DSOs as 
                                                          
39 For example, a media article published in November 2014 mentions that there were 23 ongoing ‘state fights’ between 
utilities and regulators over increased fixed charges in the US: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-fight-over-solar-
moves-from-net-metering-to-rate-design/327742/, accessed on 19/02/18.  
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they would allow for a better alignment of the network tariff with the network cost structure, DSOs 
can also be averse towards the risk of raising fairness concerns. Political actions aimed at reducing 
discontent could eventually put grid cost recovery in danger.  
 
However, if higher fixed network charges are not acceptable even when cost-efficient, other network 
tariff components (e.g. volumetric or capacity-based) will be needed to recover the residual grid costs. 
By resorting to these, the network tariff will be distorted, implying that active consumers could exploit 
opportunities that might be beneficial in terms of reduced private network charges but not necessarily 
optimal from a system point of view. Moreover, the benefits active consumers obtain could be at the 
expense of passive consumers. Brown and Sappington (2017a) estimate the welfare and distributional 
impact of a vertical utility not being allowed to recover its costs by raising fixed charges in addition to 
volumetric charges with net-metering.  Indeed, they find that in a context with active consumers 
investing in solar PV, negative distributional and aggregate welfare effects can be more pronounced 
when the regulator is not allowed to raise fixed charges. In short, a trade-off exists between a fairness 
issue with increased fixed charges, i.e. raising the network charges for smaller households, and 
sustaining a distortion in the network tariff which could finally also lead to a fairness issue due to active 
consumers reacting to the distortive network tariff.  With the help of the game-theoretical model, 
introduced in the next section, we demonstrate this trade-off quantitatively. 
 Model formulation 
In this section, the game-theoretical model is described. In theory, a centralised planner, optimising 
social welfare by deciding unilaterally on the optimal trade-off between the utilisation of the network 
and the adoption of DER by consumers, would lead to the lowest total system costs. However, in 
reality, there is no central planner that has information about the network cost function and at the 
same time decides on behalf of the consumers what technology to install in order to minimise the total 
system costs. On the contrary, decision-making is decentralised and coordinated by price signals.40  In 
the following of this section, the description of the implemented model is split into three parts. First, 
the upper-level problem is described. Then, the lower-level problem is introduced. Last, the applied 
solution technique is explained. 
3.1 The upper-level regulator 
The upper-level of the model represents the network tariff design problem of the regulator. It is 
assumed that the regulator can set the network tariff and that it aims at minimising total system costs 
                                                          
40 For a comparison between a centralized planner model and the game-theoretical model introduced in this paper, please 
consult Appendix B. 
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(here equivalent to maximising social welfare).41 This is a simplification, as in some European countries 
the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) is responsible for network tariff design, while in other 
European countries the NRAs and DSOs share the responsibility. However, the final approval remains 
with the NRA (European Commission, 2015). The objective function of the regulator is shown by Eq. 1. 
The total system costs consist of four components: total energy costs, total DER investment costs, total 
grid costs, and other costs. Other costs represent taxes and levies recovered from consumers; it is 
assumed that the total level of these costs is invariant. The three variable components of the objective 
function are displayed by Eq. 2-4. All costs are annualised and normalised per (average) consumer. All 
introduced variables are positive continuous variables. Variables are represented in italics, parameters 
in standard style. An overview of the nomenclature used can be found in Appendix 0. 
𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (1) 
The total net energy costs to meet the electricity demand of all consumers are calculated by Eq. 2. 
Assuming one retailer for all consumers, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 equals the revenue of the retailer minus 
the money received by consumers for the electricity injected in the grid (so-called feed-in 
remuneration).  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  ∑ ∑ PCi ∗ (𝑞𝑤t,i ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖t,i ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT 
N
i=1
T
t=1  (2) 
The index i stands for a representative consumer of type i, PC𝑖  is a parameter indicating the proportion 
of a consumer type relative to the total consumers. EBPt stands for the price to buy a kWh of electricity 
from the retailer and ESPt is the price received when feeding in a kWh of electricity (excluding grid or 
other costs). Further, 𝑞𝑤t,i and 𝑞𝑖t,i represents respectively the quantities of electricity withdrawn and 
injected from the network by a consumer i for a certain time step t. Please note that 𝑞𝑤t,i can only be 
positive if  𝑞𝑖t,i is zero and vice-versa. For a passive consumer 𝑞𝑤t,i will always equal its demand and 
𝑞𝑖t,iwill always be equal to zero. This does not hold for an active consumer. For example, if an active 
consumer installs solar PV, it could be that at a given time step the PV production exceeds the 
consumer’s demand. For that time step,  𝑞𝑤t,i  will be zero and  𝑞𝑖t,i will be positive and equal to the 
excess PV production over demand. If that active consumer also installs a battery next to solar PV, it 
would have the choice to inject the excess electricity directly into the network (𝑞𝑖t,i) or store it in the 
battery to lower the need to withdraw from the grid (𝑞𝑤t,i) at a later moment. Finally, WDT is a factor 
to annualise the values and is a function of the length of the utilised time series (T). Please note that if 
the price for buying a kWh of electricity from the retailer (EBPt) equals the price received by an active 
                                                          
41 We assume that electricity demand elasticity is zero. Instead, we allowed consumers to fulfil their electricity demand by 
other means than the grid (solar PV and/or batteries). This implies that demand response is not included. This assumption is 
further discussed in Section 7.1. 
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consumer when injecting a kWh of electricity (ESPt) (excluding grid or other costs), Eq. 2 can be 
simplified. In that case, the total energy costs equal the aggregate net demand scaled over all 
consumers multiplied by the retailer’s energy price. 
The total investment cost in solar PV and batteries by consumers is described by Equation 3. 𝑖𝑠i stands 
for the capacity of solar PV (in kWp) installed by consumer i and 𝑖𝑏i is the capacity of batteries (in kWh) 
installed by consumer i. AICS and AICB are the annualised investment costs for respectively solar PV 
and batteries. No maintenance costs for the DER technologies are assumed.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = ∑ PCi ∗ (𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ AICB)
N
i=1  (3) 
Finally, the function describing total grid costs is displayed by Eq. 4. Sunk grid costs are the costs of 
grid investments made in the past to be able to cope with electricity demand in the future. Sunk grid 
costs are represented by a parameter as these costs are unaffected by the utilisation of the network. 
Schittekatte et al. (2018) also discuss network tariff design with active consumers and grid costs are 
assumed to be all sunk throughout that work. This means the objective of a network tariff is mainly 
allocative, i.e. socialising the grid costs in a non-distortive and fair manner. In this work, also a term for 
prospective grid costs (IncrGridCosts ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘) is added in Eq. 4.42 These grid costs are variable 
(in the long-run) and a function of the maximum coincident network utilisation of all consumers 
(𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘). The higher the coincident peak, the higher the network costs to be recovered. The 
parameter IncrGridCosts describes the cost per kW of increase/decrease in the coincident peak. This 
parameter resembles the incremental network cost as in MIT Energy Initiative (2016a). In case 
reactions of the consumers in terms of consumption from the grid (or injection) affect the network 
cost and in its turn the network charges, the network tariff should guide consumers to cost-efficient 
behaviour apart from purely allocating network costs. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = SunkGridCosts + IncrGridCosts ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘  (4) 
Abdelmotteleb et al. (2017), Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017) and Simshauser (2016) describe that the 
coincident peak demand (or injection if higher) is generally considered as the main cost driver of a 
distribution network. Brown and Sappington (2018) apply a similar formula by stating that the network 
costs are a function of the maximum potential demand for electricity supplied by centralised 
generation. In Brown and Sappington (2017a) a different approach is used, and it is assumed that the 
network costs are a function of the capacity of centralised generation and solar PV installed, with a 
                                                          
42 We label these grid costs ‘prospective’ as they are ideally reflected to grid users by ‘forward-looking grid charges’, meaning 
the element of network charges that looks to provide signals to users about how their consumption pattern can increase or 
reduce future network costs (Ofgem, 2017b). However, in the longer-run equilibrium we are modelling, these costs become 
part of the grid costs to be recovered by the DSO. Therefore, they are included in Eq. 4. 
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higher weight for solar PV.43 Next to the coincident peak demand, other network cost drivers can be 
identified, such as thermal losses and investment cost to replace electronic components (e.g. 
protection) to deal with bi-directional flows due to high concentrations in PV adoption (see e.g. MIT 
Energy Initiative (2015) and Cohen et al. (2016)). These other network cost drivers are not included in 
the current analysis.  
 
How the coincident peak demand (or injection) is obtained is shown by Eq. 5-7. 𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 stands 
for the coincident peak demand, i.e. the maximum value of the sum of the consumer demands (𝑞𝑤t,i) 
minus injections (𝑞𝑖t,i ) at a certain time step t. Similarly, the coincident peak injection of the network 
 𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is obtained. The 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 is determined as the maximum of the two. In the 
most likely scenario, and also in the numerical example used in this paper 𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 >
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  and thus 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 ≡ 𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑. 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 ≡ Max {𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} (5) 
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≡ Max {∑ PCi(𝑞𝑤t,i − 𝑞𝑖t,i)
N
i=1  ∀t} (6) 
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≡ Max {∑ PCi(𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑤t,i)
N
i=1  ∀t}  (7) 
The relative magnitude of the three variable system cost components (retailer energy costs, DER 
investment costs and grid costs) are a function of how the electricity demand of the consumers is met, 
i.e. the mix of the energy sourced from the retailer and delivered by the grid and the energy delivered 
directly from installed DER at the consumer side. A regulator cannot directly decide on the optimal 
trade-off. Instead, he can only indirectly influence the consumer decisions by setting a network tariff 
which anticipates their reactions. Eq. 8 expresses the need for total grid costs to be equal to the total 
grid charges collected. With this formulation, the unbundled DSO recovers its grid costs with a 
combination of a volumetric charge 𝑣𝑛𝑡 (€/kWh), a capacity-based charge 𝑐𝑛𝑡 (€/kW) and a uniform 
fixed charge 𝑓𝑛𝑡 (€/connection). 𝑣𝑛𝑡, 𝑐𝑛𝑡 and 𝑓𝑛𝑡 are the decision variables of the upper-level, while 
𝑞𝑤t,i, 𝑞𝑖t,i and 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥i are decision variables of the lower-level. 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖  is the maximum observed capacity 
(for withdrawal or injection) of consumer i over the considered time series. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ ∑ PCi ∗ (𝑞𝑤t,i − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖t,i) ∗ WDT
N
i=1
T
t=1 +  𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ PCi ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥i
N
i=1 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡  (8) 
                                                          
43 Brown and Sappington (2017a, 2017b, 2018) also apply a welfare analysis to gain insights into the issue of optimal tariffs 
in a setting where consumers with a certain elasticity are adopting distributed generation (DG). An important difference with 
our work is the institutional setting. Brown and Sappington focus on the design of the entire retail tariff and model one 
vertically integrated utility responsible for generation, transmission and distribution. We consider a setting with a fully 
unbundled distribution network company that does not own or operate any generation assets.  A second important difference 
is that Brown and Sappington (2017a, 2017b, 2018) do not use inter-temporal data series. As a consequence, batteries at 
consumer level cannot be modelled. 
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NM is a parameter and determines the type of volumetric charge.44 If NM is set as equal to 1, 
volumetric charges with net-metering result. With NM set equal to 0, solely charging for the total 
volume of electricity withdrawn are in place, these type of volumetric charges are so-called net-
purchase volumetric charges. Please note that for the latter a bi-directional meter, measuring 
separately electricity withdrawn from and injected into the grid is a necessary requirement. Further, 
the capacity-based charge 𝑐𝑛𝑡 accounts for maximum observed capacity (for withdrawal or injection) 
of a consumer i (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥i). The fixed network charge 𝑓𝑛𝑡 is assumed to be uniform for all consumers. 
3.2 The lower-level consumers 
The objective of the individual consumers’ optimisation problems is to minimise the cost of meeting 
their electricity demand. Active consumers are enabled to invest in solar PV or batteries to lower their 
dependency from the grid when they have the financial incentive to do so. The objective function of a 
consumer i is represented by Eq. 9. The total electricity cost per consumer also consists of four 
components, similar to the upper-level, but now for an individual consumer: grid charges, the 
investment cost in DER, the energy cost and other charges, again representing taxes and levies. It is 
assumed that the amount of taxes and levies per consumer is not a function of its grid usage but 
recovered through a fixed charge per consumer. The other three components of the consumers’ 
electricity costs are variable. 
𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐞  𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠i + 𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠i + 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠i + OtherCharges (9) 
Eq. 10-13 describe the different components of the total electricity costs in more detail. The grid 
charges are the sum of volumetric, capacity-based and fixed grid charges. The coefficients of the 
different grid charges are set by the upper-level regulator. The DER investment costs are the sum of 
the annualised investment cost of solar PV and batteries installed as shown in Eq. 12. Eq. 13 calculates 
the retailer energy costs for a consumer minus the feed-in remuneration. 
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠i = ∑ (𝑞𝑤t,i − 𝑞𝑖t,i ∗ NM) ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
t=1 + 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥i ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡      ∀ i (10) 
with  𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥i ≡ Max {𝑞𝑤t,i − 𝑞𝑖t,i ∀t}       ∀i (11) 
𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠i = 𝑖𝑠i ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏i ∗ AICB       ∀ i  (12) 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠i = ∑ (𝑞𝑤t,i ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖t,i ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT
T
t=1       ∀ i (13) 
                                                          
44 In Brown and Sappington (2017a) the optimality of net-metering is investigated. The setup in their paper is different but 
one could say that they model the term NM as a continuous variable. Namely, they investigate the optimal value of the 
compensation in kWh for DG compared to the full retail rate under different industry conditions. In this work, NM can only 
take two values, 1 and 0. This assumption is also briefly referred to in Section 7.1. 
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A consumer is subject to a number of constraints; these constraints are described by Eq. 14-21. Eq. 14 
shows the demand balance for consumer i. The demand Dt,i is determined exogenously and can be 
satisfied by the electricity withdrawn from the grid (𝑞𝑤t,i), a discharging battery (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,i) or electricity 
produced by installed solar PV (𝑖𝑠i ∗ SYt,i). Electricity can also be injected into the grid (𝑞𝑖t,i) or used to 
charge the battery (𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛t,i). Meeting the electricity demand is a hard constraint. Eq.  15-17 describe 
the battery balance, where 𝑠𝑜𝑐t,i is the state of the battery at time step t, EFC the charge efficiency, 
EFD the discharge efficiency and LR the leakage rate of the battery. DT is the time step as a fraction of 
60 minutes used to convert all numbers to kWhs. Eq. 18-20 constrain the battery in terms of energy 
stored and instantaneous (dis)charging. BRD/BRC stands for the ratio of the maximum instantaneous 
battery discharge/charge over its maximal energy stored. Eq. 21 indicates that all consumer variables 
must be non-negative.45 
Dt,i = 𝑞𝑤t,i + 𝑖𝑠i ∗ SYt,i + 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,i − 𝑞𝑖t,i − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛t,i    ∀ i, t (14) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐1,i = 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛1,i ∗ EFC ∗ DT −  (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡1,i EFD)⁄ ∗ DT + SOC0  ∀ i (15) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐t,i = 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛t,i ∗ EFC ∗ DT − (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,i EFD⁄ ) ∗ DT + 𝑠𝑜𝑐t−1,i ∗ (1 − LR ∗ DT)   ∀ i, t ≠ 1 (16) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐T,i = SOC0  ∀ i (17) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐t,i ≤ 𝑖𝑏i    ∀ i, t (18) 
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,i ≤ 𝑖𝑏i ∗ BRD  ∀ i, t  (19) 
𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛t,i ≤ 𝑖𝑏i ∗ BRC     ∀ i, t (20) 
𝑞𝑤t,i, 𝑞𝑖t,i, 𝑠𝑜𝑐t,i, 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,i, 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛t,i, 𝑖𝑠i , 𝑖𝑏i ≥ 0  ∀ i, t (21) 
3.3 Solving the bi-level optimisation problem 
In order to solve the bi-level problem, it is first reformulated as a Mathematical Problem with 
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC); for a full overview of the properties of MPECs see e.g. Gabriel et al. 
(2012). The reformulation into a single level problem is done by including the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
(KKT) conditions of the linear and thus convex lower-level as constraints to the upper-level problem. A 
non-linear MPEC results. The non-linearities in Eq. 8 are discretised using the technique described in 
Momber (2015, p. 102), and the complementarity constraints are transformed into disjunctive 
constraints using the technique described in Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981). A Mixed Integer Linear 
Program (MILP) results that can be solved by off-the-shelf optimisation software. The reformulation of 
the bi-level problem can be found in Appendix 0.  
                                                          
45 No binary variables are introduced to ensure that no electricity is withdrawn/injected and that the battery is not 
charged/discharged at the same time step. Instead, it is checked ex-post whether these conditions are violated. 
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 Numerical example: setup and data 
In this section, the setup and data of a numerical example are described. The first section briefly 
introduces the setting. After, four subsections consider four groups of input data. This data is used to 
calibrate the model.  
4.1 Setup 
Two consumer types are modelled for simplicity: passive and active consumers, as is also done in 
Brown and Sappington (2017a, 2017b, 2018) and Schittekatte et al. (2018). The passive consumer does 
not have the option to invest in solar PV and batteries, unlike an active consumer, who can opt to 
invest in DER. Passive consumers are uninformed about the possibility to invest in DER. They either do 
not have the financial means, are strongly risk averse or simply do not have space. Active consumers 
minimise their costs to meet their electricity demand and may invest in DER to do so. At one extreme, 
all consumers can be passive, as in the recent past. At the other extreme, all consumers can be active, 
i.e. install DER when it can reduce their overall electricity cost. Reality presumably lies in the middle. 
Some consumers will remain passive for a number of reasons. Other consumers could be installing DER 
even when they do not financially profit from it, but because of other reasons which are harder to 
monetise, e.g. independence from the grid, sustainability motives etc. In the numerical example, it is 
assumed that 50% of all consumers are active and 50% are passive.46  
 
The different results from the model which are presented in Sections 5, 6 and 7 are compared relative 
to a baseline scenario. In the baseline scenario, it is assumed that no consumer invests in DERs, i.e. 
solar PV and battery investment are disabled for active consumers in this scenario. This implies that in 
the baseline scenario the upper-level regulator is actually indifferent in terms of which distribution 
network tariff to choose. No tariff choice would distort decisions nor would lead to overall efficiency 
gains as no consumer can invest in DER and demand elasticity is zero. The historically accepted practice 
are volumetric charges with net-metering. Therefore these charges are defined as the baseline 
network tariff. In the recent past, with highly inelastic consumers, it was less an issue to recover grid 
costs with volumetric charges with net-metering. Limited inefficiencies were introduced as consumers 
had few options to serve their electricity needs other than from the grid. Also, high-usage and thus 
                                                          
46 50 % active consumer might seem quite a lot today. Today many consumers are passive because they are indifferent or 
vulnerable. A lower proportion of active consumers result in a lower impact of distortive network tariff design on total system 
costs. However, distortions result in costs shifts from active to passive consumers. In their turn, these cost shifts could again 
convert more (indifferent) passive consumers into active ones, increasing the impact of the distortion. Also, with dropping 
costs in DER, rising electricity bills, digitalisation and more climate awareness, a proportion of indifferent passive consumers 
might turn active.   
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higher network contributions correlated rather well with richer households, making such practice 
acceptable.  
 
Under the baseline scenario, the two different types of consumers pay their baseline consumer bill as 
presented in Subsection 4.3. In the baseline scenario, the total system costs simply equal the consumer 
bills aggregate over all consumers. In the runs of the model when active consumers are enabled to 
invest in DER, the relative proportion and absolute values of the bill components can change for both 
the active and the passive consumers. The change in the consumer bills will be a function of the choice 
of the network tariff set by the upper-level regulator and the reactions from the lower-level active 
consumers. In that case, the total system costs consist possibly not only out of the aggregated 
consumer bills, but also the investment in solar PV and batteries by the active consumers is added. 
4.2 Consumer types, demand and solar yield 
The consumer demand and solar PV yield profiles are represented using a time series of 48-hours with 
hourly time steps and are shown in Figure 11 (left). The yield per kWp of solar PV installed is shown in 
Figure 11 (right). 
 
Figure 11: Original 48-hour electricity demand profiles (left) and PV yield profile (right) 
 
Household demand for electricity shows for both modelled days a small peak in the morning and a 
stronger peak in the evening, the typical ‘humped-camel shape’ (Faruqui and Graf, 2018). For both 
consumer types the shape of the demand profile is identical; however, it is scaled differently. As a 
result, passive consumers have a slightly lower electricity demand than active consumers. The passive 
consumer has an annual consumption of 5,200 kWh with a peak demand of 3.2 kW and the active 
consumer a 7,800 kWh annual consumption with a peak demand of 4.8 kW. In Europe, average annual 
electricity consumption per household ranged from 20,000 kWh (Sweden) to 1,400 kWh (Romania) in 
2015. In the same year, the average electricity consumption per household in the USA was about 
10,800 kWh (EIA, 2016).  The idea behind this difference in the levels of consumption is that active 
consumers are expected to be more affluent than passive consumers and that affluent consumers have 
higher electricity needs. This statement is a simplification of reality, but evidence for it is found in the 
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literature. Borenstein (2017) analyses Californian data and finds that the income distribution of solar 
PV installations is heavily skewed towards the wealthy, but adds that the gap is narrowing with time. 
It is also found that PV adopters have slightly higher energy consumption levels and peak demand. 
Borenstein (2016) also confirms that wealthier households consume more electricity, but adds that 
although this claim is accurate, it is often overstated. Hledik et al. (2016) analyse data from Great 
Britain and confirm that lower-income consumers are also smaller consumers of electricity, although 
the correlation appears to be somewhat limited. 
 
The yield per kWp of solar PV installed, as shown in Figure 11 (right), scales up to 1,160 kWh per year. 
As a reference, this level is similar than the average yield in the territory of France (Šúri et al., 2007). 
Seasonality is introduced in the PV yield profile by having a daily average PV yield of 40% of either side 
of the annual mean. The peak demand coincides with the day with the low PV yield. Letting the peak 
demand day coincide with the day with lower solar irradiation and vice-versa produces two effects. 
First, a high capacity of PV installed does not necessarily mean that the peak demand can be reduced. 
Faruqui and Graf (2018) investigate load profiles in Kansas and find that after the installation of PV 
systems, logically the net energy consumption reduces; nevertheless, the peak demand is virtually left 
unchanged. Second, if a high capacity of PV is installed, the injection peak of active consumers can 
become significant. 
 
Additional sensitivity analysis regarding the length of the time series, the profiles of consumer demand 
and the profiles of solar PV yield is conducted in Appendix C. 
4.3 Baseline consumer bills 
In Table 7 the baseline consumer electricity bill, paid by the consumers when no consumer installs any 
DER technology, is shown. However, if active consumers decide to invest in DER, the relative 
proportion and absolute values of the bill components can change for both the active and the passive 
consumers. The annual electricity cost for the active and passive consumer equals respectively 1,340 
€/year (0.172 €/kWh delivered) and 971 €/year (0.187 €/kWh delivered). This total cost is near the 
average electricity cost for EU households in 2015, which was estimated at around 0.21€/kWh 
(Eurostat, 2016). In the USA, the average electricity cost in 2015 was around 0.125€/kWh (EIA, 2016). 
The consumer bill is based on information from the Market Monitoring report by ACER and CEER 
(2016). There, the breakdown of the different components of the electricity bill for an average 
consumer in the EU for the year 2015 is presented. The energy component in the EU in 2015 is 
estimated at 37%. In absolute terms, this is a cost of 0.077 €/kWh. Further, 26% of the bill consisted of 
network charges, and 13% are RES and other charges. Finally, an important chunk of the bill (25%) 
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consists of taxes. A value-added tax (VAT), averaging 15%, must be paid and additional (ecological) 
taxes, averaging 10%, are raised in some countries. In this work, the VAT is integrated into the three 
components of the bill. Please note that a typical consumer bill varies from one country to another 
(e.g.  ACER and CEER (2016) for the EU).  
Table 7: Consumer bill in the baseline scenario (no investment in DER by active consumers)  
 
Recovery 
Cost per year 
Bill component Active Passive 
Energy costs  0.08 €/kWh 624 €/year (46 %) 416 €/year (43 %) 
Network charges  
Default: 0.062 €/kWh 
In the analysis: least-cost network tariffs 
485 €/year (36 %) 324 €/year (33 %) 
Other charges  Fixed fee (no interference with the analysis) 231 €/year (17-24 %) 
Total electricity 
cost  
 1340 €/year 
 (0.172 €/kWh) 
971 €/year  
(0.187 €/kWh) 
The retailer energy price is set at 0.08 €/kWh.47 Other charges are recovered through a fixed fee and 
as such do not interfere with the analysis. However, this is not always the case. How to collect such 
charges, or whether they belong in the electricity bill at all, is beyond the scope of this work, see e.g. 
the paper of Bohringer et al. (2017) in which the German case is discussed.  
The network charges are in the baseline case recovered through (net-metered) volumetric charges 
equal to 0.062 €/kWh. How to adapt network tariff design when dealing with active consumers is the 
main contribution of this paper and is discussed in Sections 5, 6 and 7. 
4.4 DER investment cost and technical parameters 
Two DER technologies are assumed at the disposition of active consumers: solar PV and batteries. A 
scenario with low PV but also battery investment costs can be expected to materialise soon as pointed 
out by many studies (Lazard, 2016b, 2016a; MIT Energy Initiative (2016a); RMI, 2015).48 Regarding solar 
PV, in the Utility of the Future Study by the MIT Energy Initiative (2016a) it is quoted that PV developers 
and industry analysts expect the installed cost of utility-scale PV to fall below $1000 per kW before the 
end of this decade, and that one major US car manufacturer projects that lithium-ion battery cell costs 
will drop below $100 per kWh by 2022—an order of magnitude less costly than 2010 costs. The 
levelised cost of energy (LCOE) of solar PV is 0.09 €/kWh49, slightly higher than the retailer energy price. 
An important assumption is that no investment subsidy for PV is introduced in this work and no 
reduced social losses from environmental externalities due to the installation of solar PV are accounted 
                                                          
47 The retailer energy price is considered flat and modelled exogenously; this assumption is also discussed in Section 7.1. 
Time-of-use retailer energy prices are introduced in the sensitivity analysis in Appendix C. 
48 For example, Maloney (2018) notes that 20% of Sunrun's customers have chosen to install solar plus storage systems in 
California in early 2018. 
49 In the model applied, the LCOE of solar PV is a function of the investment cost of the PV panel, lifetime, discount factor, 
the PV system performance ratio and importantly the solar PV yield profile, which is location dependendent. 
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for.50 Batteries are assumed to cost 200 €/kWh with a C-rate of 1, i.e. the battery can fully (dis)charge 
in one hour. The other DER parameters are shown in Table 8. Technical DER data is in line with 
Schittekatte et al. (2016).  
Table 8: Financial and technical DER data 
Parameters PV related Value Parameters battery related Value 
Investment cost 
Lifetime PV 
1300 €/kWp 
20 years 
Investment cost (C-factor=1) 
Lifetime battery 
200 €/kWh 
10 years 
Discount factor PV  5 % Discount factor battery 5 % 
Maximum solar capacity installed 5 kWp Maximum battery capacity installed No limit 
Price received for electricity injected (% of 
retailer energy price) 
90 % Efficiency charging & discharging 
Leakage rate 
90 % 
2 % 
4.5 Grid cost structure 
Determining the grid cost structure is no easy task.  Pollitt (2018) states that if we attribute energy 
losses to retailers, perhaps 80% or more of distribution network costs are fixed in the medium-run for 
a given set of connections and probably cannot be reduced significantly within a five to ten-year period. 
Simshauser (2016) assumes, based on Crawford (2014) and Hanser (2013), that the distribution 
network has a cost structure which comprises approximately 20% fixed operating costs, 60% sunk 
capital costs, and 20% variable operating costs. Jenkins and Pérez-Arriaga (2017) provide a more 
detailed discussion of the different network costs components.  
 
When presenting the results using the numerical example, three different grid cost structures are 
considered. First, grid costs are assumed to be 100% sunk, a short-term vision, i.e. the grid is over-
dimensioned, and the electricity usage of consumers has no effect on the total grid costs. In some 
countries also policy costs are recovered through the network charges, which from a cost allocation 
point of view is no different than recovering sunk network costs. Second, half of the grid costs are 
considered sunk and the other half prospective, i.e. driven by the coincident consumer peak demand. 
Lastly, the grid costs are assumed to be driven completely by the coincident consumer peak demand. 
In the very long run grid costs are also variable. The network capacity will adjust to the coincident peak 
demand need from the consumers. If the coincident peak demand augments, the increase in grid costs 
could be seen as the cost of reinforcements or additional capacity. If the coincident peak demand is 
reduced, the decrease in grid costs could be seen as the avoided cost for replacing existing capacity or 
maintenance. In all cases, short-run marginal costs, e.g. energy losses, are not considered as they 
typically only contribute to a small proportion of the total cost of a network operator. Different 
network cost functions could be introduced in future work. 
                                                          
50 Also this assumption is further discussed in Section 7.1. 
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The values for the parameters of the grid cost function (Eq. 4), SunkGridCosts and IncrGridCosts, are 
derived from the ‘baseline network costs’ of the modelled consumers (shown in Table 7) and are a 
function of the proportion of active and passive consumers.  With 50 % active and 50 % passive 
consumers, the (scaled) coincident consumer peak demand equals 4 kW in the baseline scenario, and 
the average grid costs equal 404 €/consumer.51 In the first case, grid costs are assumed 100% sunk, the 
parameters SunkGridCosts and IncrGridCosts in Equation 2 are set as equal to € 404 and 0 €/kW 
respectively. In the second case, 50% of the costs are assumed sunk and 50% perspective, 
SunkGridCosts equals € 202 and IncrGridCosts is set to 50.5 €/kW.52 In the third case, SunkGridCosts is 
zero and IncrGridCosts are set to 101 €/kW. As a reference, Brown et al. (2015) assume the (annualised) 
cost to be 75 $ for a kW of incremental household demand. Please note that another implementation 
constraint would be a correct estimation of the incremental network cost, or the network cost function 
in general, next to having an imperfect proxy of the network cost driver.  
 Incorporating an implementation constraint: revisiting the model, results and discussion 
In this section, the model described in Section 3 is used to provide insights into the impact of the 
implementation constraint, i.e. not having a perfect proxy of the network cost driver. The section 
consists of two parts. First, the modelling implication is pointed out. Second, the obtained results, using 
the numerical example as introduced in the previous section, are shown and discussed.  
5.1 Revisiting the model 
A simple, yet effective change has been made to Eq. 4 to incorporate an imperfect proxy for the 
network cost driver in the model. This change has as a result that a reduction of the individual peak 
demand of a consumer of 1 kW results in a reduction of its contribution to the system peak demand 
by less than 1 kW. Eq. 22 shows the updated version of Eq. 4. DPeak is a parameter and stands for the 
baseline coincident peak demand, i.e. the coincident peak demand in the case no consumer installs 
DER, and 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 is a variable and stands for the optimised coincident peak demand, i.e. the 
coincident peak demand after active consumers installed DER when profitable. The parameter WF  
represents a weighting factor.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = SunkGridCosts + IncrGridCosts ∗ (DPeak − WF ∗ (DPeak − 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘)) (22) 
The weighting factor can be interpreted as how imperfect the proxy of the network cost driver is. If 
WF has a low value, the more imperfect the proxy. This would mean that even though some active 
                                                          
51 4kW = 0.5*4.8 kW + 0.5*3.2 kW and 404 € = 0.5*485 € + 0.5*324 € 
52 50.5 €/kW = 0.5*404 €/4kW 
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consumers adapt their individual peak demand, total grid costs are not affected much. This effect 
would be witnessed if consumers were being incentivised to lower their demand at a certain time 
which does not coincide with the time of the system peak. In the extreme, the actions of the consumers 
have no effect on the total grid costs (WF equals zero). Such a situation resembles the scenario with 
100% sunk costs from a cost allocation point of view, although the nature of the grid costs, hard-to-
target prospective grid costs versus sunk grid costs, is different.  Alternatively, if the proxy for the 
network cost driver is very accurate, the actions of active consumers will have a stronger effect on the 
total grid costs. In the extreme, we end up with a fully cost-reflective tariff as implied by Eq. 2 in Section 
3 (WF equals 1). 
 
By introducing Eq. 22 also the assumption of identically shaped demand profiles is relaxed. Namely, 
with Eq. 22 the impact of the optimised coincident peak demand on total grid costs is reduced. A similar 
effect could be witnessed with heterogeneous demand profiles optimising their individual peak 
demand under an (individual) capacity-based charge. Passey et al. (2017) find low correlation 
coefficients in the range of 0.48 to 0.62 between consumer payments under a monthly capacity-based 
charge and the responsibility for the network peak. The correlation increases to 0.82 if only in months 
containing the system peaks are included instead of all months.  
 
Finally, please note that the implication of Eq. 22 could also be interpreted from a reliability point of 
view. Namely, it is difficult to assume that DER at a consumer’s premise can be a perfect substitute for 
the grid. There could be moments when technology fails, leaving the electricity need of consumers 
unmet. A reliability margin might be built into the grid to accommodate such extreme or unlikely 
conditions. Pollitt (2018) argues that the impact of DERs on network costs can be overestimated (and 
over-rewarded) for any network cost reductions. He bases this opinion on the fact that conventional 
networks may have 99.99% (one hour per year of lost load) or more availability, whereas individual 
asset availability may struggle to reach 98%. From a modelling point of view this means that even 
though the optimised peak demand might drive the network investment, the DSO will still make sure 
that there is spare network capacity available, thus dampening the impact of consumer actions on grid 
investment. 
5.2 Results and discussion 
First, a run is done in which we assume that we have a perfect proxy for the network cost drivers (WF 
equals 1). The results for the least-cost network tariff design are shown in Figure 12 and Table 9. In 
Table 9, two metrics are calculated for the different grid cost structures. First, the change in total 
system costs compared to the baseline scenario in which investments in batteries and solar PV are 
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disabled. This metric is a proxy for cost-efficiency. Second, the change in network charges paid by the 
passive consumers is shown, with as reference the amount of volumetric network charges paid by the 
passive consumer in the baseline scenario (as shown in Table 7). This metric is a proxy for fairness. The 
higher the increase in network charges for the passive consumer compared to the past, the more unfair 
a network tariff is perceived. 
Table 9: Total system costs and increase network 
charges per passive consumer compared to the 
baseline scenario. Perfect proxy for the network cost  
In Figure 12, the least-cost network tariff consists of a capacity-based charge equal to the incremental 
grid cost parameter (IncrGridCosts in Eq. 4) and a fixed charge equal to the sunk grid costs per 
consumer (SunkGridCosts in Eq. 4).53 This corresponds to the theoretical optimal network tariff 
structure as described by MIT Energy Initiative (2016a).  
 
When grid costs are 100% sunk, the least-cost network tariff design consists solely of a non-distortive 
uniform fixed charge (Figure 12), and there is no impact on the total system cost (Table 9: Total system 
costs and increase network charges per passive consumer compared to the baseline scenario. Perfect 
proxy for the network cost Table 9). Active consumers are indeed not incentivised to install DER: 
batteries would not reduce the total grid costs, and the LCOE of PV is slightly higher than the retailer 
energy price. However, due to the high uniform fixed network charge smaller passive consumers see 
                                                          
53 There can exist an interval around the value of the coefficients of the least-cost network tariff for which the total system 
costs are the same. In modelling terms this means that there is more than one equilibrium with the same value for the upper-
level objective but with not exactly the same network tariff designs and thus values for the lower-level objectives. In this case, 
one of these equilibria is the theoretical least-cost network tariff, the other equilibria have a network tariff structure which 
is very similar but the coefficients of the different charges (€/kWh, €/kW and/or €/connection) are slightly higher or lower. 
The reasoning behind this is that if a capacity-based/volumetric charge is set slightly higher or lower, it might not impact 
consumer decisions and thus the total system costs. The richer the data (e.g. number of consumer types or the length of the 
time series), the more sensitive the lower-level response function is to changes and thus the more sensitive the total system 
costs are to a minor change in the network tariff. When we introduce the fairness constraint and this constraint is binding 
(see Section 6), the interval around the value of the coefficients of the least-cost network tariff becomes small and generally 
there will be only one equilibrium. 
50 % active consumers –  
Results compared to the baseline scenario 
 (=no DER & volumetric network charges)  
Perfect 
implementation 
cost-reflective 
charges 
Total system costs 
100 % Sunk grid costs 0.0 % 
50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective -1.4 % 
100 % Prospective grid costs -6.8 % 
Network charges 
passive consumer 
100 % Sunk grid costs 25.0 % 
50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective 12.6 % 
100 % Prospective grid costs 0.0 % 
Figure 12: Network tariff components and 
grid costs compared to the baseline scenario 
for the three different grid cost structures. 
Perfect proxy for the network cost drivers. 
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their network charges significantly increase; some of the network costs, previously allocated to larger 
consumers through volumetric charges, are shifted to them.  
 
With 100% prospective grid costs, it is efficient to ‘steer’ consumer behaviour with higher cost-
reflective capacity-based charges, and each self-interest pursuing active consumer installs a battery of 
3.7 kWh. Again, no solar PV is installed as the LCOE of PV is slightly higher than the retailer energy price 
and solar PV can only weakly help to reduce the network charges. From an active consumer’s point of 
view, installing more or less DER would result in a higher (individual) total electricity cost. A total 
system cost reduction of almost 7% results, as shown in Table 9. In this case, the active consumers 
reduce their grid charges proportionally with the reduction in total system costs and the passive 
consumers do not see any change in the grid charges paid.  
Table 10: Total system costs and increase network charges 
per passive consumer compared to the baseline scenario. 
Imperfect proxy for the network cost driver assumed  
Figure 13 shows the least-cost tariff structure when introducing an imperfect proxy for the network 
cost driver, i.e. the parameter WF in Eq. 22 is lowered from 1 to 0.75. This means that a reduction of 
the individual peak demand of a consumer of 1 kW results in a reduction of its contribution to the 
system peak demand (which drives the prospective grid costs) with 0.75 kW instead of 1 kW. Two 
observations can be made when comparing the network tariff structure with (Table 10) and without 
(Table 9) an implementation constraint. 
 
First, the results do not change for the case with 100% sunk network costs. There is indeed no value in 
information about the grid cost driver as the grid costs are assumed to be independent of grid use. 
Second, when a proportion of the grid costs are prospective, the non-distortive fixed charges are 
increased at the expense of the ‘steering’ capacity-based charge. This leads to an overall slightly lower 
50 % active consumers – 
Imperfect proxy network cost driver (WF=0.75) 
Results compared to the baseline scenario 
 (=no DER & volumetric network charges) 
Least-
cost 
tariff  
Capacity-
based charge = 
incremental 
grid cost 
Total system 
costs  
100 % Sunk grid costs 0.0 % 0.0 % 
50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective -0.3 % -0.1 % 
100 % Prospective grid costs -4.0 % -3.7 % 
Network charges 
passive 
consumer  
100 % Sunk grid costs 25.0 % 25.0 % 
50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective 15.6 % 15.9 % 
100 % Prospective grid costs 7.0 % 10.9 % 
Figure 13: Network tariff components 
and total grid costs compared to the 
baseline for the three grid cost 
structures. Imperfect proxy for the 
network cost driver assumed 
(WF=0.75). 
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grid cost reduction when compared to the case without implementation constraint and less DER 
installed by the consumer.  
 
The reason for this change in the network tariff when introducing the implementation constraint can 
be deducted from the results in Table 10. Two result columns are introduced. First, the regulator is 
free to optimise the network tariff which would lead to the lowest total system cost (first column) - 
the network tariff shown in Figure 13 results from this run. This can be viewed as the case where the 
regulator is aware of the implementation difficulties with cost-reflective network charges. After, a run 
is computed in which the capacity-based charge is set as equal to the incremental grid cost (second 
column). This would be the situation when the regulator ignores the inaccuracy in the network cost 
driver proxy. It is evident that by taking into account the imperfect proxy and departing from the 
theoretical least-cost network tariff, a lower total system cost can be obtained. 
 
The intuition behind these results is the following: if the capacity-based charge is set as equal to the 
incremental grid costs, batteries are over-incentivised. An individual consumer installs batteries as 
they are profitable from his individual perspective. However, the grid costs decrease less than the cost 
of the DER investment. Overall, in that case, total system costs are higher than when active consumers 
install fewer batteries (2.8 kWh), demonstrating a deadweight loss for society due to distortive tariff 
design. Further, the grid costs, which did not decrease significantly due to the imperfect proxy of the 
network cost driver, need to be recovered.  
 
As a consequence, non-cooperative active consumers compete with each other to escape from high 
grid costs by installing more and more batteries. Active consumers install a battery of 3.7 kWh capacity, 
instead of one with 2.8 kWh capacity which results in the case the regulator accounts for the inaccuracy 
in the proxy of the network cost driver in its network tariff design. Higher grid charges for the passive 
consumers result, not only due to the introduction of uniform fixed network charges but also due to 
distortive network tariff design, leading to active consumers benefiting from higher reductions in their 
grid charges than the reduction in total grid costs they are responsible for. This is clearly illustrated by 
comparing the increase of the network charges of the passive consumer for the 100% prospective grid 
cost structure. In that case, the grid charges for the passive consumer increase quite significantly (3.9 
percentage points) due to the distorted network tariff design. Notably increased grid charges for 
smaller passive consumers can lead to fairness issues, as discussed in more depth in the next section. 
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 Adding a fairness constraint: revisiting the model, results and discussion 
The previous section has shown that pursuing a least-cost network tariff design can lead to significant 
distributional effects. In this section, a fairness constraint, in the form of a cap on the increase of grid 
charges for the smaller passive consumers, is added to the model described in Section 3 and amended 
in Section 5. The section consists of three parts. First, the modelling implication is pointed out. Second, 
the results obtained with a fairness constraint, using the same numerical example as introduced in 
Section 4 and 5, are shown and discussed. Third, results are discussed when jointly applying the 
fairness and implementation constraint.  
6.1 Revisiting the model 
In order to assess the least-cost tariff design with a cap on the increase of network charges paid by 
passive consumers, Eq. 23 is added to the upper-level problem. The index ‘i2’ stands for the passive 
consumer type and  BGC′i2′ are the network charges paid by the passive consumer in the baseline 
scenario. With the parameter Cap′𝑖2′ it can be decided how high the increase in network charges paid 
by the passive consumer is allowed to be when compared to the network charges paid in the baseline 
scenario (Table 1). If the cap is set very high, the fairness constraint will not be binding and thus will 
not influence the least-cost network tariff design. If the cap is set very low, the model can become 
unfeasible, i.e. there is no network tariff that can lead to cost-recovery for the DSO while taking into 
account the reactions of the active consumers to the network tariff and at the same time respecting 
the fairness constraint.  
𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ (𝑞𝑤t,′i2′ − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖t,′i2′) ∗ WDT
T
t=1 + 𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥′i2′ + 𝑓𝑛𝑡 ≤  BGC′i2′ ∗ (1 + Cap′i2′) (23) 
6.2 Results and discussion with a fairness constraint 
In this section, the results for the numerical example are discussed. Figure 14 illustrates that the state 
of the grid determines to what extent the incentives given to active customers via distribution network 
tariffs result in system benefits and/or whether these benefits are shared with passive consumers. The 
results are completely different for the three illustrated grid states. Additionally, the resulting least-
cost network tariff designs at a 10% fairness cap (Cap′i2′ = 0.10) are shown for the case in which the 
grid costs are assumed 100 % sunk and the case in which the grid costs are assumed 50% sunk and 50% 
prospective costs. In the case grid costs are assumed 100 % prospective, the fairness cap is not binding; 
thus the results are not impacted. 
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Figure 14: Total system cost increase trade-off with the increase of grid charges of passive 
consumers for different grid cost structures. Perfect proxy for the grid cost drivers assumed. 
 
The first state of the grid is 100% sunk costs. In this state of the grid, the least-cost network tariff is a 
fixed charge, which significantly increases the costs for small passive consumers (25% increase in grid 
charges). However, we can ‘sacrifice’ some cost-efficiency to lower fairness concerns. Looking at Figure 
14, this means moving to the left on the ‘’100 % sunk grid cost line’’. Two opposing forces are working 
in this case. On the one hand, by lowering the fixed network charges, the fairness issue decreases. But 
by resorting to other network tariff components which are needed to ensure full grid cost recovery 
(volumetric charges and/or capacity-based charges as can be seen on the same figure), the network 
tariff will be distortionary.54 This implies that active consumers can exploit opportunities that might be 
beneficial for themselves but which are not necessarily optimal from a system point of view.55 The 
private benefits active consumers obtain in this way come at the expense of passive consumers, thus 
aggravating the fairness issue once again. These two forces can be played out until the moment the 
model becomes unfeasible, i.e. there is no way anymore to recover all grid costs while limiting the 
fairness concern. For this example, this occurs at the point when the increase of grid charges for passive 
consumers is capped at a level lower than 8%. Note that the significant improvement in fairness comes 
at a relatively small increased total system cost.  
 
                                                          
54 Volumetric charges with net-purchase, i.e. only charging for the electricity withdrawn from the network, are opted for by 
the regulator. Volumetric charges with net-metering lead to a higher system cost and create a fairness issue as they strongly 
over-incentivise PV adoption.  
55 This happens at the point when the increase of grid charges for passive is capped at a level lower than 14 %. Beyond that 
point, when further reducing the grid charges for passive consumers, the increase of volumetric and capacity-based charges 
in the network tariff, which are needed to respect cost-recovery, are large enough to impact the investment decisions of the 
active consumers. Consequently, the increase in total system costs rises above 0 %. 
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The second state of the grid is 100% prospective costs. In this case, a cost-reflective tariff can achieve 
a lot of cost savings thanks to the incentives given to active consumers. These system benefits also 
lead to a price reduction for passive consumers. It is possible to push the model towards a network 
tariff structure that sacrifices some of the system benefits for an outcome that is even better for 
passive consumers, but it is unlikely that this would occur in practice as there is no perceived unfairness 
in this case.  
 
The third state of the grid is 50-50 sunk and prospective grid costs. In our numerical example, the 
negative effects we see in the first state of the grid for passive consumers dominate the positive effects 
we see in the second state of the grid. Even though the system is better off, the passive consumers pay 
more. This means that the active consumers are winning twice: they are getting all the system benefits 
and they are pushing some of the costs towards passive consumers. It is possible to engineer a network 
tariff that somewhat softens the unfairness for passive consumers, but they are always worse off in 
this case.  
6.3 Results and discussion with a fairness and implementation constraint 
Figure 15 is even more sobering for passive consumers than the results in the previous section. If we 
cannot get the cost driver right, we risk passive consumers are worse off in all cases. The results for 
100% sunk costs do not change, of course. If all costs are sunk, there is no cost driver, so the inaccuracy 
of the cost driver does not apply to that case. In the other two cases, the implementation issues with 
cost-reflective network charges make the system, and also the passive consumers, relatively worse off. 
In the case of 100% prospective costs, the impact is most significant for passive consumers: they end 
up mostly losing instead of sharing the benefits with active consumers. In other words, the two issues 
that we discussed separately in this paper strongly interact with each other. 
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Figure 15: Total system cost increase trade-off with the increase of grid charges of passive 
consumers for different grid cost structures. Results with and without implementation issues with 
cost-reflective network tariffs are shown. 
 Discussion results and policy implications 
This section consists out of two parts. Firstly, an overview of the results is shown, important 
assumptions are discussed, and the main findings of the sensitivity analysis are described. The 
sensitivity analysis can be found in Appendix C. Secondly, the main policy implications are derived. 
7.1 Overview of results, discussion assumptions and finding of the sensitivity analysis 
Figure 16 shows an overview of the results for the case in which 50 % sunk and 50 % prospective grid 
costs are assumed. From that figure, it can be seen how the results are gradually impacted by the two 
considered constraints in terms of the least-cost network tariff design, the total system costs (and its 
components) and the network charges increase for passive consumers. 
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Figure 16: Summary of all the results for the case with 50 % sunk and 50 % prospective grid costs 
assumed. 
We do four observations in Figure 16. First, it can be seen that there is a clear case to redesign the 
historical in place baseline network tariff, volumetric charges with net-metering, as also argued in the 
introduction of the paper. Active consumers are strongly incentivised to invest in solar PV (5 kWp per 
active consumer) as by doing so they can avoid paying for energy and grid charges. The overall 
expenditure on energy costs does indeed reduce strongly (-41.6%), but grid costs remain more or less 
stable (-1.4 %). Overall a 3.4 % increase in system costs compared to the baseline results; the total 
costs of PV investment by active consumers is higher than the sum of system benefits in terms of 
energy and grid. Also, active consumers lower significantly their grid charges but the grid costs do not 
lower proportionally. Therefore these costs are shifted to the passive consumers (+78 % in grid charges 
compared to the baseline) and a significant fairness issue results. 
 
The second observation is that when not assuming any implementation constraint or disregarding 
distributional impacts, Figure 16 shows that the least-cost network tariff replacing volumetric charges 
with net-metering consists of a fixed charge to recuperate the sunk grid costs and a capacity-based 
charge to align grid benefits with consumer benefits. It can be seen that when having a perfect proxy 
for the network cost driver, a system cost reduction can be achieved (-1.4 % compared to the baseline) 
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while the network charges for the passive consumers increase (+12.6 %).56 Third, in case of not having 
a perfect proxy, the cost-efficiency decreases and the fairness issue aggravates. Finally, when capping 
the increase in network charges for the passive consumers a three-part network tariff results. By 
introducing a volumetric network charge with net-purchase at the expense of the unpopular high 
network fixed charge some cost-efficiency can be sacrificed for fairness. 
 
In what follows we discuss three important assumptions made in this work and highlight the two main 
findings of the sensitivity analysis which can be found in Appendix C. A first important assumption 
made in the numerical example is the fact no positive externalities from solar PV adoption are 
assumed. If decentralised solar PV adoption would (partly) replace polluting central generation plants, 
a carbon markup in the energy price and subsidies are not politically feasible; it might be socially 
beneficial to stimulate PV adoption by allowing for a larger proportion of volumetric network charges 
(possibly with net-metering). This is also argued for in the work by Brown and Sappington (2017a).57 
However, the fairness issue with overly volumetric network charges combined with active consumers 
installing solar PV would remain pertinent. A relevant empirical work in this regard is the paper by 
Borenstein and Bushnell (2018). The authors investigate how some electricity prices in the US might to 
be too low– such as unpriced pollution externalities– while others cause prices to be too high– such as 
recovery of fixed costs through volumetric charges.  
 
Second, we assumed perfectly price-inelastic demand. Instead, we allowed active consumers to fulfil 
their electricity demand by other means than the grid (solar PV and batteries). Demand response (DR) 
could give consumers the ability to shift their demand in time, just as batteries can. For example, Koliou 
et al. (2015) analyse a tariff-based DR programme and find that it can result in reduced overall costs 
both for the DSO and consumers. It is hard to put a price tag on DR actions, but one can imagine that 
some demand shifting can be done fairly cheap through automatisation. This would mean that by 
including DR, the attractiveness to invest in batteries might reduce. Also, the negative impact on 
system cost of a network tariff that overly relies on imperfectly implemented capacity-base charges 
could be lower. However, this could also mean that the fairness issue would be more significant as it 
easier for active consumers with automated appliances to ‘shift’ network charges to passive consumers 
who do not own such appliances.  
                                                          
56 Active consumers install a battery (2.7 kWh per active consumer) to lower their grid charges and by doing so they also 
lower the overall grid costs (-14.6 %). A small increase in energy costs (+1.7 %) results due to energy losses of the battery. 
The increase in grid charges for the passive consumers compared to the baseline results from the introduction of the uniform 
fixed network charge in a setting with lower-usage passive consumers. 
57 In that regard, making the parameter NM, which is set to account for net-metering or net-purchase volumetric charges, 
endogenous and allowing it to be a continuous number might bring new insights. 
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Lastly, a limitation of the modelling approach is that the retailer energy price a consumer pays is not 
considered endogenous.58 One could argue that if consumers install solar PV, this will propagate to the 
wholesale market and finally energy prices could go down (see e.g. Darghouth et al. (2016)). This is 
true on the short-run, but in the long run the effect is more ambiguous. For example, Green and 
Vasilakos (2011) use a long-run market equilibrium model and find that in the long-run equilibrium the 
average price level does not change much with a significant increase in wind power. However, the 
volatility of the price would increase. To get an idea of the effect of more volatile energy prices, we 
added runs with time-of-use (TOU) energy retailer prices in Appendix C. It is found that with TOU 
energy prices instead of flat energy prices, system cost can decrease more compared to the baseline 
than in the presented numerical example. With TOU energy prices, batteries cannot only be used by 
active consumers to lower the peak demand but also to arbitrage energy prices. With TOU energy 
prices in place, in most scenarios, the proportion of capacity-based network charges in the least-cost 
network tariff decreases slightly. This occurs because battery investment is additionally incentivised 
by TOU energy prices. It is also shown that TOU energy prices affect not only battery adoption but can 
also affect solar PV adoption. 
 
Besides the interaction between network tariff design and TOU energy prices, a second main finding 
of the sensitivity analysis in Appendix C is that the results are sensitive to how financially attractive 
solar PV investment is. If we assume that the retailer energy price is higher than the cost to generate 
electricity from solar PV on rooftops, logically, the total system costs go down with solar PV adoption 
by the active consumers.59 However, we find that at the same time the fairness concern becomes more 
severe. Making the least-cost tariff fairer by increasing volumetric network charges to partially replace 
unpopular fixed network charges, does not work anymore in the case solar PV is cheaper. This is true 
because the investment distortion in solar PV investment become more sensitive to these increased 
volumetric charges. On the contrary, if solar PV is relatively expensive, fairness is less of a concern as 
the share of (net-purchase) volumetric network charges in the final network tariff can be quite high 
before these charges induce distortions. 
                                                          
58 Also, the impact of DER adoption on transmission costs are abstracted from the analysis, see e.g. Denholm et al. (2014) for 
a complete overview of the system benefits of DER adoption. 
59 In the sensitivity analysis we do this by inserting higher solar PV yield profiles than in the numerical example and keeping 
the investment cost of solar PV and the retailer energy price constant. Similar results would be obtained by lowering the 
investment cost of solar PV or increasing the retailer energy price.  
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7.2 Policy implication: overcoming the limitations of traditional network tariff design 
options 
Our work confirms the challenges faced by regulators today, e.g. in Europe (CEER, 2017a) and the US 
(Trabish, 2018). Before, distribution network tariffs were mainly a technical discussion between the 
DSO and the regulator. Today and in the future, there are a whole lot more stakeholders. These 
stakeholders need impact analysis where the response of consumers to network tariff design and 
distributional impacts are shown to justify choices.  
 
We found that if the regulator only has the three options available that we consider in this paper, it 
will be difficult to implement a fair network tariff design. However, in practice, our results regarding 
fairness might be overestimated as such issues can be improved through other solutions than standard 
network tariff design. Negative distributional effects could be remedied through specific low-income 
programmes as described by Wood et al. (2016). Another solution would be not to implement a 
uniform fixed network charge as in our analysis, but differentiate the fixed network charges per 
consumer or consumer groups without distorting the use of electricity, e.g. by income, property value, 
property size, kW connection capacity (Abdelmotteleb et al., 2017; MIT Energy Initiative, 2016; Pollitt, 
2018). It might also be possible to improve fairness by introducing some form of taxation for active 
consumers. However, taxation is also difficult to implement and could conflict with other public policy 
goals. In the case of high sunk grid costs, under-recovery of the grid costs could be an option as full 
cost recovery leads to inefficiencies. Not recovered sunk network costs could be recuperated through 
other means than the electricity bill, an option also discussed in the report by the MIT Energy Initiative 
(2016). An alternative could be to let taxpayers pay for these costs, as is done for roads in some 
countries. 
 
On the other hand, our results could underestimate the difficulties with least-cost and fair distribution 
network tariff in practice. We did assume policy costs not to interfere with the analysis, but the share 
of these costs in the electricity bill is increasing year by year in most countries, and the way these costs 
are recuperated from consumers, mostly volumetrically, can seriously distort network tariff design and 
aggravate efficiency and fairness issues. 
 
An additional takeaway is that we show that it can be reasonable to spread distribution network costs 
over the different traditional network charge options (volumetric, capacity-based and fixed) if these 
are the only options available. As such, the identified issues with each of them are dampened, i.e. 
distortions in solar PV adoption with too high volumetric network charges, distortions in battery 
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adoption with too high capacity-based network charges and fairness issues with too high fixed network 
charges. Three smaller distortions are desirable over one more significant distortion. Overall, more 
impact analysis is needed.  
 Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we have applied a game-theoretical model to analyse the impact of an implementation 
and fairness constraint on least-cost distribution network tariff design. The game-theoretical model 
takes into account decentralised decisions of self-interest pursuing active consumers enabled to invest 
in solar PV and batteries. 
 
First, we find that both constraints have a significant impact on the least-cost network tariff design. In 
theory, the least-cost distribution network tariff design has a fixed component that is proportional to 
the sunk costs, and a capacity component to reflect the costs of grid investments that still have to be 
made and that can be partly avoided if it is cheaper for active customers to invest in DER. In practice, 
departing from volumetric charges towards higher fixed charges is often perceived as unfair as their 
introduction would mean that low-usage passive consumers, who are often also less wealthy 
consumers, would pay similar charges as high-usage active consumers, who are often richer. Also, in 
practice, the individual capacity or individual peak is often a relatively weak approximation of the 
actual cost driver(s) of the network. As a result, a three-part tariff combining fixed, capacity, and 
volumetric charges may be more suitable, even though in theory, volumetric is not to be considered 
for a least-cost distribution network tariff design. 
 
Second, we find that there is a strong interaction between the two constraints we analysed. If 
regulators do not anticipate that their implementation of cost-reflective tariffs will be imperfect, the 
system costs will increase, and the fairness issues will also aggravate. It is therefore important to have 
realistic estimations of what we know and do not know about the cost drivers of distribution networks. 
Limited information is available, suggesting that we need to be careful in setting strong incentives. This 
is especially true with high shares of active consumers. 
 
Third, the results depend on the state of the grid. If most of the grid investments still have to be made, 
passive and active consumers can both be made to benefit from cost-reflective tariffs, while this is not 
the case for passive consumers if the costs are mostly sunk. The standard network tariff design options, 
i.e. volumetric, capacity, and fixed charges, do not suffice to transfer part of the welfare gains of the 
active consumers to compensate the passive consumers. Other solutions than standard tariff design 
would have to be introduced to reach a fairer outcome; examples are specific low-income 
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programmes, differentiated instead of uniform fixed charges, the recuperation of sunk network costs 
through other means than the electricity bill or the taxation of active customers, which has its own 
issues. 
 
Regarding future work, it would be interesting to include electric vehicles and heat pumps in the 
analysis. Accounting for these (mainly) electricity consuming technologies could present new insights. 
More granular network tariffs could become increasingly important to limit the efficiency loss. Overall, 
the interaction between network tariff design, retail energy pricing, public policies (e.g. energy 
efficiency and DER subsidies) and taxation deserves further analysis. Lastly, due to the structure of the 
model, it is assumed that the regulator has perfect insight into the consumer’s reaction on the network 
tariff design. This is a simplification. In reality, future demand is not known ex-ante and has to be 
estimated. This anticipation issue could be accounted for by including stochasticity in the consumer 
reaction. An example is the paper by Weijde and Hobbs (2012) in which a stochastic two-stage 
optimisation model that captures the multistage nature of the planning of a transmission network 
under uncertainty is presented. Actually, this planning uncertainty is another implementation issue 
with improved network tariffs. Adding multiple stages and stochasticity would require an expansion of 
the presented model. 
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CHAPTER 4: ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
TARIFF DESIGN AND THE BUSINESS CASE FOR RESIDENTIAL STORAGE 
Abstract 
Battery adoption by residential consumers, mostly coupled with a new or existing solar PV system, 
is expected to rise in the near future. In that regards, distribution network tariff design plays an 
important role. The network tariff design should align the business case of storage with the impact 
it has on the local grid. We evaluate capacity-based network charges and two types of network 
charges which stimulate self-consumption: net-purchase and bi-directional volumetric network 
charges. We show that when grid costs are sunk, all network tariff design options will over-
incentivise battery adoption at the expense of overall welfare. In contrast, when many future grid 
costs are to be made, the considered network tariff design options will mostly under-incentivise 
battery adoption, and potential welfare gains are missed out.  Besides the network tariff design, also 
time-varying energy prices do improve the business case of storage. However, some unwanted 
interactions between the network tariff design and time-varying energy prices are possible. 
 
Keywords: Batteries, distributed energy adoption, distribution network tariff design, game-theory, 
non-cooperative behaviour 
 
This chapter is written without co-authors and serves as a draft for a working paper. The additional 
finding regarding the interaction between different energy pricing schemes and the evaluated network 
tariff design might be omitted in the final version of the working paper. The reason for this is that this 
finding is expected to serve as a starting point for further research after the submission of the thesis. 
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at: 
 
 Workshop storage taskforce SmartEN–  Brussels, Belgium, 9 October, 2018  
 DIW: SET-Nav Modeling Workshop - Two-stage decision making and modelling for energy 
markets – Berlin, 11 October 2018  
 Conference on storage business models, organized by EASE and Vlerick Business School – 
Brussels, Belgium, 30 November 2018 
 3rd AIEE Energy Symposium –Milan, Italy, December 10-12, 2018 
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 Introduction 
Electrical energy storage, mainly in the form of lithium-ion batteries, is becoming a factor in the 
residential solar market. Schill et al. (2017) state that in Germany in 2015, nearly every second small-
scale PV system was installed together with a battery. By the end of 2016, summing up to about 48,000 
‘prosumage’ systems were installed. Maloney (2018) notes that 20% of Sunrun's customers have 
chosen to install solar plus storage systems in California in early 2018, in parts of Southern California 
that total is as high as 50% of sales. Greentech Media estimates that battery installations will reach a 
rate of more than 1300 MW per year by 2022 in the US (GTM Research and Energy Storage Association, 
2017). The business case of batteries is mainly a function of two forces. On the one hand, the strongly 
decreasing investment costs (see e.g. RMI (2015)). On the other hand, the reduction in the electricity 
bill that can be achieved by battery adoption. In this paper, we focus on the latter. In that regard, rate 
design, more specifically distribution network tariff design plays an important role. Distribution 
network charges represent on average around 30 % (incl. VAT) of the final electricity bill in Europe, 
with a maximum of around 50 % in Norway and a minimum of around 15 % in Italy (ACER and CEER, 
2018).  
 
Historically, volumetric distribution network charges (€/kWh) were in place in most jurisdictions 
around the world. This practice is being challenged in recent years. More specifically, volumetric 
charges with net-metering, implying that a consumer’s network charges are proportional to its net 
consumption from the grid over a period of time (e.g. month), are deemed inadequate with the 
massive deployment of solar PV. Consumers with solar PV pay significantly lower network charges but 
still rely on the distribution grid as much as they did before. In other words, such network charges 
serve as an implicit subsidy for solar PV which ends up being paid by consumers without solar PV.60 
Therefore, regulators in many countries are thinking to suspend net-metering and move more towards 
network tariffs which are capacity-based (€/kW) or stimulate self-consumption of the on-site 
generated electricity (CEER, 2017a; European Commission, 2015b; Hledik, 2014). Such types of 
distribution network charges are deemed to align better what consumers pay for the network with the 
costs they cause. Batteries are identified as a key enabling technology to allow the reduction of 
capacity needs of a consumer or to allow for more self-consumption.  
 
The impact of distribution network tariff design on the business case for residential electricity storage 
is the topic of this paper. More precisely, it is analysed whether the network tariff design aligns the 
                                                          
60 See e.g. the blog post by Lucas Davis (March 2018): https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2018/03/26/why-am-i-paying-
65-year-for-your-solar-panels/  
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business case for residential electricity storage with wider system benefits. We show that depending 
on the assumed grid cost structure, i.e. whether most grid investments are sunk or many grid 
investments still have to be made, batteries can be over-or under-incentivised by the design of the 
distribution network tariff; the network tariff can act as an implicit subsidy or a tax for storage 
adoption. 
 
Besides the network tariff design, an additional important driver for the business case of residential 
storage is time-varying energy prices. With time-varying energy prices, a battery can also be used for 
energy price arbitrage aside from solely reducing grid fees. Ceteris paribus, with time-varying energy 
prices instead of flat energy prices, the business case for storage will improve. However, a consumer, 
when deciding about the adoption and operation of storage, will look at the possible reduction in her 
final electricity bill instead of at each separate cost component (network charges, energy costs and 
taxes and levies) in isolation. Therefore, there is an interaction between network tariff design and 
energy price arbitrage. We look briefly at how this interaction can result in energy arbitrage strategies 
that deviate from the optimal energy arbitrage strategy which would lead to the highest wider system 
benefits.  
 
The following of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the evaluated distribution network 
tariff designs are introduced. In Section 3, the methodology is described. Two models are used. A 
game-theoretical model with which the alignment of incentives of individual consumers and the wider 
system is evaluated and a central planner model that serves as a benchmark. The full model 
formulation is not treated in the body of the text but can be found in Appendix A. In Section 4 , the 
setup and data for the numerical example are described. In the core of the paper, Section 5, results 
are shown and discussed. The result section is split up into four parts. First, we show the results for 
the case that all grid costs are assumed sunk. Second, we show the results for the case that the grid 
costs are driven by the aggregated consumer peak demand. Third, we look at how time-varying energy 
prices impact the results. Fourth, we show that there exists a theoretically optimal network tariff 
design, so-called critical peak pricing, which approximates the outcome of the central planner under 
given assumptions. Lastly, in Section 5 a conclusion is presented, and policy implications are derived. 
 Evaluated distribution network tariff designs 
In this section, the three evaluated network tariff designs are introduced. First, we describe capacity-
based network charges. After, two types of network charges which stimulate self-consumption are 
introduced: net-purchase and bi-directional volumetric network charges.  
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2.1 Capacity-based network charges 
With capacity-based network charges, also called (maximum) demand charges in the US, a consumer 
pays for the grid according to his (individual) monthly or yearly peak capacity usage averaged per e.g. 
an hour. Simshauser (2016)  finds that capacity-based charges resolve issues with volumetric network 
charges such as rate instability and wealth transfers between solar PV and non-solar PV adopters. The 
idea behind capacity-based charges is that as the main driver of the network is (peak) network capacity, 
it makes sense to charge consumers according to their maximum network capacity needs. The problem 
is however that individual consumer maximum capacity-usage does not always coincide with the main 
network cost driver, the aggregated peak capacity need over a group of consumers connected to the 
same network.  
 
In that regard, Simshauser (2016) notes that if the capacity-based charge overstates the value of peak 
load, it may pull-forward battery storage to an extent that it is not cost-efficient anymore. Similarly, 
Brown and Sappington (2018) find that capacity-based charges tend to be relatively effective at 
enhancing welfare when the demand for electricity is relatively sensitive to price and when the peak 
demands of all consumers occur during the same period. However, welfare gains are a lot more modest 
when the peak demands of many residential customers do not coincide with the system-wide peak 
demand for electricity. Finally, Passey et al. (2017) present a method to assess the cost-reflectivity of 
capacity-based charges visually and test different implementations.  They use Australian data and find 
that standard capacity-based charges to have low cost-reflectivity in terms of aligning customer bills 
with their contribution to the overall network peak demand. The authors continue by arguing that the 
potentially significant adverse impacts on the economic efficiency of such tariffs is an issue that does 
not appear to have received sufficient policy attention. However, more advanced implementations 
significantly improve the cost-reflectivity. An example are capacity-based charges that are only levied 
during the months in which the aggregated peak demand occurs.  
2.2 Self-consumption incentivising network charges 
Besides capacity-based network charges, we also evaluate two distribution network tariff design that 
stimulates self-consumption.61 With net-purchase volumetric charges, a consumer pays a €/kWh fee 
for all electricity withdrawn from the network. Contrarily to the historical practice of volumetric 
charges with net-metering, the meter does not turn backwards when excess electricity is injected in 
                                                          
61 Self-consumption is defined as the direct use of PV electricity on the same site where it is produced, with a smaller amount 
of electricity fed into the grid. 
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the network. With bi-directional volumetric network charges, a €/kWh network fee is paid for each 
kWh of electricity withdrawn and injected into the network.62  
 
By creating a difference between the value of on-site generated electricity that is self-consumed or 
injected back into the network, these network tariff design incentivise self-consumption.  On one 
extreme, volumetric network charges with net-metering did not stimulate self-consumption at all, i.e. 
the grid acts as a free battery, and the price a consumer receives to inject 1 kWh into the grid is always 
equal (or even greater) than the price a consumer pays to consume 1 kWh from the grid. On the other 
extreme, volumetric network charges with bi-directional metering, i.e. a consumer has to pay a 
volumetric network charge to withdraw and a volumetric network charge to inject electricity in the 
grid, will give the incentive to minimise the exchange of electricity with the grid and thus to maximise 
self-consumption. The incentive to self-consume under volumetric charges with net-purchase lies in 
the middle. 
 
Different self-consumption policies have been implemented in different countries. Luthander et al. 
(2015) describes that for example Italy had a self-consumption premium and that also China has 
recently introduced a similar self-consumption subsidy. The authors add that also in Germany there 
was a bonus for self-consumed electricity between 2000 and 2012. However, since 2012 the price a 
consumer received to inject one kWh of electricity into the grid fell below the final price to consume 
one kWh of electricity (energy cost, network charges plus taxes and levies). As such, self-consumption 
has become profitable even without the extra incentive and the bonus has therefore disappeared. 
Similarly, Green and Staffell (2017) explain that an electricity tariff is in place in the UK which triples 
the value of stored energy due to the arbitrage value of avoiding exports and storing electricity until it 
is consumed. 
 Methodology  
Two models are used to do the analysis: a game-theoretical model and a central planner model. First, 
we describe the game-theoretical model. After, the central planner model is briefly described.  The 
game-theoretical model is used to capture the interaction between the distribution network tariff 
design, decentralised decision making of self-interest pursuing active consumers investing in solar PV 
and batteries, and their aggregated effect on the network costs. The model was first introduced in 
Schittekatte and Meeus (2018). In Schittekatte and Meeus (2018) the model was used to analyse the 
                                                          
62 We assume in this analysis that the fee to withdrawn has the same magnitude as the fee to inject. 
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trade-off between cost-reflective and fair distribution network tariff design. The central planner model 
serves as a first-best benchmark. The full formulation of both models can be found in Appendix A. 
3.1 Game-theoretical model 
The game-theoretical model has a bi-level structure. A regulator is represented in the upper-level. The 
regulator decides upon the distribution network tariff in place anticipating the reactions of the 
consumers represented in the lower-level. The objective of the regulator is to minimise the total 
system cost under the condition that the total network costs equal the network charges collected from 
the consumers. The total system costs consist of four components: total grid costs, total retailer energy 
costs, total DER investment costs and other costs.63 The relative share of the different components of 
the total system costs are a function of the incentives of the consumers, i.e. the mix of the energy 
sourced from the retailer and delivered by the grid and the energy delivered directly from installed 
DER at the consumer-side.  
 
The total grid costs can consist of two parts: sunk grid costs and prospective grid costs. Sunk grid costs 
are the costs of grid investments made in the past to be able to cope with electricity demand in the 
future and these costs are unaffected by the utilisation of the network. Prospective grid costs are 
variable (in the long-run) and a function of the maximum coincident network utilisation of all 
consumers. The higher the coincident peak, the higher the network costs to be recovered. 
Abdelmotteleb et al. (2017), Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017) and Simshauser (2016) describe that the 
coincident peak demand (or exceptionally the injection if higher) is generally considered as the main 
cost driver of a distribution network. Next to the coincident peak demand, other network cost drivers 
can be identified, such as thermal losses and the investment cost to replace electronic components 
(e.g. protection) to deal with bi-directional flows due to high concentrations in PV adoption (see e.g. 
MIT Energy Initiative (2015) and Cohen et al. (2016)). These other network cost drivers are not included 
in the current analysis. 
 
Consumers react to the electricity bill as a whole, but the accounting of the cost components is 
separate as we consider an unbundled setting. Besides the endogenously considered network charges, 
the consumers buy electricity, the commodity, from a retailer who bought this energy in the wholesale 
market and sells it to downstream consumers for an exogenous price. Finally, next to the retailer 
energy price and the network charges, a consumer pays taxes and levies; the level of these costs is 
considered invariant, and the way these are collected does not interfere with the analysis. Modelled 
                                                          
63 Other costs represent taxes and levies recovered from consumers; it is assumed that the total level of these costs is 
invariant. 
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consumers can be passive or active. Passive consumers are assumed not to react to prices; active 
consumers pursue their own self-interest, i.e. their objective is to minimise the cost to satisfy their 
electricity demand. They have the option to invest in two technologies, solar PV and batteries, to lower 
their dependence on grid supplied electricity. 
 
The incentives of the active consumers will not always align with system benefits and can have negative 
distributional consequences. An intuitive example is what happens with volumetric charges with net-
metering in place. In that case, an active consumer will be incentivised to install solar PV; the 
investment cost of solar PV is compared to the avoided retailer energy costs ánd network charges. 
From a system perspective, the total retailer energy costs will go down as consumers buy less energy 
from the retailer, the total DER investment costs will go up due to investment in solar PV and the total 
grid costs will more or less stay the same as stand-alone solar PV does not affect the grid costs much. 
High PV generation and the aggregated consumer peak demand often do not coincide. As a result, the 
reduction in grid charges for consumers is higher than the avoided grid cost. Overall, the total system 
costs might even go up due to the solar PV adoption compared to a situation in which no consumer 
installs solar PV.64 In addition, the network charges (in €/kWh) need to increase to allow full grid cost 
recovery. As a result of this increase, mostly passive consumers, which did not install solar PV, will see 
their electricity bill increase. Similarly, in this paper, we focus on battery adoption and do this analysis 
for capacity-based charges, net-purchase volumetric charges, bi-directional volumetric charges in 
Sections 5.1 to 5.3 and for (time-varying) peak-coincident network charges in Section 5.4.  
 
Mathematically speaking the model is formulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC). An equilibrium is obtained if all grid costs are recovered and none of the 
consumers has an incentive to adapt their electricity withdrawal and injection pattern from the grid by 
e.g. by installing more solar panels or using installed batteries in an alternate fashion. Different 
methods exist to solve the model. In this case, the model is reformulated as a Mixed Integer Linear 
Programme (MILP) which can be solved using commercial off-the-shelf optimisation software. For a 
complete treatment of different solution methods see Gabriel et al. (2012). 
3.2 Central planner model 
Besides the game-theoretical model, a centralised planner model is used as a benchmark. The 
difference with the game-theoretical model is that there is no distribution network tariff formulated 
in the central planner model; the consumers do not need to be coordinated. Instead of consumers 
                                                          
64 Disregarding the environmental benefits of the adoption of solar PV. 
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acting in their own interest, the central planner decides unilaterally about their actions. 65 The central 
planner model is formulated as a linear programme (LP). By comparing the results for the evaluated 
network tariff designs with the game-theoretical model and this benchmark, we can show how much 
storage is under- or over incentivised due to imperfect distribution network tariff design. Also, the 
impact on system cost due to the imperfect network tariff design can be estimated.  
 Numerical example 
In this section, the numerical example is described. The section is split up into four subsections which 
each consider a different group of input data. This data is used to calibrate the model. It should be 
noted that the demand and solar PV profiles presented in subsection 4.1, the baseline consumer bill 
presented in subsection 4.2 and the grid costs as described in subsection 4.3 are the same as used in 
Schittekatte and Meeus (2018). Results for additional consumer profiles can be found in Appendix D. 
4.1 Consumer types, demand and solar yield 
Two consumer types are modelled for simplicity: passive and active consumers, as is also done in 
Brown and Sappington (2017a, 2017b, 2018) and Schittekatte et al. (2018). The passive consumer does 
not have the option to invest in solar PV and batteries, unlike an active consumer, who can opt to 
invest in DER. Passive consumers do not have the financial means, are strongly risk averse or are 
uninformed about the possibility to invest in DER. Active consumers minimise their costs to meet their 
electricity demand and may invest in DER to do so. At one extreme, all consumers can be passive, as 
in the recent past. At the other extreme, all consumers can be active, i.e. install DER when it can reduce 
their overall electricity cost. Reality presumably lies in the middle. Some consumers will remain passive 
for a number of reasons. Other consumers could be installing DER even when they do not financially 
profit from it, but because of other reasons which are harder to monetise, e.g. independence from the 
grid, sustainability motives etc. In the numerical example, it is assumed that 50% of all consumers are 
active and 50% are passive.66  The consumer demand and solar PV yield profiles are represented using 
a time series of 48-hours with hourly time steps and are shown in Figure 17 (left). The yield per kWp 
of solar PV installed is shown in Figure 17 (right). 
                                                          
65 Please note that no economies of scale in terms of battery investment are considered, e.g. a battery of 250 kWh energy 
capacity is cheaper than 25 batteries of 10 kWh. If that would be the case, an additional advantage of the central planner 
approach would be to invest in a couple of large batteries instead of a multitude of smaller batteries per household as also 
discussed in Schill et al. (2017). 
66 50 % active consumer might seem quite a lot today. Today many consumers are passive because they are indifferent or 
vulnerable. A lower proportion of active consumers result in a lower impact of distortive network tariff design on total system 
costs. However, distortions result in costs shifts from active to passive consumers. In their turn, these cost shifts could again 
convert more (indifferent) passive consumers into active ones, increasing the impact of the distortion. Also, with dropping 
costs in DER, rising electricity bills, digitalisation and more climate awareness, a proportion of indifferent passive consumers 
might turn active.   
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Figure 17: Original 48-hour electricity demand profiles (left) and PV yield profile (right) 
 
The household demand for electricity shows for both modelled days a small peak in the morning and 
a stronger peak in the evening, the typical ‘humped-camel shape’ (Faruqui and Graf, 2018). For both 
consumer types the shape of the demand profile is identical; however, it is scaled differently. As a 
result, passive consumers have a slightly lower electricity demand than active consumers. The passive 
consumer has an annual consumption of 5,200 kWh with a peak demand of 3.2 kW and the active 
consumer a 7,800 kWh annual consumption with a peak demand of 4.8 kW. In Europe, average annual 
electricity consumption per household ranged from 20,000 kWh (Sweden) to 1,400 kWh (Romania) in 
2015. In the same year, the average electricity consumption per household in the USA was about 
10,800 kWh (EIA, 2016).  The idea behind this difference in the levels of consumption is that active 
consumers are expected to be more affluent than passive consumers and that affluent consumers have 
higher electricity needs. This statement is a simplification of reality, but evidence for it is found in the 
literature (e.g. Borenstein (2017) and Hledik et al. (2016)). 
 
The yield per kWp of solar PV installed, as shown in Figure 17 (right), scales up to 1,160 kWh per year. 
As a reference, this level is similar to the average yield in the territory of France (Šúri et al., 2007). 
Seasonality is introduced in the PV yield profile by having a daily average PV yield of 40% of either side 
of the annual mean. The peak demand coincides with the day with the low PV yield. Letting the peak 
demand day coincide with the day with lower solar irradiation and vice-versa produces two effects. 
First, a high capacity of PV installed does not necessarily mean that the peak demand can be reduced. 
Faruqui and Graf (2018) investigate load profiles in Kansas and find that after the installation of PV 
systems, logically the net energy consumption reduces; nevertheless, the peak demand is virtually left 
unchanged. Second, if a high capacity of PV is installed, the injection peak of active consumers can 
become significant. 
4.2 Baseline consumer bills 
In Table 11 the baseline consumer electricity bill, paid by the consumers when no consumer installs 
any DER technology, is shown. However, if active consumers decide to invest in DER, the relative 
proportion and absolute values of the bill components can change for both the active and the passive 
95 
 
consumers. The annual electricity cost for the active and passive consumer equals respectively 1,340 
€/year (0.172 €/kWh delivered) and 971 €/year (0.187 €/kWh delivered). This total cost is near the 
average electricity cost for EU households in 2015, which was estimated at around 0.21€/kWh 
(Eurostat, 2016). In the USA, the average electricity cost in 2015 was around 0.125€/kWh (EIA, 2016). 
The consumer bill is based on information from the Market Monitoring report by ACER and CEER 
(2016). There, the breakdown of the different components of the electricity bill for an average 
consumer in the EU for the year 2015 is presented. The energy component in the EU in 2015 is 
estimated at 37%. In absolute terms, this is a cost of 0.077 €/kWh. Further, 26% of the bill consisted of 
network charges, and 13% are RES and other charges. Finally, an important chunk of the bill (25%) 
consists of taxes. A value-added tax (VAT), averaging 15%, must be paid and additional (ecological) 
taxes, averaging 10%, are raised in some countries. In this work, the VAT is integrated into the three 
components of the bill. Please note that a typical consumer bill varies from one country to another 
(e.g.  ACER and CEER (2016) for the EU). 
Table 11: Consumer bill in the baseline scenario (no investment in DER by active consumers)  
 
Recovery 
Cost per year 
Bill component Active Passive 
Energy costs  0.08 €/kWh 624 €/year (46 %) 416 €/year (43 %) 
Network charges  
Default: 0.062 €/kWh 
In the analysis: least-cost network tariffs 
485 €/year (36 %) 324 €/year (33 %) 
Other charges  Fixed fee (no interference with the analysis) 231 €/year (17-24 %) 
Total electricity 
cost  
 1340 €/year 
 (0.172 €/kWh) 
971 €/year  
(0.187 €/kWh) 
In the result sections 5.1 and 5.2, the retailer energy price is set at a constant rate of 0.08 €/kWh in 
order to isolate the impact of distribution network tariff design. In Section 5.3, two time-of-use (TOU) 
energy pricing schemes are introduced. To be able to compare results among the three energy price 
profiles, the TOU energy price schemes are scaled to make sure that in the baseline scenario (no DER) 
the weighted average energy price per consumer type is equal over the different energy price profiles. 
This means that the average TOU energy price will be slightly lower than 0.08 €/kWh. This is because 
consumers have a higher demand during the times that the energy prices are relatively higher for these 
profiles.  Other charges are recovered through a fixed fee and as such do not interfere with the analysis. 
However, this is not always the case. How to collect such charges, or whether they belong in the 
electricity bill at all, is beyond the scope of this work, see e.g. the paper of Bohringer et al. (2017) in 
which the German case is discussed. The network charges are in the baseline case recovered through 
(net-metered) volumetric charges equal to 0.062 €/kWh. In the results presented in Section 5, different 
network tariff designs are evaluated. 
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4.3 Grid cost structure 
The values for the parameters of the grid cost function (Eq. A.9) are derived from the ‘baseline network 
costs’ of the modelled consumers (shown in Table 11) and are a function of the proportion of active 
and passive consumers. With 50 % active and 50 % passive consumers, the (scaled) coincident 
consumer peak demand equals 4 kW in the baseline scenario, and the average grid costs equal 404 
€/consumer.67  
 
In Section 5.1  grid costs are assumed 100% sunk. In Section 5.2-5.4, all grid costs are assumed to be 
driven by consumers. In that case, the incremental grid cost is set to 101 €/kW. As a reference, Brown 
et al. (2015) assume the (annualised) cost to be 75$/kW.  
4.4 DER investment cost and technical parameters 
Two DER technologies are assumed at the disposition of active consumers: solar PV and batteries. A 
scenario with low PV but also battery investment costs can be expected to materialise soon as pointed 
out by many studies (Lazard, 2016b, 2016a; MIT Energy Initiative (2016a); RMI, 2015). 
 
The investment cost of solar PV is set equal to 1250 €/kWp. Under flat energy prices, this means that 
the levelised cost of energy (LCOE) of solar PV is 0.086 €/kWh.68 Excluding grid charges, an active 
consumer is assumed to receive 98 % of the retailer energy price when injecting solar energy.69 An 
important assumption is that no investment subsidy for PV is introduced in this work and no reduced 
social losses from environmental externalities due to the installation of solar PV are accounted for. 
Table 12 shows the other DER parameters. Technical DER data is in line with Schittekatte et al. (2016). 
Table 12: Financial and technical DER data 
Parameters PV related Value Parameters battery related Value 
Lifetime PV 20 years Lifetime battery 10 years 
Discount factor PV  5 % Discount factor battery 5 % 
Maximum solar capacity installed 5 kWp Maximum battery capacity installed No limit 
Price received for electricity injected (% of 
retailer energy price) 
98 % Efficiency charging & discharging 
Leakage rate 
90 % 
2 % 
Sensitivity is done regarding the batteries investment costs. Investment costs between 350 €/kWh and 
100 €/kWh with steps of 50 €/kWh are tested for. All batteries are assumed to have a C-rate of 1, i.e. 
                                                          
67 4kW = 0.5*4.8 kW + 0.5*3.2 kW and 404 € = 0.5*485 € + 0.5*324 € 
68 In the model applied, the LCOE of solar PV is a function of the investment cost of the PV panel, lifetime, discount factor, 
the PV system performance ratio and importantly the solar PV yield profile, which is location dependendent. 
69 This percentage is deliberatly not set equal to 100 % but just below. The reason is that if it would be 100 %, excluding the 
impact of the network tariff design, an active consumer would be indifferent in self-consuming or injecting the solar PV 
energy. This could lead to modelling issues. Setting the selling price equal to 98 % instead of 100 % of buying price has no 
significant effect on the results. 
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the battery can fully (dis)charge in one hour. Schmidt et al. (2017) find that regardless of electricity 
storage technology, capital costs are on a trajectory towards US$ 340± 60kWh-1 for installed stationary 
systems and US$175±25kWh-1 for battery packs by 2027-2040. Hledik et al. (2018) review many studies 
and are more bullish. They state that the investment cost of residential storage could be declined to 
250 $/kWh by 2025. 
As mentioned before, what matters for the business case of residential electricity storage is how the 
battery investment costs measure up against the reduction in the electricity bill that can be made by 
investing in batteries. The point of this work is not to obtain an estimate about at what exact 
investment costs residential storage becomes financially viable. Instead, the aim is to analyse the 
interactions between the business case for storage and the distribution network tariff design. As an 
alternative to ranging over different values for battery investment costs, the results could be tested 
for different magnitudes of the grid costs recuperated through the electricity bill. 
 Results 
In this section, we show and discuss the results obtained with the numerical example. We show the 
results for the three considered network tariff structures: capacity-based charges, net-purchase 
volumetric network charges and bi-directional volumetric network charges. More specifically, per 
network tariff design we show the capacity of storage adopted by the active consumers compared to 
the benchmark. Also, we compare the total system costs, a proxy for overall cost-efficiency of the 
network tariff design.  
 
The section is split up into four parts. First, we show the results for the case that all grid costs are 
assumed sunk. Second, we show the results for the case that the grid costs are driven by the 
aggregated consumer peak demand. Third, we look at how time-varying energy prices impact the 
results. Fourth, we show that there exists a theoretically optimal network tariff design, so-called critical 
peak pricing, which approximates the outcome of the central planner under the given assumptions. 
5.1 Sunk grid costs 
First, grid costs are assumed to be 100% sunk, a short-term vision, i.e. the grid is over-dimensioned, 
and the electricity usage of consumers has no effect on the total grid costs. In some countries, also 
policy costs are recovered through the network charges, which from a cost allocation point of view is 
no different than recovering sunk network costs. In Table 13, the capacity of the battery installed per 
active consumer is shown for the different distribution network tariff designs. Sensitivity analysis 
regarding the investment costs of the batteries is done. The benchmark network tariff design is the 
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central planner. Also fixed network charges (€/consumer) give the same results as the central planner. 
This is true as it is assumed that all grid costs are sunk, no consumers go off-grid completely and that 
all externalities (e.g. CO2 emissions) are priced correctly in the other components of the electricity bill.  
  
The results are split up in three parts to single out the interaction between investment in solar PV and 
batteries by active consumers. First, it is assumed that there is no possibility for the active consumer 
to invest in solar PV. Second, the active consumer is free to install solar PV up to 5 kWp if this 
investment lowers its costs to fulfil its electricity needs. Third, it is assumed that the active consumer 
always installs a 5 kWp solar PV installation at its premises.70  
Table 13: Battery and solar PV investment per active consumer for the different network tariff 
designs under different investment cost assumptions for batteries and interaction with solar PV 
investments. All grid costs are assumed sunk. 
Distribution network tariff design 
 
Benchmark – 
central 
planner/ fixed 
charges [€] 
Capacity-based 
[€/kW] 
Volumetric 
Net-purchase 
[€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional 
[€/kWh] 
Investment cost batteries 
Battery installed per active consumer [kWh]  
/ PV in brackets [kWp] 
No PV installed, 
only batteries can 
be invested in by 
the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
300 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
250 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
200 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
150 €/kWh 0 (0) 4.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
100 €/kWh 0 (0) 6.8 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Batteries and PV 
can be installed in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.4 (3.2) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
300 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.6 (1.4) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
250 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.6 (0.5) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
200 €/kWh 0 (0) 3.7 (0.4) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
150 €/kWh 0 (0) 6.9 (3.7) 0 (5) 0.6 (0.7) 
100 €/kWh 0 (0) 9.6 (4.8) 4.9 (5) 2.2 (1.4) 
Active consumer 
has a 5 kWp solar 
PV, batteries can 
be invested in 
350 €/kWh 0 (5) 3.2 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 
300 €/kWh 0 (5) 3.2 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 
250 €/kWh 0 (5) 3.2 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 
200 €/kWh 0 (5) 6.4 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 
150 €/kWh 0 (5) 6.5 (5) 0 (5) 13.3 (5) 
100 €/kWh 0 (5) 9.7 (5) 4.9 (5) 13.3 (5) 
 
                                                          
70 In modelling terms, this means that first for the active consumers the maximum capacity of solar PV installed is set equal 
to 0 kWp. Then, the maximum capacity of solar PV is set to 5kWp and the minimum capacity of solar PV is set to 0 kWp. Lastly, 
both the maximum and the minimum capacity of solar PV are set to 5kWp. For the passive consumers, the minimum and 
maximum capacity of solar PV (and batteries) are always set to zero. 
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Figure 18 shows the impact on the total system costs of the different distribution network tariff 
designs. Again the results are split up for the three cases of solar PV investment and the results are 
shown relative to the benchmark. 
 
Figure 18: Increase in total system costs for the three network tariff structures when compared with 
the benchmark. Sensitivity for three different assumptions regarding solar PV adoption and the 
investment cost of storage. 
Three observations can be made from Table 13 and Figure 18. First, capacity-based network charges 
over-incentivise battery adoption for all runs. Under capacity-based charges, active consumers can 
lower their individual peak demand by investing in a battery. By lowering their peak demand, they 
reduce their individual grid charges to be paid. But as we assume that grid costs are sunk, the total grid 
costs do not reduce. Therefore, when looking at the overall system cost in Figure 18, an increase results 
due to the investment in batteries by active consumers and accompanied energy losses in the battery. 
The reductions in grid charges by the active consumers are simply transferred to the passive consumers 
who see their electricity bill increase, and the investment cost in batteries by active consumers adds 
to the total system costs. The blue line in the left graph in Figure 18, which represents the cost of the 
distortion under the given assumptions, has a U-shape. This can be explained by the fact that the cost 
of the distortion is a function of the capacity of batteries adopted, the losses in the batteries and the 
investment costs of batteries. Logically, the cheaper batteries are, the higher the capacity of the 
batteries installed and the higher the losses are but, the lower the cost per kWh of battery installed. 
The results for when active consumers can invest in both batteries and solar PV in Table 13 show that 
there are some synergies between solar PV and battery investment under capacity-based network 
charges; higher capacities of solar PV are installed than under the benchmark network tariff, and the 
capacity of the batteries generally increases when compared to the case when no solar PV investment 
is enabled.   
 
The second observation is that no investment in batteries is made under the network tariff designs 
which incentivise self-consumption when no solar PV investment is enabled or when batteries are 
relatively expensive. It makes sense that under these network tariff designs, no batteries are invested 
in when no solar PV is enabled. In that case, the only other potential revenue from a battery investment 
would be arbitraging the energy price, but the energy price is assumed constant. This assumption is 
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relaxed in Section 5.3. The left graph in Figure 18 shows that these two tariff structures have the same 
performance as the benchmark, i.e. they do not cause any distortions. The middle graph in Figure 18 
shows that under net-purchase volumetric charges there is a constant minor distortion, excluding the 
case when the battery investment costs are 100 €/kWh. This can be explained by the fact that the 
active consumers each invest in 5 kWp while under the benchmark in no solar PV is invested; net-
purchase volumetric charges over-incentivise solar PV adoption in this case.71 The cost of the distortion 
is rather small as the LCOE of solar PV is just slightly higher than the energy price. A similar but less 
significant result is found for volumetric charges with bi-directional metering as less solar PV 
investment is done by the active consumers. 
 
Third, when active consumers have solar PV installed, and batteries are relatively cheap, batteries with 
a significant capacity are invested in under the network tariff designs that strongly incentivises self-
consumption. In that case, it makes sense for an active consumer to invest in a (relatively cheap) 
battery to avoid paying network charges by increasing self-consumption. We split this observation up 
into two. First, when the active consumer can choose to invest in solar PV, it can be seen in Table 13 
that under net-purchase volumetric charges the over-investment in solar PV can suddenly also trigger 
a significant over-investment in batteries. This happens when the battery investment costs drop to a 
low level. Again, this battery investment does not lower the grid costs and slightly increase the retailer 
energy costs due to losses. Therefore, the orange line the middle graph in Figure 18 shows a strong 
increase at that point. Second, when assumed that 5 kWp solar PV is already installed per active 
consumer, batteries are most over-incentivised under bi-directional volumetric charges. As a result, 
the self-consumption rate increases from 32.4 % without batteries to 59.0 % with batteries of 250 
€/kWh to finally 80.8 % when the cost of batteries reaches 150 €/kWh.72 This means that if the cost of 
batteries drops to that low level (alternatively, if the grid charges are very high), it is optimal for an 
active consumer to install a battery in order to strongly reduce the injection of any electricity generated 
by its solar PV panels into the network. Figure 18 (right) shows that this distortion has a high cost at 
relative cheap battery prices. The cost of the distortions becomes even higher than under capacity-
based charges. 
                                                          
71 1/ This over-incentive is much less strong than under volumetric network charges with net-metering and a function of the 
coincidence of the solar PV generation and the demand of the consumer. 2/ This distortion vanishes in the right graph in 
Figure 18 as in that case also 5 kWp is assumed to be installed by the active consumers under the benchmark network tariff, 
thus there is no difference in solar PV investment anymore between the benchmark and net-purchase volumetric charges. 
72 The self-consumption rate (SCR) is calculated as in Eq. 8 in Quoilin et al. (2016): the total solar electricity generated plus 
the total battery electricity output minus the total electricity injected in the grid and the total battery electricity input over 
the total solar electricity generated. 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑖 =
∑ (𝑖𝑠𝑖∗SYt,i−𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖+𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖−𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖)
T
𝑡
∑ (𝑖𝑠𝑖∗SYt,i)
T
𝑡
. In the same paper, it is stated that self-
consumption rates without batteries vary between 30% and 37%, thus agreeing with the value in this example. 
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5.2 Grid costs as a function of the aggregated consumer peak demand 
In this subsection, the other extreme in terms of grid cost scenario is examined. Instead of assuming 
the grid costs to be sunk, they are assumed to be fully driven by the aggregated consumer peak 
demand. The  aggregated consumer peak demand, also called coincident peak demand, is commonly 
considered to be the main cost driver of the network (Abdelmotteleb et al., 2017; Baldick, 2018; Pérez-
Arriaga et al., 2017). The assumption that no grid costs are sunk could be interpreted as a context in 
which the network is being built up or a fully amortised network is operating near its limits and needs 
to be expanded to accommodate strong load-growth.  
 
In Table 14, the capacity of the batteries installed per active consumer is shown for the different 
distribution network tariff designs. Again, sensitivity analysis regarding the investment costs of the 
batteries is conducted.  The benchmark network tariff design is again the central planner. In this case, 
fixed network charges do not replicate the outcome of the central planner anymore. Namely, with 
fixed network charges, active consumers are not incentivised to adjust their electricity withdrawal or 
injection patterns and thus to limit the incurred network cost. A fully informed central planner who 
can decide unilaterally on behalf of the consumers on how many batteries to install and how to operate 
them in order to obtain the lowest system costs is the first best outcome. In reality, however, there is 
no central planner. Instead, consumer decisions are driven by price signals, in this case network tariffs.  
 
Again the results are split up in three parts to single out the interaction between investment in solar 
PV and batteries by active consumers. Similarly, first, it is assumed that there is no possibility for the 
active consumer to invest in solar PV. Second, the active consumer is free to install solar PV up to 5 
kWp if this investment lowers its costs to fulfil its electricity needs. Third, it is assumed that the active 
consumer has a 5 kWp installation at its premises.  
Table 14: Battery and solar PV investment per active consumer for the different network tariff 
designs under different investment cost assumptions for batteries and interaction with solar PV 
investments. All grid costs are assumed to be driven by the aggregated consumer peak demand. 
Distribution network tariff design 
 
Benchmark – 
central 
planner 
Capacity-
based [€/kW] 
Volumetric 
Net-purchase 
[€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional 
[€/kWh] 
Investment cost batteries 
Battery installed per active consumer [kWh]  
/ PV in brackets [kWp] 
No PV installed, 
only batteries can 
be invested in by 
the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 4.4 (0) 2.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
300 €/kWh 4.4 (0) 2.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
250 €/kWh 5.5 (0) 3.3 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
150 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
100 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
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Batteries and PV 
can be installed in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 4.4 (0) 2.7 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
300 €/kWh 4.4 (0) 2.7 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
250 €/kWh 5.5 (0) 3.3 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 
150 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (5) 0.6 (0.7) 
100 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 4.7 (5) 2.2 (0.7) 
Active consumer 
has a 5 kWp solar 
PV, batteries can 
be invested in 
350 €/kWh 4.6 (5) 2.8 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 
300 €/kWh 4.8 (5) 2.8 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 
250 €/kWh 5.1 (5) 3.0 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 
200 €/kWh 5.7 (5) 3.1 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 
150 €/kWh 5.7 (5) 3.2 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 
100 €/kWh 7.3 (5) 4.2 (5) 4.7 (5) 13.3 (5) 
 
Figure 19 shows the impact on the total system costs for the different distribution network tariff 
designs. Again, the results are split up for the three cases of solar PV investment, and the results are 
shown relative to the benchmark. 
 
Figure 19: Increase in total system costs for the three network tariff structures when compared with 
a central planner. Sensitivity for three different assumptions regarding solar PV adoption and the 
investment cost of storage. 
Four observations are derived from Table 14 and Figure 19. First, under capacity-based charges, 
batteries are always under-incentivised when all grid costs are driven by the aggregated peak demand. 
More striking, when comparing these results with the results in Table 13, it can be seen that batteries 
with a lower capacity are installed than in the case grid costs are assumed sunk even though they are 
more useful from a system perspective. This can be explained as follows. Under the grid cost 
assumption, each investment in batteries by active consumers increases the value of additional 
investment in batteries until a certain point of saturation. This happens as, by each investment in 
batteries, the network tariff needs to increase in order to recuperate all network costs which remain 
the same. Thus, the business case of batteries (and solar PV) improves with increasing DER adoption. 
Saturation occurs when it becomes very costly to lower individual network charges, e.g. further reduce 
the individual peak demand when it is already significantly lowered due to a certain investment in 
batteries. This ‘’race-to-the-bottom’’ effect or non-cooperative behaviour is captured by the modelling 
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formulation.73 On the other hand, if grid costs are assumed to be driven by the aggregated peak 
demand and the network tariff in place adequately targets the network cost driver, an investment in 
batteries by active consumers can decrease the value of additional investment in DER. This effect is 
however ambiguous. Namely, each additional investment in batteries can lower the total grid costs. 
But at the same time, the grid charges paid by the active consumers will decrease as well. If the 
decrease in grid charges paid by the active consumer due to the adoption of batteries is lower in 
magnitude than the decrease in the total grid costs caused by their investment in batteries, all grid 
costs can be recuperated with a lower network tariff. In that case, an investment in batteries will 
decrease (‘’cannibalise’’) the incentive to install additional battery capacity.74 On the other hand, if the 
decrease in grid charges paid by the active consumer due to the adoption of batteries is higher than 
the magnitude of the decrease their investment caused on the total grid costs, the network tariff needs 
to increase to recuperate all grid costs. In this case, the same but weakened ‘’race-to-the-bottom’’ 
effect as under the sunk grid assumption occurs. 
 
The second observation is that not only batteries are under-invested in; active consumers also do not 
operate batteries in a way that their operation would lead to the lowest grid costs possible given the 
installed battery capacity. This is illustrated in the example shown in Figure 20; the results are shown 
for the run in which we assume that 5 kWp solar PV is installed by the consumer and batteries cost 
100 €/kWh. It is clear that under capacity-based charges, the active consumers flatten their profile in 
order to lower the grid charges to be paid (2nd row - left graph). However, it is the aggregated demand 
profile of both active and passive consumers that drives the grid costs. The aggregated profile is also 
shown in Figure 20 (2nd row –right graph). It could be said that active consumers operating their battery 
under capacity-based charges are uninformed about the aggregated demand.75 As such, the reduction 
of the aggregated peak demand is limited. Under the central planner approach, the active consumers 
significantly lower their demand at the time that the passive consumers have their peak. As a result, 
the aggregated peak, the one that really matters, is minimised.  
 
In this numerical example, only two consumer groups are modelled: active and passive consumer. Each 
consumer group is represented by one profile, and the profiles are coincident. In reality, many 
individual profiles exist, and these will not all be coincident. The assumption of coincident profiles can 
                                                          
73 Its significance is mostly a function of the proportion of active consumers and the attractiveness of DER investments 
relative to the network tariff structure and the magnitude of its coefficients. 
74 Similarly, as each investment in solar PV lowers the price of energy around noon and thus decreases the incentive to install 
more solar PV as described in Hirth (2013). 
75 Capacity-based network charges would have the same outcome as the central planner in the case that all consumers are 
active and they all have exactly the same electricity demand profile. This is also verified with the model. 
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be interpreted as capacity-based charges which are very carefully implemented, e.g. the capacity is 
only considered during certain months or even only during moments of the days within these months 
that the local system peak is expected to take place. More discussion on the implementation of 
capacity-based charges can be found in Passey et al. (2017) and Hledik (2014). In Appendix D, results 
are shown for three non-coincident consumer profiles. The results show that all observations remain 
the same for that setup, except for the fact that the performance of capacity-based network charges 
in terms of the reduction of system costs is overestimated with coincident consumer profiles. This 
overestimation mainly occurs when batteries are expensive and thus smaller battery capacities are 
installed. If higher battery capacities are installed, the individual peaks will be flattened over multiple 
time-steps thus possibly also during the time steps other consumers have their peak demand. As a 
result, also the aggregated consumer peak will decrease to a certain extent. 
 
Figure 20: Reactions of active consumers to the different network tariff design and their impact on 
the aggregated load profile and peak. Assumption: 5 kWp solar PV already installed by the active 
consumer and battery investment cost of 100 €/kWh. 
The third observation is that the two network tariff designs that incentivise self-consumption do not 
lead to investment in batteries if there is no solar PV installed by the active consumer or when there 
is solar PV installed, but batteries are relatively expensive. In other words, these network tariff designs 
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block the business case of storage when not coupled with electricity generation behind the meter. 
Figure 19 shows that because of the fact that no batteries are installed, the system costs are 
significantly higher than in the central planner case. 
 
Similar as in the case grid costs are assumed sunk, the fourth observation is that the two network tariff 
designs that incentivise self-consumption are shown to lead to significant investment in batteries if 
there is solar PV installed by the active consumer and batteries are relatively cheap. However, the 
investment in batteries does not result in a lower system cost as can be seen from Figure 19. Instead, 
the opposite occurs. The system cost increases relative to the benchmark. Figure 20 illustrates what 
happens. Indeed, the active consumers use the battery to increase self-consumption; under volumetric 
network charges with net-purchase 57.8 % of the electricity generated by solar PV is self-consumed 
for this example. This percentage increases further for bi-directional volumetric charges as also can be 
deducted from Figure 20, the self-consumption rate attained is 80.8 %.76  However, the batteries are 
not operated in a way that their functioning leads to a lower aggregated peak demand. Instead, the 
batteries are used to store as much as self-produced electricity as possible until it is fully charged. 
After, the battery is used to fulfil the demand of the active consumers instead of grid supplied 
electricity. The discharging goes on until a point in time that the batteries are fully discharged. Looking 
at Figure 20, for this example, the batteries are fully discharged just before the time steps when 
aggregated peak demand is near its maximum. As a result, the aggregated peak demand decreases 
only very slightly. 
 
Figure 21 summarises observations 1, 2 and 4 and further clarifies what happens regarding the total 
system cost for the example shown in Figure 20. The first vertical bar represents the baseline scenario, 
the case that no active consumer invests in DER. The proportions of the grid costs, energy retailer costs 
and taxes and levies are those as shown in Table 11. The next vertical bar represents the most optimal 
trade-off between the grid costs, retailer energy costs, solar PV and batteries for the given parameter 
settings. This optimal trade-off is the result of the central planner. This mix lowers the sum of the 
interacting components of the electricity bill to a total system cost which is 14 percentage points lower 
than the baseline.77 In the example, capacity-based charges, also lead to a mix which lowers the total 
system costs relative to the baseline, however, not as much as the central planner. Mainly due to an 
under-incentive to invest in batteries and sub-optimal operational signals, the grid costs are not 
                                                          
76 The self-consumption rates under the central planner and capacity-based charges are respectively 40.6 % and 43.4% for 
this example. 
77 Taxes and levies are assumed to be invariable and recovered through a fixed charge which does not distort the decisions 
of consumers. 
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decreased as much as would be optimal, as discussed in observations 1 and 2. Volumetric network 
tariffs with net-purchase lead to a total system cost with around the same value as the baseline, even 
though the composition of the different components is very different. Some batteries are installed, 
less than optimal, and they are not operated in a way that the grid costs are decreased. Interestingly, 
for this example, volumetric charges with bi-directional charges lead to a system which is more 
expensive than the baseline case without any DER investment. An overinvestment in batteries by the 
active consumers occurs. The active consumers are incentivised to increase self-consumption to a level 
which is not cost-efficient from a system point of view under the given assumptions. 
 
Figure 21: System costs and its components for the different network tariff designs. Assumption: 5 
kWp solar PV already installed by the active consumer and battery investment cost of 100 €/kWh. 
5.3 The impact of time-varying energy prices 
In the previous two sections, the focus was laid on the design of the distribution network tariff design. 
It was shown that the network tariff design has an impact on the business case for storage and whether 
the business case is aligned with overall system benefits. To single out the impact of distribution 
network tariff design, we assumed that the energy price was constant in time. However, besides 
network tariff design, another important driver for battery adoption are time-varying energy prices; 
households can arbitrage energy prices with batteries. Different papers, e.g. Ren et al. (2016) and 
Erdinc et al. (2015), show with case studies that a battery system creates greater savings for a 
household if energy prices are time-varying instead of flat. 
 
In this section, we introduce two TOU energy pricing schemes besides the flat retailer energy prices. 
In the previous sections, a constant retailer energy price of 0.08 €/kWh is assumed. Figure 22 shows 
the two newly introduced options. The TOU1 profile is ‘solar PV friendly’ as during hours that solar PV 
is producing, an energy price is charged which is slightly higher than the flat energy charge. The TOU2 
profile charges relatively high prices during the evening when consumer demand is expected to peak 
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and charges a relatively low price during the hours that solar PV is producing a lot. The TOU2 profile is 
less ‘solar PV friendly’ but might induce battery investment due to significant relative changes in the 
energy price between the different periods. These daily energy price patterns are used as 
representative for the year. To be able to compare results among the three energy price profiles, the 
TOU1 and TOU2 profile are scaled to make sure that in the baseline scenario (no DER) the weighted 
average energy price per consumer type is equal over the different energy price profiles. Also, for the 
runs for which the PV investment is forced, the difference in avoided energy costs due to solar PV 
adoption with the different TOU energy price schemes are corrected for to be able to compare the 
results with flat retailer energy prices.   
 
Please note that energy prices remain considered exogenous, i.e. more solar PV or battery adoption 
has no impact on the retailer energy prices. These results should therefore be interpreted carefully. 
They can be interpreted in the context of a specific area with high DER penetration which is part of a 
very large power system over which as a whole the DER penetration is a lot more modest. This 
assumption can be relaxed in future work. 
 
Figure 22: Three energy price schemes. 
In Table 15, the results for the battery capacity installed per active consumer are shown for the 
different battery investment costs, distribution network tariff designs and energy price schemes. We 
assume that all grid costs are driven by the aggregated peak demand. We do three observations. First, 
when comparing the results in Table 15 with the results in Table 14, it can be seen that indeed the 
battery capacity installed by the active consumers remains the same or in most cases increases under 
the TOU energy prices when compared to flat energy prices. This statement holds for the benchmark 
and the three evaluated distribution network tariff designs. Second, when comparing the two TOU 
energy price schemes, the TOU2 energy price scheme results in the highest increase in battery capacity 
installed for this numerical example. Third, interestingly, still no batteries are installed under the 
network tariffs that incentivise self-consumption if not combined with the adoption of solar PV. Even 
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though with time-varying energy prices there is the additional opportunity to arbitrage the energy 
prices. 
Table 15: Battery and solar PV investment per active consumer for the different network tariff 
designs and energy pricing schemes under different investment cost assumptions for batteries and 
interaction with solar PV investments. All grid costs are assumed to be driven by the aggregated 
peak demand.  
Distribution network tariff 
design 
 
Benchmark – central 
planner 
Capacity-based 
[€/kW] 
Volumetric Net-
purchase [€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional [€/kWh] 
Energy price TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 
Investment cost batteries Battery installed per active consumer [kWh] / PV in brackets [kWp] 
No PV 
installed, 
only batteries 
can be 
invested in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 4.6 (0) 6.1 (0) 2.8 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)0 
300 €/kWh 5.5 (0) 6.2 (0) 3.3 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
250 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 7.4 (0) 3.7 (0) 4.5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 11.0 (0) 3.7 (0) 6.6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
150 €/kWh 6.8 (0) 12.4 (0) 4.6 (0) 7.4 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
100 €/kWh 6.8 (0) 13.5 (0) 6.1 (0) 8.1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Batteries and 
PV can be 
installed in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 4.7 (0.8) 6.1 (0) 2.8 (0.8) 3.7 (0) 0 (5) 0 (1.2) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.5) 
300 €/kWh 5.5 (0.7) 6.2 (0) 3.3 (0.7) 3.7 (0) 0 (5) 0 (1.2) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.5) 
250 €/kWh 6.1 (0.4) 7.4 (0) 3.6 (0.4) 4.5 (0) 0 (5) 0.3 (1.2) 0 (0.7) 0.1 (0.5) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 11.0 (0) 3.7 (0) 6.6 (0) 0 (5) 3.8 (4.1) 0.0 (0.7) 0.6 (0.7) 
150 €/kWh 7.6 (0) 12.4 (0) 4.6 (0) 7.4 (0) 0.3 (5) 4.9 (5) 1.7 (1.2) 7.4 (3.1) 
100 €/kWh 10.1(0.5) 13.5 (0) 6.1 (0.5) 8.1 (0) 4.9 (5) 9.4 (4.3) 11.8(4.5) 9.8 (3.9) 
Active 
consumer 
has a 5 kWp 
solar PV, 
batteries can 
be invested 
in 
350 €/kWh 4.8 (5) 5.7 (5) 2.8 (5) 3.1 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 
300 €/kWh 5.2 (5) 5.7 (5) 3.0 (5) 3.1 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 
250 €/kWh 5.7 (5) 7.3 (5) 3.1 (5) 3.7 (5) 0 (5) 4.7 (5) 4.9 (5) 6.1 (5) 
200 €/kWh 5.7 (5) 10.3 (5) 3.2 (5) 6.0 (5) 0 (5) 4.9 (5) 4.9 (5) 8.9 (5) 
150 €/kWh 7.3 (5) 11.9 (5) 3.9 (5) 6.5 (5) 0.3 (5) 4.9 (5) 4.9 (5) 13.3 (5) 
100 €/kWh 10.3 (5) 15.0 (5) 6.0 (5) 10.2 (5) 4.9 (5) 8.9 (5) 13.3 (5) 13.3 (5) 
 
By including TOU energy prices, not only the grid costs can be decreased due to battery adoption but 
also the retailer energy costs can be lowered due to gains from arbitrage. For this numerical example, 
Table 16 shows whether this increased battery capacity installed also leads to a lower total system 
cost.  The relative difference in system costs between flat energy prices and the two TOU energy price 
schemes are shown for different distribution network tariff designs and investment cost of batteries. 
Table 16: Relative difference in system costs between flat energy prices and TOU energy prices for 
different distribution network tariff designs and investment cost of batteries. 
Distribution network tariff 
design 
 
Benchmark – 
central planner 
Capacity-based 
[€/kW] 
Volumetric Net-
purchase [€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional [€/kWh] 
Energy price TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 
Investment cost batteries Difference in total system costs compared to a flat energy price [%] 
No PV 
installed, 
only 
batteries can 
be invested 
in by the 
350 €/kWh -1.5% -5.4% -0.9% -3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
300 €/kWh -1.8% -6.0% -1.0% -3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
250 €/kWh -2.2% -6.5% -1.3% -3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
200 €/kWh -2.4% -7.5% -1.3% -4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
150 €/kWh -2.5% -9.4% -1.4% -5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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active 
consumers 
100 €/kWh -2.7% -11.9% -1.9% -6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Batteries and 
PV can be 
installed in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh -1.6% -5.4% -0.9% -3.2% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 0.3% 
300 €/kWh -1.8% -6.0% -1.0% -3.5% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 0.3% 
250 €/kWh -2.2% -6.5% -1.3% -3.8% -0.5% 0.3% -0.1% 0.4% 
200 €/kWh -2.4% -7.5% -1.3% -4.3% -0.5% 5.3% -0.1% 0.8% 
150 €/kWh -2.5% -9.4% -1.4% -5.3% -0.2% 0.6% 1.0% -0.7% 
100 €/kWh -3.3% -11.9% -1.9% -6.7% -2.0% -3.4% 5.1% 0.6% 
Active 
consumer 
has a 5 kWp 
solar PV, 
batteries can 
be invested 
in 
350 €/kWh -1.5% -5.0% -0.9% -3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
300 €/kWh -1.6% -5.4% -0.9% -3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 
250 €/kWh -1.8% -5.7% -0.9% -3.2% 0.0% -0.4% 3.1% 2.2% 
200 €/kWh -1.9% -6.9% -1.0% -3.8% 0.0% -2.1% -0.5% -9.7% 
150 €/kWh -2.1% -8.7% -1.0% -4.8% 0.3% -3.5% -0.5% 3.2% 
100 €/kWh -3.1% -11.1% -1.5% -6.2% -1.5% -12.8% -0.1% -5.4% 
 
Three observations are made from Table 16. The first observation is that for the benchmark, the central 
planner, the system costs always decrease when introducing TOU energy prices. With TOU energy 
prices instead of flat energy prices, there is an additional revenue stream for the battery which can 
also induce a decrease of the total system costs. In the central planner case, there are no distortive 
effects between network tariffs and energy prices. The higher investment in batteries is justified from 
a system point of view and leads to lower total system costs. Figure 23 shows this in detail for four 
runs of the model. It can be seen that in all four cases, under the central planner there are higher DER 
costs when TOU prices are put in place due to more investment in batteries but that these higher DER 
costs are compensated by a stronger decrease in energy costs and grid costs. Thus overall, the system 
costs go down. 
 
The second observation is that the system costs are always most decreased under the benchmark, with 
two exceptions. These two exceptions are underlined in Table 16. Excluding these two exceptions, the 
fact that the system costs decrease most under the benchmark implies that the evaluated network 
tariff designs distort energy price arbitrage. The two exceptions for which the system costs decrease 
more than the benchmark happens for the network tariffs which incentivise self-consumption. In these 
two cases, the TOU energy prices scheme alleviates part of the distortions introduced by the network 
tariff design. There is thus a positive synergy between TOU energy price scheme and the network tariff 
design when compared to the case that energy prices are flat.78 The lower-right graph in Figure 23 
shows the case where under net-purchase volumetric network charges, the system costs decrease 
more than under the central planner. It can be seen that DER costs increase but that a strong decrease 
in energy costs (due to arbitrage) results which also lowers the grid costs. This happens because the 
                                                          
78 The synergy is a function of the coincidence between the TOU energy price profile, the consumer demand profiles, the 
solar PV profiles and the battery investment cost. 
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periods in which the energy price is high, coincides with the periods of a high aggregated demand. As 
a result, less energy is bought at the time steps around the system peak demand. 
 
Figure 23: Absolute difference in the different system costs components when comparing a flat 
energy price with the two time-of-use energy price schemes under different battery investment cost 
scenarios. 
The third observation is that the system costs can also increase with time-varying energy prices instead 
of flat energy prices. Unfortunately, the positive synergy between time-varying energy prices and 
network tariffs as discussed in the previous observations seems to be not intentional but a pure 
coincidence. It is rather counterintuitive that with the introduction of TOU prices total system costs 
increase. One would thus expect that time-varying energy prices will always lead to an overall system 
cost reduction. Namely, with exogenous time-varying energy prices, an additional revenue source is 
added for batteries which can generate a decrease in energy costs for active consumers without having 
a direct adverse effect on passive consumers. Instead, it is shown that time-varying energy prices can 
also aggravate the distortion created by the network tariff design.  The upper-right graph in Figure 23 
shows a case where this happens both for net-purchase and bi-directional volumetric network charges. 
It can be seen that time-varying energy prices lead to a decrease in energy costs but that this decrease 
is significantly smaller than the increase in DER costs and grid costs. The grid costs increase because of 
the creation of new aggregated demand or injection peaks at times the energy price is very low or high 
respectively.  
 
It should be added that a disclaimer applies to the results discussed in this last observation. The 
creation of new peaks, driven by changes in the demand profiles of active consumers, only will have a 
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strong effect on the overall grid costs if the proportion of active consumers is high and their demand 
profiles are rather homogeneous. Overall, with self-consumption incentivising network tariffs in place, 
the impact on total system cost of time-varying energy prices when replacing flat energy prices is 
ambiguous. Chaotic interactions between the network tariff design and energy prices can bring 
forward results which are hard to anticipate. Also, because of the fact that the energy prices are not 
endogenous in the model, it cannot be assessed whether the arbitrage actions of the active consumers 
would affect the energy price in a way that the energy costs are further decreased (or exceptionally 
increase). Therefore, it cannot be excluded that overall a system costs decrease would result relative 
to the case that energy prices are flat. An extension of the modelling approach is needed. Whatsoever, 
what is clear from these results, is that imperfect network tariff design obstructs optimal energy 
arbitrage strategies. A consumer, when deciding about the adoption and operation of storage will look 
at the possible reduction in her final electricity bill, instead of at each separate cost component 
(network charges, energy costs and taxes and levies) in isolation. As a result, the interaction between 
network charges and energy prices has an impact on the business case of storage but also on the 
potential welfare gains from introducing time-varying instead of flat energy prices to residential 
consumers. 
5.4 Peak-coincident network prices: approximating the central planner outcome 
In the previous subsection, it is shown that none of the evaluated distribution network tariffs can 
replicate the outcome of the central planner. However, the evaluated network tariff designs are rather 
simple. In the literature, it is discussed that so-called critical peak-pricing or coincident peak-pricing 
can reproduce ideal incentive properties for consumers (see e.g. Abdelmotteleb et al. (2017), Baldick 
(2018) and Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017)). In this work, we test what happens if we allow the upper-level 
regulator to set such time-varying network charges. These network charges can be quite easily 
integrated into the model. The grid cost recovery described by Eq. A.9 in Appendix A becomes Eq. 1 
below where 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 stands for the (time-varying) network charge in €/kWh. 𝑓𝑛𝑡 represents the uniform 
fixed network charge which might complement the time-varying network charge. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1  
T
𝑡=1 + 𝑓𝑛𝑡  (1) 
𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 is a free variable. In the case of high solar PV penetration combined with low levels self-
consumption, it might even be optimal to have negative network prices. The equation representing 
grid charges in the objective function of the lower level consumers (Eq. A.11 in Appendix A), becomes: 
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 = ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡    (2) 
In this case, the regulator has to decide how to set the time-varying network charges in order to 
minimise the total system costs. Regarding the solution method, it is in this case extremely important 
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that the bilinear products in the upper-level cost recovery constraint (Eq. 1) are efficiently linearised 
using the strong duality theorem instead of being discretised are for example done in  Momber (2015, 
p. 102) and Schittekatte and Meeus (2018). The strong duality theorem says that if a problem is convex, 
the objective functions of the primal and dual problems have the same value at the optimum (Castillo 
et al., 2001). Another application of the strong duality theorem to linearize a bilinear term in an MPEC 
problem can be found for example in Ruiz and Conejo (2009). 
 
The reason why the linearization using strong duality is helpful in this case is due to the fact that the 
time-varying network charges are by definition a function of the time-step while this is not the case 
for the previously modelled capacity based-charges, volumetric net-purchase and volumetric bi-
directional charges. Therefore, when using the discretisation technique, the number of binaries 
needed to discretise the bilinear products with time-varying network charges are multiplied by the 
number of time-steps when compared to the number of binaries needed with non-time varying 
network charges. The introduction of such a high number of binaries slows down the model 
significantly and can even lead to not finding any solution while there is one. 
 
Figure 24 shows the resulting peak-coincident network charges for the numerical example with the 
three energy prices schemes. The results are shown for the case we assume that the active consumers 
have 5 kWp solar PV installed and the battery investment costs are 250 and 100 €/kWh.  
 
Figure 24: Examples of peak-coincident network prices for the case 5 kWp is installed by the active 
consumers. Sensitivity for the battery investment costs of 250 and 100 €/kWh. 
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As expected, it can be seen from Figure 24 that this more advanced network tariff exhibits peak prices 
at the time steps that the aggregated demand peaks and that network prices are equal to zero when 
the aggregated demand is rather low.79 Additionally, it is shown that the network charges are a 
function of the investment cost of the batteries and the energy price scheme in place. Overall, the 
lower the battery investment cost, the wider but, the less steep the network peak prices. The width 
has to do with the fact that if batteries are cheaper and thus higher capacities are adopted, the number 
of time steps increases in which the aggregated demand reaches its maximum. During all these time 
steps a network price signal is needed. The decreasing steepness of the peak has to do with the fact 
that with cheaper batteries a less strong incentive is needed to reaches the optimal outcome.80 If the 
peak price would be steeper, too many batteries could be invested in and vice-versa. Further, it can be 
seen that the network charges adjust with the energy prices scheme in place in order to send an 
adequate aggregated price signal to the consumers. 
 
For this numerical example, the outcome obtained by these peak-coincident network charges in terms 
of battery investment and the total system cost is exactly the same or less than 1 % higher than under 
the central planner.81 Overall, these results suggest that a more advanced network tariffs as 
formulated in this paper can approximate the outcome of a first-best outcome closely. A formal proof 
of how close the approximation is as a function of the parameters is out of the scope of this paper. 
 
Even though these results for peak-coincident network charges are very promising, it should be 
understated that they hinge upon the assumption that the upper-level regulator has full information 
about which consumers are active and how these active consumers will respond to a certain network 
price signal. In reality, there persists an information asymmetry between the regulator and the actions 
of consumers. It goes without saying that this asymmetry complicates implementation of this optimal 
network tariff design. 
                                                          
79 The peak-coincident network charges shown in Figure 24 are obtained using a two-step process. First, the MPEC is solved. 
After solving the MPEC, the lowest possible system costs (the objective of the upper-level) is known. However, the network 
charges computed are not unique. Namely, the upper-level regulator can arbitrarily increase the time-varying network charge 
at time-steps that the elasticity of the consumers is very low without changing the obtained value of the objective function. 
However, these arbitrary choices for the upper-level do have a distributional impact for the lower level consumers. Therefore, 
a second solution step was added. The MPEC remains exactly the same except for one constraint and the objective function. 
One constraint is added which states that the total system cost is forced to be equal to the minimal total system cost obtained 
in step one.  The objective function of the upper-level changed to a minimisation the sum of the coefficients of the network 
charges. As such, a unique solution is obtained for the network charges without room for arbitrary choices of the upper-level 
regulator. 
80 The total costs spend on batteries by the active consumer under-time varying prices, which equals the product of the 
battery capacity installed with the investment cost, decreases with decreasing battery costs. 
81 There are two exceptions, for the scenario when battery costs are 150€/kWh and 100 €/kWh and no investment in solar 
PV is assumed under TOU2 energy prices, the difference in total system costs is 2.2 and 4.0% respectively. Also, the installed 
battery capacities differ slightly. 
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 Conclusion and policy implications 
We use a game-theoretical model to analyse whether different distribution network tariff designs align 
the business case of residential electricity storage, in the form of batteries, with overall wider system 
benefits. Three different network tariff designs are evaluated: capacity-based charges, net-purchase 
volumetric network charges and bi-directional volumetric network charges. Capacity-based network 
tariffs incentivise consumers to lower their individual peak demand. The two other network tariff 
designs result in a difference between the value of on-site generated electricity that is self-consumed 
and electricity that is directly injected back into the network. As such, these network tariff design 
incentivise self-consumption. We compare the outcome of the game-theoretical model for the 
different network tariff designs with a first-best central planner solution. Besides network tariff design, 
another important driver for battery adoption is time-varying retailer energy prices. Therefore, also 
the impact of time-varying energy prices on battery adoption and the interaction with distribution 
network tariff design is investigated. 
 
We found that the business case of batteries and overall system benefits are not always aligned.  In 
one extreme, the case that most grid costs are sunk and little future grid investment is expected, the 
evaluated network tariffs mostly over-incentivize battery adoption. In this case, network costs are 
simply transferred from active to passive consumers, and each investment in batteries by active 
consumers increases the (private) value of additional investment in batteries. From a grid perspective, 
there is little need for batteries and the main exercise is to find an as little as possible distortive 
network tariff design which remains acceptable in terms of distributional impacts. Examples can be 
found in e.g. Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017), Pollitt (2018) and Wolak (2018): differentiated fixed network 
charges or not recovering all sunk grid costs through the electricity bill. Schittekatte and Meeus (2018) 
show that spreading the grid costs over capacity-based charges, volumetric charges and fixed charges 
can also mitigate the induced distortions. 
 
After, the other extreme is investigated; the situation when still many grid investments have to be 
made, and the future grid costs are driven by the growing aggregated peak demand of consumers. It 
is shown that in that situation the tested network tariff designs will not only give an inadequate 
investment signal to the consumers, also will the consumers operate their installed batteries sub-
optimally from a grid point of view. If consumer electricity demand profiles are rather homogeneous, 
batteries are under-invested by capacity-based charges. If consumer electricity demand profiles are 
heterogeneous, consumers will lower their individual demand which will have little effect on the 
system peak demand; a similar dynamic as in the sunk grid cost scenario occurs. With a network tariff 
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design that encourages self-consumption, the business case of storage is unrightfully negatively 
impacted when the batteries are not coupled with onsite generation such as solar PV. Oppositely, 
when active consumers combine solar PV with cheap batteries or grid costs are high, an over-
investment in batteries can result under the network tariff designs that encourage self-consumption. 
The batteries are fully charged with self-generated solar PV to increase self-consumption, but it can 
happen that by the time the system peak demand occurs, the batteries are already fully discharged 
again. In that case, a high capacity of batteries is installed, but they do not contribute to overall grid 
costs savings. It should be noted that energy losses in the distribution network or the cost of bi-
directional flows are omitted in the presented analysis.82 When self-consumption increases, there is 
less electricity exchange between the active consumers and the grid and bi-directional flows are 
reduced. More elaborated grid costs functions could be experimented with in future work. 
 
Time-of-use energy prices instead of flat energy prices are shown to improve the business case for 
residential storage for all evaluated network tariff designs. With time-of-use energy prices, the active 
consumers can use their batteries to arbitrage energy prices on top of lowering their network charges. 
The introduction of time-of-use energy prices seems in most cases also beneficial from a system point 
of view. However, far from all potential efficiency gains are exploited due to unwanted interaction 
between the network tariff design and retailer energy prices; imperfect network tariff designs obstruct 
the optimal energy arbitrage strategies. This mechanism shows that distribution network tariff design 
and retailer energy price schemes should not be evaluated in isolation. Both interact as a consumer 
reacts to their aggregate. Even more difficulties can be expected when accounting for taxes and levies 
in the electricity bill which are left out in this analysis. 
 
Overall, in a high future grid cost scenario, a more advanced network tariff design is needed to correctly 
align the business case of residential storage and wider system benefits. Without a more advanced 
network tariff design, it is not possible to fully unlock flexibility from the consumers-side and efficiently 
coordinate grid charges and energy prices signals. It is shown that peak-coincident network prices, 
which exhibit strong peak prices at times when there are system demand peaks, give optimal or near-
optimal results. Baldick (2018) explains that such types of tariffs are already used for transmission grid 
prices in for example ERCOT and Great-Britain. However, such distribution network tariff is hard to 
implement as they should have a very fine locational and temporal granularity. Peak prices could differ 
from one feeder to another and would have to be announced ex-ante or accounted for ex-post. If they 
                                                          
82 As a reference,  Costa-Campi et al. (2018) describe that energy losses in Spain in 2012 represented 8.9% of the total energy 
injected into the grid. 
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are announced ex-ante, it could happen that the expected peak differs from the realized peak. If they 
are accounted for ex-post, consumers’ bills could become unpredictable. Also, to estimate the 
magnitude of the coefficients of the peak charges is a hard job. Possibly time-of-use (TOU) network 
charges could be a good compromise between efficiency and implementation difficulty. 
 
Finally, other mechanisms could complement network tariff design to unlock consumer flexibility in 
terms of batteries adoption and operation. Examples are flexibility markets for system services (also 
referred to as markets for ancillary services) in which the DSO and/or TSO are the buyers of these 
services as described in Hadush and Meeus (2018). Both local congestion management or system 
balancing services can be procured. In these markets, aggregators can bundle DER resources. However, 
similar as with the introduction of time-of-use energy prices, it can also be expected that there will be 
an interaction between the network tariff design and the markets for the delivery of such services. This 
interaction deserves further attention when designing flexibility markets. 
 
It should be added that an important driver for the business case of residential electricity storage is 
left out the analysis, namely resilience. In areas where the electricity supply from the central grid is 
not very reliable, this can be an important driver. This driver is however hard to quantify. Also, by 
including an endogenous energy market in the model, more insight can be gained about how the 
interaction of time-varying energy prices and network tariffs impacts welfare. Govaerts et al. (2019) 
apply a similar model to analyse the spill-over effects of different distribution network tariffs across 
multiple countries.  
 
Finally, the game-theoretical applied in this work is highly stylised. For example, battery degradation 
is not taken into account. Battery degradation has shown to be an important cost for batteries which 
can also impact the operational strategy (Sidhu et al., 2018; Thompson, 2018; Uddin et al., 2017). Also, 
a constant C-rate (max. output over max. energy capacity) of the battery has been assumed. Different 
C-rates could lead to different business cases and uses for the battery as also shown in Schittekatte et 
al. (2016) and Schill et al. (2017). Besides battery storage, demand-side management (DSM) and smart 
charging of an electric vehicle is another way to do peak shaving, increase self-consumption or 
arbitrage energy prices. For example, Erdinc et al. (2015) show how the optimal sizing of batteries is 
impacted when considering the demand response possibilities and Hoarau and Perez (2018) discuss 
the impact of smart EV charging on battery adoption. These points offer possibilities to extend the 
presented analysis   
117 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This final section consists of two main parts. First, the conclusions of the thesis are summarised per 
chapter, excluding the first introductory chapter. Second, future work is discussed. Future work is split 
up into three parts: research options within the modelling framework, possible research options when 
adjusting the modelling framework and relevant research options outside the modelling framework. 
 Conclusions per chapter 
Not all low-voltage consumers can be considered as passive anymore in times of affordable Distributed 
Energy Resources (DER). The availability and the costs of these new technologies strategically interact 
with network tariffs to recover grid costs, as active consumers will react with their profit-maximising 
actions to any network tariff charged to them. In this thesis mainly the adoption of two behind-the-
meter technologies are considered: solar PV and batteries. Different game-theoretical models have 
been developed per chapter. In the context of increasing active consumers, each chapter assess a 
different dimension of the distribution network tariff design problem. 
1.1 Chapter 2 - On whether capacity-based network charges solve the efficiency and fairness 
problems experienced with volumetric charges with net-metering 
The results in Chapter 2 confirm that in a world with an increasing share of consumers connected to 
low voltage distribution networks reacting to price signals, simple netted-out volumetric network 
charges to recover grid costs cannot be considered as the adequate network tariff design. However, 
depending on DER technology costs, also capacity-based charges can severely distort the investment 
decisions of consumers. This is especially true if grid costs are mainly sunk. 
 
Further, it was shown that both under volumetric charges with net-metering and capacity-based 
charges active consumers make uncoordinated investment decisions to push sunk grid costs to one 
another which can lead to overinvestment in DER and subsequently raise fairness issues. Fairness 
issues are found acuter under net-metering. However, paradoxically, under capacity-based charges, a 
situation can occur in which not only passive consumers but also active consumers end up paying more 
than in a situation where nobody invests in DER. This is due to competitive pressure among active 
consumers in allocating sunk grid costs. This effect was captured by modelling the grid cost recovery 
problem as a non-cooperative game between consumers, which is unprecedented in the existing body 
of literature. 
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1.2 Chapter 3 - On how to design a least-cost distribution network tariff when faced with 
two real-world constraints: implementation issues with cost-reflective charges and fairness 
In Chapter 3, it is shown that both considered constraints have a significant impact on the least-cost 
network tariff design. In theory, the least-cost distribution network tariff design has two components. 
First, a fixed component that is proportional to the sunk costs. And second, a capacity component to 
reflect the costs of grid investments that still have to be made and that can be partly avoided if it is 
cheaper for active customers to invest in DER. In practice, departing from volumetric charges towards 
higher fixed charges is often perceived as unfair as their introduction would mean that low-usage 
passive consumers, who are often also less wealthy consumers, would pay similar charges as high-
usage active consumers, who are often richer. Also, in practice, the individual capacity or individual 
peak is often a relatively weak approximation of the actual cost driver(s) of the network. As a result, a 
three-part tariff combining fixed, volumetric and capacity-based charges may be more suitable, even 
though in theory, volumetric is not to be considered for a least-cost distribution network tariff design.  
 
Further, a strong interaction between the two analysed constraints in found. If regulators do not 
anticipate that their implementation of cost-reflective tariffs will be imperfect, the system costs will 
increase, and the fairness issues will aggravate. It is therefore important to have realistic estimations 
of what we know and do not know about the cost drivers of distribution networks. Limited information 
is available, suggesting that we need to be careful in setting strong incentives. This is especially true 
with high shares of active consumers. 
 
Lastly, it is shown that if most of the grid investments still have to be made, passive and active 
consumers can both benefit from cost-reflective tariffs, while this is not the case for passive consumers 
if the costs are mostly sunk. The standard network tariff design options, i.e. fixed, volumetric and 
capacity-based charges, do not suffice to transfer part of the welfare gains of the active consumers to 
compensate the passive consumers. Other solutions than standard tariff design would have to be 
introduced to reach a fairer outcome; examples are specific low-income programmes, differentiated 
instead of uniform fixed charges, the recuperation of sunk network costs through other means than 
the electricity bill or the taxation of active customers, which has its own issues. 
1.3 Chapter 4 - On the interaction between the business case of residential storage and the 
distribution network tariff design 
In Chapter 4, it is found that the business case of storage and overall welfare are not always aligned.  
Three distribution network tariff designs are evaluated: net-purchase volumetric charges, bi-
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directional volumetric charges and capacity-based charges. In one extreme, in the case that most grid 
costs are sunk and little future grid investment is expected, the evaluated network tariffs mostly over-
incentivize battery storage. In the other extreme, when future grid costs are driven by the growing 
needs of consumers, not only do the evaluated network tariff designs give an inadequate investment 
signal to the consumers, but also do the consumers operate their installed batteries sub-optimally from 
a system point of view.  
 
Further, it is shown that with time-varying energy retailer prices instead of flat energy prices the 
business case for residential storage improves for all evaluated network tariff designs. With time-of-
use energy prices, the active consumers can use their batteries to arbitrage energy prices besides 
lowering their network charges. The introduction of time-of-use energy prices is in most cases also 
beneficial from a system point of view. However, far from all potential efficiency gains are exploited 
due to unwanted interaction between the network tariff design and retailer energy prices. Consumers 
react to an aggregate of both price signals and as a result, imperfect network tariff design obstructs 
the optimal energy arbitrage strategy. This mechanism shows that distribution network tariff design 
and retailer energy price schemes should not be evaluated in isolation. Even more difficulties can be 
expected when considering taxes and levies in the electricity bill which are left out of this analysis. 
 
Overall, in a high future grid cost scenario, a more advanced network tariff design is needed to correctly 
align the business case of residential storage with system benefits and coordinate energy prices and 
grid charges. It is shown that peak-coincident network prices, which exhibit strong peak prices at times 
when there are system peaks, give optimal or near-optimal results. However, such distribution 
network pricing is hard to implement, much information about the grid and actions of consumers is 
required, and the applied charges should have a fine locational and temporal granularity. Other 
mechanisms could complement network tariff design to unlock consumer flexibility in terms of battery 
adoption and operation. Examples are flexibility markets for system services in which the DSO and/or 
TSO are the buyers of these services and aggregators bundle the DER resources. However, also 
interactions between the network tariff design and the markets for the delivery of such services can 
be expected. These interactions deserve further attention when designing flexibility markets. 
 Future work 
Potential avenues for future work can be split up into three parts: research options within the 
modelling framework, research options when adjusting the modelling framework and research options 
outside the modelling framework. 
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2.1 Within the modelling framework 
 The inclusion of other behind-the-meter technologies which could be used by consumers to 
react to the network tariff design could be considered. Examples are electric vehicles and heat 
pumps. Accounting for these (mainly) electricity consuming technologies could present new 
insights. For example, Hoarau and Perez (2018) base their model on the work of chapter 2 and 
include electrical vehicles. 
 Demand response could be included. Demand response could compete with batteries to do 
peak shifting and/or increase self-consumption. 
 The recuperation of policy costs and taxation deserves further attention. The way policy costs 
and taxes are recuperated in the electricity bill could severely distort the network tariff design. 
 Similarly, the interaction (or substitutability) of subsidies and network tariff design is worth 
deeper investigation. 
 More elaborated network costs functions could be evaluated, e.g. energy losses and 
accounting for the cost of bi-directional flows. 
2.2 When adjusting the modelling framework 
 DER operation and costs could be represented in a more advanced manner. More accurate 
representation implies in most cases the need for binary variables or the introduction of non-
linearities, e.g. battery degradation (Cardoso et al., 2018). Binaries or non-linearities in the 
lower-level problems complicate the modelling significantly. Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) show 
when and how discretely-constraint MPECs can be solved. Also, the consumers’ decision to go 
off-grid could be modelled with the use of binary variables. 
 Due to the structure of the model, it is assumed that the regulator has perfect insight into the 
consumers’ reaction on the network tariff design. In reality, future demand is not known ex-
ante and has to be estimated. This anticipation issue could be accounted for by including 
stochasticity in the consumer reaction. An example is the paper by Weijde and Hobbs (2012) 
in which a stochastic two-stage optimisation model capturing the multistage nature of the 
planning of a transmission network under uncertainty is presented. Adding multiple stages and 
stochasticity would require an expansion of the presented model. 
 The energy prices could be endogenised including wholesale energy market. Govaerts et al. 
(2019) build further on the model presented in Chapter 2 and capture the wholesale market 
effects of distribution grid tariffs. By doing so, they can have an idea of the spill-over effects 
from (national) distribution network tariff designs through interlinked wholesale markets. 
They also show that in the long-run, the average energy price is not that strongly decreased as 
would be expected with strong solar PV adoption. But, the volatility of the price increases. This 
finding confirms earlier work, e.g. Green and Vasilakos (2011). 
 In this thesis, non-cooperative behaviour among consumers is modelled. Alternatively, 
cooperative behaviour among consumers, i.e. consumers forming an energy community, can 
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be modelled. Abada et al. (2018, 2017) look at the ability of such communities to adequately 
share the gains and look at the effects these communities have on grid tariffs. 
 The model could be complemented with the option for consumers to provide flexibility 
services to grid operators through market mechanisms (with or without aggregation). It could 
be looked at how these markets perform as a function of market design and market structure. 
Also, the interaction between the network tariff design and the provision of services could be 
investigated. 
2.3 Outside the modelling framework 
 Locationally more granular network tariffs could become increasingly important to limit the 
efficiency loss of uniform network tariffs over large areas. Such an analysis would require more 
detailed modelling of the distribution network which complicates the possibilities to 
mathematically couple the loop between consumer-reactions to the network tariff design and 
their impact on the network and thus to come to an equilibrium. Such type of analysis can be 
found in MIT Energy Initiative (2016). 
 Larger databases with many different consumer profiles, longer-time series and more precise 
network costs can be used to do specific case study analysis. Again, more data complicates the 
possibility to find an equilibrium and other types of analysis needs to be done. Examples are 
the work of Küfeoğlu and Pollitt (2019) doing a case study for GB and Passey et al. (2017) 
looking deeper into Australian data.  
 Different assumptions regarding the behaviour of consumers can be made, other than fully 
rational and active or completely passive. In that regard, agent-based modelling can be of use. 
Interesting papers in this regard are the work of Saguan et al. (2006) in which the main 
differences between equilibrium and agent-based modelling to study imperfect competition 
in electricity markets are discussed and the work of Weidlich and Veit (2008) in which a critical 
survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models is conducted. 
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APPENDICES 
A. The complete mathematical model 
A.1 Overview of the used sets, parameters and variables 
Sets 
i : 1,..,N: Consumers types 
t: 1,..,T: Time steps with a certain granularity 
Parameters  
Upper-level 
SunkGridCosts: Sunk annualised grid costs, scaled per average consumer [€] 
IncrGridCosts: Incremental annualised grid cost per kW increase/decrease of the coincident peak 
demand/injection, scaled per average consumer [€/kW] 
DPeak: (Default) coincident peak demand before investment in DER by active consumers, scaled per 
average consumer [kW] 
WF: Weighting factor, indicating the inaccuracy in the network cost driver [-] 
NM: Factor indicating whether net-metering (1) or no net-metering (0) or bi-directional volumetric 
charges (-1) are in place [-] 
PC𝑖 : Proportion of consumer type i 
TotalOtherCosts: all other costs paid through the electricity bill, e.g. policy costs, annualised and scaled 
per consumer [€] 
BGC𝑖 : Baseline volumetric grid charges paid before investment in DER for consumer type i [€] 
Cap𝑖: Cap on the increase of grid charges paid for consumer type i [%] 
Lower level 
WDT: Scaling factor to annualise, dependent on length of the used time series and time step [-] 
DT: time step, as a fraction of 60 minutes [-] 
D𝑡,𝑖: Original demand at time step t of agent i [kW] 
MS𝑖 : Maximum solar capacity that can be installed by agent i [kW] 
MB𝑖 : Maximum battery capacity that can be installed by agent i [kWh] 
SY𝑡,𝑖: Yield of the PV panel at time step t of agent i [kWh/kWpeak] 
EBP𝑡: Energy price to be paid by agent for buying from the grid [€/kWh] 
ESP𝑡: Energy price received by agent for buying from the grid (feed-in tariff) [€/kWh] 
AICS: Annualised investment cost solar PV [€/kWpeak] 
AICB: Annualised investment cost battery [€/kWh] 
BDR: Ratio of max power output of the battery over the installed energy capacity [-]  
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BCR: Ratio of max power input of the battery over the installed energy capacity [-]  
EFD: Efficiency of discharging the battery [%] 
EFC: Efficiency of charging the battery [%] 
LR: Leakage rate of the battery [%]  
SOC0: Original (and final) state of charge of the battery [kWh] 
OtherCosts: other costs paid through the electricity bill, e.g. policy costs [€] 
PrDSMi: Max. percentage of the demand at any time step that can be shifted by DSM [%] 
CDSMi: Cost of DSM per kWh shifted [€/kWh] 
Variables 
UL decision variable 
𝑣𝑛𝑡 : Volumetric network tariff [€/kWh] 
𝑐𝑛𝑡: Capacity network charge [€/kWpeak] 
𝑓𝑛𝑡: Fixed network charge [€/connection] 
𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡: Time-varying network charge [€/kWh] (free variable) 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘: The coincident (aggregated) peak demand after optimisation (highest absolute of 
value of the positive/negative coincident peak), scaled per average consumer [kW] 
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑: Positive coincident peak demand after optimisation, scaled per average consumer 
[kW] 
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: Negative coincident peak demand after optimisation, scaled per average consumer 
[kW] 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡: Total annualised grid cost, scaled per average consumer [€] 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠: Total annualised investment cost in DER, scaled per average consumer [€] 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠: Total annualised energy cost, scaled per average consumer [€] 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠: Total annualised demand side management operational cost, scaled per average 
consumer [€] 
LL decision variable 
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 :  Annualised grid charges for agent i [€] 
𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖:  Annualised investment cost in DER for agent i [€] 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖: Annualised energy cost for agent i [€] 
𝐷𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖: Annualised demand side management operational cost for agent i [€] 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖: Energy bought at time step t by agent i [kW] 
𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖: Energy sold at time step t by agent i [kW] 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖: Peak demand of agent i over the length of the considered time series [kW] 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖: State of charge of the battery of agent i at step t [kWh] 
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖: Discharge of the battery of agent i at step t [kW] 
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𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖: Power input into the battery of agent i at step t [kW] 
𝑖𝑠𝑖: Installed capacity of solar by agent i [kW] 
𝑖𝑏𝑖: Installed capacity of the battery by agent i [kWh] 
𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖: Energy increased at time step t by agent i due to DSM (shifted from another time step) [kW] 
𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖: Energy decreased at time step t by agent i due to DSM (shifted to another time step) [kW] 
A.2. Original optimisation problems 
The upper-level problem for a total system cost minimising regulator 
Objective function, the minimisation of total system costs: 
Minimise  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + TotalOtherCosts (A.1) 
With its components being: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = SunkGridCosts + IncrGridCosts ∗ (DPeak − WF ∗ (DPeak − 𝑂𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘))  (A.2) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ AICB)
N
𝑖=1  (A.3) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT 
N
𝑖=1
T
𝑡=1  (A.4) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) ∗ CDSMi ∗ WDT 
N
𝑖=1
T
𝑡=1  (A.5) 
 
Finding the aggregated peak demand in absolute value: 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 ≡ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 {𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} (A.6) 
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≡ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 {∑ 𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∀𝑡} (A.7) 
𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≡ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 {∑ 𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∀𝑡} (A.8) 
Cost recovery Eq. of the upper-level (A.9) with a cap on the increase of grid charges of the passive 
consumer (i2) (A.10): 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖
N
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 ∗
N
𝑖=1
T
𝑡=1
(𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT + 𝑓𝑛𝑡 (A.9) 
𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,′𝑖2′ − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑡,′𝑖2′) ∗ WDT
𝑇
𝑡=1 + 𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥′𝑖2′ + 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡,𝑖 ∗ ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1  
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡  ≤
 BGC′i2′ ∗ (1 + Cap′i2′) (A.10) 
The lower level problem for an electricity cost minimising consumer 
Objective function per consumer type i, the minimisation of individual electricity cost: 
Minimise  𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝐷𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + OtherCharges  (A.11) 
With:  
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 = ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ NM) ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 + 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 + ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡    
     ∀i  (A.12) 
𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ AICB             ∀i (A.13)  
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 = ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1    ∀i (A.14) 
𝐷𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 = ∑ (𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) ∗ CDSMi ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1    ∀i (A.15) 
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Constraints (including duals): 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ SYt,i + 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − Dt,i = 0    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡    (𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 )   (A.16) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐1,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛1,𝑖 ∗ EFC ∗ DT + (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡1,𝑖 EFD)⁄ ∗ DT − SOC0 = 0    ∀ 𝑖 (𝜇1,𝑖
𝑏 )   (A.17) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EFC ∗ DT + (𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡t,𝑖 EFD⁄ ) ∗ DT − 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡−1,𝑖 ∗ (1 − LR ∗ DT) = 0   ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡 ≠ 1 (𝜇𝑡≠1,𝑖
𝑏 )   (A.18) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑇,𝑖 − SOC0     = 0  ∀ 𝑖 (𝜇𝑖
𝑐)   (A.19) 
∑ (𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) = 0
T∈day
𝑡=1    ∀ 𝑖 (𝜇𝑖
𝑑)   (A.20) 
−𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖+𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖  ≤ 0                    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 )   (A.21) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖−𝑖𝑏𝑖   ≤   0       ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖  (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 )   (A.22) 
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ BDR ≤ 0   ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 )   (A.23) 
𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ BCR ≤  0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 )   (A.24) 
𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − PrDSMi ∗ Dt,i  ≤  0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 )   (A.25) 
−𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
)   (A.26) 
− 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖  ≤ 0    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
)   (A.27) 
−𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 0    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
ℎ )   (A.28) 
−𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑖 )   (A.29) 
−𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
)   (A.30) 
−𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑘 )   (A.31) 
−𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑙 )   (A.32) 
𝑖𝑠𝑖 − MS𝑖  ≤ 0    ∀ 𝑖 (𝜆𝑖
𝑚)   (A.33) 
𝑖𝑏𝑖 − MB𝑖  ≤ 0   ∀ 𝑖 (𝜆𝑖
𝑛)   (A.34) 
− 𝑖𝑠𝑖  ≤ 0  ∀ 𝑖 (𝜆𝑖
𝑜)   (A.35) 
− 𝑖𝑏𝑖  ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑖 (𝜆𝑖
𝑝
)   (A.36) 
− 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖  ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑖 (𝜆𝑖
𝑞
)   (A.37) 
𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
, 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
, 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
ℎ , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑖 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
, 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑘 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑙   ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.38) 
𝜆𝑖
𝑚, 𝜆𝑖
𝑛, 𝜆𝑖
𝑜, 𝜆𝑖
𝑝
, 𝜆𝑖
𝑞
, ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑖 (A.39) 
Eq. (A.37) is noted down for completeness, the constraint is implied by Eq. A.21, A.26 and A.27. 
A.3. MPEC reformulation as a MILP 
A.3.1 Method 1 to transform the bilinear products in Eq. A.9: discretisation 
Newly introduced sets, parameters and variables 
Sets 
k: 1…K: Index of auxiliary binaries (𝑏𝑘
𝑎) to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑣𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
l: 1…L: Index of auxiliary binaries (𝑏𝑙
𝑐) to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
m: 1…M: Index of auxiliary binaries (𝑏𝑚,𝑡
𝑐 ) to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
Parameters 
δ: Allowed band wherein the grid costs charges can differ from the grid charges collected as a 
percentage of the total grid costs [%] 
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Δγ: Step of 𝑣𝑛𝑡 when discretised [-] 
Δ𝜕: Step of 𝑐𝑛𝑡 when discretised [-] 
Δθ: Step of 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 when discretised [-] 
MDa: Large scalar used to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑣𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) [-] 
MDb: Large scalar used to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) [-] 
M𝑡
Dc: Large scalar used to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) [-] 
Variables 
𝑏𝑘
𝑎: Binary variables used to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑣𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
𝑏𝑙
𝑏: Binary variables used to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
𝑏𝑚,𝑡
𝑐 : Binary variables used to discretise the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
𝑧𝑘
𝑎: (Pos.) continuous variables used to represent the bilinear product (including 𝑣𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
𝑧𝑙
𝑏: (Pos.) continuous variables used to represent the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑛𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐 : (Pos.) continuous variables used to represent the bilinear product (including 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) in Eq. (A.9) 
Model transformations 
Transformation of the grid cost recovery equality of the upper-level 
For easier convergence of the model, the grid cost recovery Equality (A.9) is replaced by two 
constraints (A.40-41) making sure that the network charges collected from the consumers are within 
a band (1±δ) of the grid costs to be recovered. In the performed runs δ is set to 0.1%. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − δ) − 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖
N
𝑖=1 + 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡,𝑖 ∗
∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1  
T
𝑡=1 + 𝑓𝑛𝑡 ≤ 0       (A.40) 
−𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 + δ) + 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑐𝑛𝑡 ∗ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖
N
𝑖=1 + 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡,𝑖 ∗
∑ ∑ PC𝑖 ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
N
𝑖=1  
T
𝑡=1 + 𝑓𝑛𝑡 ≤ 0  (A. 41) 
Discretising the bilinear products (of two positive continuous variables) to turn the NLP in a MIP 
Formulation based on Momber (2015), page 102, Eq. 4.60-4.63. We define: 
𝑞𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ∑ ∑ PCi ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − NM ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1       (A.42)         
and  𝑣𝑛𝑡 =  Δγ ∗ ∑ 2𝑘−1𝑘 ∗ 𝑏𝑘
𝑎                                                      (A.43) 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ∑ PCi ∗ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1            (A.44)         
and 𝑐𝑛𝑡 =  Δ𝜕 ∗ ∑ 2𝑙−1𝑙 ∗ 𝑏𝑙
𝑏      (A.45)   
𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑝
= ∑ PCi ∗ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ WDT
𝑇
𝑡=1         ∀𝑡  (A.46)         
and 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 =  Δθ ∗ ∑ 2
𝑚−1
𝑚 ∗ 𝑏𝑙,𝑡
𝑐      ∀𝑡  (A.47)   
 
It follows that: 
𝑞𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 = 𝑞𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∗  Δγ ∗ ∑ 2𝑘−1𝑘 ∗ 𝑏𝑘
𝑎  =  Δγ ∗ ∑ 2𝑘−1𝑘 ∗ 𝑧𝑘
𝑎  (A.48) 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 = 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∗  Δ𝜕 ∗ ∑ 2𝑙−1𝑙 ∗ 𝑏𝑙
𝑏  =  Δ𝜕 ∗ ∑ 2𝑙−1𝑙 ∗ 𝑧𝑙
𝑏  (A.49) 
𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑝
∗  𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 = 𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑝
∗  Δθ ∗ ∑ 2𝑚−1𝑚 ∗ 𝑏𝑙,𝑡
𝑐  =  Δθ ∗ ∑ 2𝑚−1𝑚 ∗ 𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐  ∀𝑡  (A.50)   
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with: 
𝑧𝑘
𝑎    ≥ 0                                                    ∀ 𝑘  (A.51) 
𝑧𝑘
𝑎     ≤ MDa ∗ 𝑏𝑘
𝑎                             ∀ 𝑘  (A.52) 
𝑞𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝑧𝑘
𝑎  ≥ 0                                         ∀ 𝑘  (A.53) 
𝑞𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝑧𝑘
𝑎  ≤ MDa ∗ (1 − 𝑏𝑘
𝑎  )      ∀ 𝑘  (A.54) 
𝑧𝑙
𝑏    ≥ 0                                                        ∀ 𝑙  (A.55) 
𝑧𝑙
𝑏      ≤ MDb ∗ 𝑏𝑙
𝑏                                      ∀ 𝑙 (A.56) 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 𝑧𝑙
𝑏 ≥ 0                                    ∀ 𝑙 (A.57) 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑡 −  𝑧𝑙
𝑏  ≤ MDb ∗ (1 − 𝑏𝑙
𝑏   )     ∀ 𝑙 (A.58) 
𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐     ≥ 0                                                        ∀ 𝑚, 𝑡  (A.59) 
𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐     ≤ M𝑡
Dc ∗ 𝑏𝑚,𝑡
𝑐                                       ∀ 𝑚, 𝑡 (A.60) 
𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑝
− 𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐  ≥ 0                                 ∀ 𝑚, 𝑡 (A.61) 
𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑝
− 𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐  ≤ M𝑡
Dc ∗ (1 − 𝑏𝑚,𝑡
𝑐  )      ∀ 𝑚, 𝑡 (A.62) 
 
MDa, MDb and M𝑡
Dc are well calibrated and 𝛥𝛾, 𝛥𝜕 and  𝛥𝜃 are chosen to balance precision and 
computational time. Eq. (A.40-A.41) and further transformed to (A.63- A.64) which is the final form of 
Eq. (A.8) included in the model formulation 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − δ) −  Δγ ∗ ∑ 2𝑘−1𝑘 ∗ 𝑧𝑘
𝑎 +  Δ ∂ ∗ ∑ 2𝑙−1𝑙 ∗ 𝑧𝑙
𝑏 + ∑ (Δθ ∗ ∑ 2𝑚−1𝑚 ∗ 𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐 )𝑇𝑡 + 𝑓𝑛𝑡 ≤ 0  (A.63) 
−𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 + δ) −  Δγ ∗ ∑ 2𝑘−1𝑘 ∗ 𝑧𝑘
𝑎 +  Δ ∂ ∗ ∑ 2𝑙−1𝑙 ∗ 𝑧𝑙
𝑏 + ∑ (Δθ ∗ ∑ 2𝑚−1𝑚 ∗ 𝑧𝑚,𝑡
𝑐 )𝑇𝑡 + 𝑓𝑛𝑡 ≤ 0  (A.64) 
A.3.2 Method 2 to transform the bilinear products in Eq. A.9: strong duality theorem 
The strong duality theorem says that if a problem is convex, the objective functions of the primal and 
dual problems have the same value at the optimum (Castillo et al., 2001). We apply this theorem to 
the lower-level problem. The objective function of the primal problem is stated in Eq. A.11. The dual 
objective is derived from (A.11-39) and formulated as follows: 
Maximise ∑ (𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ∗ D𝑡,𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡=1 + 𝜇1,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ SOC0 − ∑ PrDSMi ∗ Dt,i ∗  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒𝑇
𝑡=1 −  MS𝑖 ∗  𝜆𝑖
𝑚 − MB𝑖 ∗  𝜆𝑖
𝑛  (A.65) 
Thus it follows that: 
∑ (𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ∗ D𝑡,𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡=1 +  𝜇1,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ SOC0 − ∑ (PrDSMi ∗ Dt,i ∗  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 )𝑇𝑡=1 − MS𝑖 ∗ 𝜆𝑖
𝑚 − MB𝑖 ∗ 𝜆𝑖
𝑛 = ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ NM) ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗
T
𝑡=1
WDT + 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 + ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡 +   𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ AICB + ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗
T
𝑡=1
ESPt) ∗ WDT +  ∑ (𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) ∗ CDSMi ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1   (A.66) 
We can reformulate A.66 as: 
∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ NM) ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 + 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑛𝑡 + ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖) ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡 ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 +  𝑓𝑛𝑡 = ∑ (𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ∗ D𝑡,𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡=1 +
 𝜇1,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ SOC0 − ∑ (PrDSMi ∗ Dt,i ∗ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 )𝑇𝑡=1 − MS𝑖 ∗  𝜆𝑖
𝑚 − MB𝑖 ∗ 𝜆𝑖
𝑛 − ( 𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ AICB + ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EBPt −
T
𝑡=1
𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT +  ∑ (𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) ∗ CDSMi ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 )  (A.67) 
If we now multiply both sides by ∑ PC𝑖N𝑖=1 : 
136 
 
∑ 𝐏𝐂𝒊
𝐍
𝒊=𝟏 ∗ (∑ (𝒒𝒘𝒕,𝒊 − 𝒒𝒊𝒕,𝒊 ∗ 𝐍𝐌) ∗ 𝒗𝒏𝒕 ∗ 𝐖𝐃𝐓
𝐓
𝒕=𝟏 + 𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒙𝒊 ∗ 𝒄𝒏𝒕 + ∑ (𝒒𝒘𝒕,𝒊 − 𝒒𝒊𝒕,𝒊) ∗ 𝒄𝒑𝒑𝒕 ∗ 𝐖𝐃𝐓
𝐓
𝒕=𝟏 +  𝒇𝒏𝒕) =
∑ PC𝑖
N
𝑖=1 ∗ (∑ (𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ∗ D𝑡,𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡=1 +  𝜇1,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ SOC0 − ∑ (PrDSMi ∗ Dt,i ∗  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 )𝑇𝑡=1 − MS𝑖 ∗  𝜆𝑖
𝑚 − MB𝑖 ∗ 𝜆𝑖
𝑛 −
 ( 𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ AICS + 𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ AICB +  ∑ (𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EBPt − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ∗ ESPt) ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 +  ∑ (𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) ∗ CDSMi ∗ WDT
T
𝑡=1 ))  (A.68) 
We can see that the left-hand side of Eq. A.68 equals the right hand-side of Eq. A.9. Thus, we replace 
the bilinear terms in the right hand side of Eq. A.9 with the linear expression on the right-hand side of 
Eq. A.68.83 
A.3.3 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the lower level 
We derive the KKT conditions of the lower level problem (Eq. A.11-39): 
WDT ∗ (EBP𝑡 + 𝑣𝑛𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) + 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 − 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
= 0                                              ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.69) 
−WDT ∗ (ESP𝑡 + NM ∗ 𝑣𝑛𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) − 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 − 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
= 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.70) 
𝑐𝑛𝑡 − ∑ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎
𝑡 = 0    ∀ 𝑖 (A.71) 
𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 − 𝜇𝑡+1,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ (1 − LT ∗ DT) + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 −  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
ℎ   = 0   ∀ 𝑡 ≠ {T}, 𝑖 (A.72) 
𝜇𝑇,𝑖
𝑏 + 𝜇𝑖
𝑐 + 𝜆𝑇,𝑖
𝑏 − 𝜆𝑇,𝑖
ℎ = 0                                                           ∀ 𝑡 = T, 𝑖  (A.73) 
𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 +
𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑏
EFD
∗ DT + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 − 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑖  = 0      ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.74) 
−𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 − 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ EFC ∗ DT + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 − 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
 = 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.75) 
CDSM𝑖 ∗ WDT + 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 − 𝜇𝑡∈𝑑𝑎𝑦,𝑖
𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 − 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑘  = 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.76) 
−𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜇𝑡∈𝑑𝑎𝑦,𝑖
𝑑 − 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑙  = 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.77) 
AICS + ∑ 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ∗ SYt,i 𝑡 +  𝜆𝑖
𝑚 − 𝜆𝑖
𝑜 = 0     ∀ 𝑖 (A.78) 
AICB − ∑ 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑏
𝑡 − ∑ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 ∗ BDR𝑡  −  ∑ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 ∗ BCR𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖
𝑛 − 𝜆𝑖
𝑝
= 0     ∀ 𝑖 (A.79) 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑖𝑠𝑖 ∗ SY𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − D𝑡,𝑖 = 0      𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.80) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐1,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛1,𝑖 ∗ EFC ∗ dt + 
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡1,𝑖
EFD
∗ DT − SOC0 = 0                                                   𝜇1,𝑖
𝑏   𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 ∀ 𝑖 (A.81) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖 ∗ EFC ∗ dt +  
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖
EFD
∗ DT − 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡−1,𝑖 ∗ (1 − LR ∗ DT) = 0             𝜇𝑡≠1,𝑖
𝑏  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒    ∀ 𝑡 ≠ 1, 𝑖 (A.82) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑇,𝑖 − SOC0  = 0                                                                                                                       𝜇𝑖
𝑐  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 ∀ 𝑖 (A.83) 
∑ (𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖) = 0
T∈day
𝑡=1                                                                                             𝜇𝑖
𝑑  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 ∀ 𝑖 (A.84) 
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖−𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖  −𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖   ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎  ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.85) 
0 ≤ 𝑖𝑏i − 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖      ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑏  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.86) 
0 ≤ 𝑖𝑏i ∗ BDR − 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖      ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.87) 
0 ≤ 𝑖𝑏i ∗ BCR − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖         ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.88) 
0 ≤ PrDSMi ∗ Dt,i − 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖  ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.89) 
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖                    ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
 ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.90) 
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖                    ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
 ≥ 0    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.91) 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖                   ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
ℎ  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.92) 
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖            ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑖  ≥ 0    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.93) 
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖               ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
 ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.94) 
                                                          
83 ∑ PC𝑖
N
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑓𝑛𝑡 = 𝑓𝑛𝑡 as each consumer pays the same fixed charge. Also, fnt is a constant for the lower level 
objective and therefore is subtracted from the right-hand side of Eq. 68 when substituting it with the right hand 
side of Eq. 9.  
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0 ≤ 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖         ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑘  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.95) 
0 ≤ 𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖         ⊥  𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑙  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.96) 
0 ≤ MS𝑖 − 𝑖𝑠𝑖                           ⊥  𝜆𝑖
𝑚  ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑖 (A.97) 
0 ≤ MB𝑖 − 𝑖𝑏𝑖              ⊥  𝜆𝑖
𝑛  ≥ 0    ∀ 𝑖 (A.98) 
0 ≤ 𝑖𝑠𝑖                       ⊥  𝜆𝑖
𝑜   ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑖 (A.99) 
0 ≤ 𝑖𝑏𝑖                       ⊥  𝜆𝑖
𝑝
≥ 0  ∀ 𝑖 (A.100) 
Eq. (A.85-A.100) are complementarity constraints. We linearise these constraints by replacing them 
with disjunctive constraints using the method described in Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981). 
Alternatively, a transformation using SOS1 variables as explained in Siddiqui and Gabriel (2013) or can 
be implemented as indicator constraints (GAMS, 2018). In the final formulation, we can also substitute 
𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
, 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑖 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
, 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑘 , 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑙 , 𝜆𝑖
𝑜 and 𝜆𝑖
𝑝
 out. 
Newly introduced sets, parameters and variables 
Parameters 
Ma, Mb, Mc, Md, Me, Mf, Mg, Mh, Mi, Mj, Mk, Ml, Mm, Mo , Mp: Large scalars used to transform 
complementarity constraints (A.85-A.100) into disjunctive constraints [-] 
Variables 
𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
, 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
, 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
ℎ , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑖 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
, 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑘 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑙  , 𝑟𝑖
𝑚, 𝑟𝑖
𝑛, 𝑟𝑖
𝑜, 𝑟𝑖
𝑝
: Binary variables used to transform 
complementarity constraints (A.85-A.100) into disjunctive constraints [-] 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖−𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ≤ M
a ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 )       ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.101)  and      𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ≤  Ma ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑎            ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A. 102) 
𝑖𝑏𝑖 −  𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
b ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑏  )    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A. 103)  and   𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 ≤  Mb ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑏    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A. 104) 
𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ BDR − 𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
c ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑐  )  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A. 105)  and   𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 ≤  Mc ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑐    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A. 106) 
𝑖𝑏𝑖 ∗ BCR − 𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
d ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 )      ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A. 107)  and   𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 ≤  Md ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑑       ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖(A.108) 
PrDSM𝑖 ∗ D𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖 ≤ M
e ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 )  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A. 109)  and   𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 ≤  Me ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑒       ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖(A.110) 
𝑞𝑤𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
f ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑓
)     ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.111)   and   
 WDT ∗ (EBPt + 𝑣𝑛𝑡 +  𝑐𝑝𝑝t) +   𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ≤  Mf ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
f                 ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.112) 
𝑞𝑖𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
g ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
)   ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.113)   and   
 −WDT ∗ (ESPt + 𝑣𝑛𝑡 ∗ NM + 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡) −  𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ≤ Mg ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑔
     ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.114) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
h ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
ℎ )   ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.115)   and     𝜆𝑡,𝑖
ℎ ≤  Mh ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
ℎ   ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.116) 
𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
i ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑖 )  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.117)    and    𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 +
𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑏
EFD
∗ DT + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 ≤  Mi ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑖                         ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.118) 
𝑞𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
j ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
)    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.119)   and    −𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 − 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑏 ∗ EFC ∗ DT + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑  ≤  Mj ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑗
  ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.120) 
𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
k ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑘 )                             ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.121)   
and   CDSMi ∗ WDT + 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 − 𝜇𝑡∈𝑑𝑎𝑦,𝑖
𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑒 ≤ Mk ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑘                   ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.122) 
𝑢𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑡,𝑖  ≤ M
l ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑙 )    ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖   (A.123)   and     −𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜇𝑡∈𝑑𝑎𝑦,𝑖
𝑑  ≤  Ml ∗ 𝑟𝑡,𝑖
𝑙   ∀ 𝑡, 𝑖 (A.124) 
MS𝑖 −  𝑖𝑠𝑖  ≤ M
m ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑖
𝑚)      ∀ 𝑖      (A.125)    and     𝜆𝑖
𝑚 ≤  Mm ∗ 𝑟𝑖
𝑚  ∀ 𝑖 (A.126) 
MBi −  𝑖𝑏𝑖  ≤ M
n ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑖
𝑛)          ∀ 𝑖      (A.127)    and     𝜆𝑖
𝑛 ≤  Mn ∗ 𝑟𝑖
𝑛  ∀ 𝑖 (A.128) 
𝑖𝑠𝑖  ≤ M
o ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑖
𝑜)    ∀ 𝑖      (A.129)    and    AICS + ∑ 𝜇𝑡,𝑖
𝑎 ∗ SY𝑡,𝑖  𝑡 +  𝜆𝑖
𝑗
≤ Mo ∗ 𝑟𝑖
𝑜 ∀ 𝑖 (A.130) 
𝑖𝑏𝑖  ≤ M
p ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑖
𝑝
)     ∀ 𝑖      (A.131)    and 
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AICB − ∑ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑏
𝑡 − ∑ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑐 ∗ BDR𝑡  −  ∑ 𝜆𝑡,𝑖
𝑑 ∗ BCR𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖
𝑘 ≤ Mp ∗ 𝑟𝑖
𝑝
       ∀ 𝑖     (A.132) 
 
A.3.4. Final model formulation 
The final model formulation is composed of Eq. (A.1-8) and (A.10). Eq. (A.9) can be transformed using 
discretization or the strong duality theorem. The lower level problem is incorporated in the MILP by 
Eq. (A.16-A.39), Eq. (71-73) and (A.101-A.132).   
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B. Appendix Chapter 2 
This Appendix has three aims. Firstly, to test the sensitivity of the results discussed in the body of the 
paper to the length of the time series for demand and PV yield. Second, to show the sensitivity of the 
results to different demand and PV yield profiles. And third, to highlight the impact of seasonality on 
the results. The Appendix is build up out of two sections. B.1. describes the data used for the sensitivity 
analysis. All other input data remains the same as in the body of the paper unless explicitly mentioned. 
Results are presented in B.2. 
B.1.. Data sensitivity analysis 
Next to the one-day reference demand and PV yield time series applied in the body of the paper, three 
additional time series for demand and five for the solar yield are build up. These two-week time series 
(336h) are obtained by randomising and scaling the original one-day reference profiles. In Figure B.1, 
the time series are visualised (left) and key metrics are displayed (right). 
 
 
Figure B.1: Left- Time series for demand (up) and PV yield (down). Right – key metric of the data 
B..2. Results sensitivity analysis 
In Table B.2 the results with the runs of the one-day reference profiles which are used in the body of 
the paper are compared to the runs with the same profiles, but randomised and with a length of two-
weeks. The results are shown for the four states of the world, all other parameters remained the same. 
The trends of the results are the same, the obtained values can change slightly in some states of the 
worlds for certain tariff structures. In general, higher variability in the time series leads to slightly less 
complementarity of PV and batteries, see e.g. the installed capacity of PV and batteries under TS2 and 
TS3 in the maturing DER scenario for the 24h and 336h time series. Also, from e.g. TS3 under the 
maturing battery and expensive PV scenario and TS3 under the maturing DER scenario, it can be seen 
Demand 
profiles 
Yearly 
consumption 
[kWh] 
Peak 
demand 
[kW] 
Low 3750 2.5 
Reference 6500 3 
High 11000 5 
PV yield 
profiles 
Yearly solar yield 
[kWh/kWp] 
Low  960  
Reference 1160 (l/h seasonality) 
High 1360 (l/h seasonality) 
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that the metric for equity issues tends to decline slightly with longer time series. This can be explained 
by the fact that with longer time series slightly more investment in DER is needed to reduce the grid 
charges of active consumers with the same amount than when shorter time series are used. In other 
words, it can be said that due to higher variability in demand and PV yield, the value of PV and/or 
batteries declines slightly for active consumers. 
Table B.2: Results for the runs with the reference demand and solar profiles (24h and 336h) in the 
four states of the world. 
 Immature DER Maturing battery and 
expensive PV 
Maturing PV and expensive battery Maturing DER  
 TS1/
TS2 
TS3 TS1/ 
TS2 
TS3 
TS1 TS2 TS3 TS1 TS2 TS3 
24h/
336h 
24h 336h 24h/
336h 
24h 336h 24h/
336h 
24h 336h 24h 336h 24h/
336h 
24h 336h 24h 336h 
Efficiency issue 
[%] 
0 1.7 0.3 0 5.9 6.5 4.0 0.6 0.4 2.2 0.4 4.0 0.8 0.7 9.4 7.8 
Equity issue [%]* 0 7.9 1.5 0 32.7 29.1 80 5.9 4.0 9.5 1.7 80 6.7 5.8 48.5 34.7 
PV active 
consumer [kWp] 
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0 5 0.9 0.7 2.6 0.8 
Battery active 
consumer [kWh] 
0 0.6 0.1 0 4.1 4.9 0 0 0 0.6 0.1 0 0.5 0.3 5.6 5.5 
 
In Table B.3, the results for five additional runs under the different tariff structures are given. Four 
combinations are made with the new time series for demand and solar yield shown in Appendix B.1. 
Additionally, the run in which the high demand profile is combined with the high PV yield profile is ran 
twice. First, with an upper boundary of 5 kWp for the PV capacity installed by the active consumers. 
Second, with this upper boundary set to 10 kWp. 50 % of active consumers are assumed and the 
mature DER scenario (low investment cost for PV and batteries) is used. All other parameters remained 
the same. The relative performances of the tariff structures are in line with the results of the reference 
demand and PV yield series shown in the body of the paper.  
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Table B.3: Results for the additional runs under the different tariffs structures. Technology cost of 
maturing DER scenario. 
 Low demand/ Low solar 
yield 
Low demand/ High solar 
yield low seasonality 
High demand/ Low solar 
yield 
High demand/ High solar yield low seasonality 
(different max. PV)  
 
TS1 TS2 TS3 TS1 TS2 TS3 TS1 TS2 TS3 
TS1 TS2 TS3 
5 
kWp 
10 
kWp 
5/10 
kWp 
5 
kWp 
10 
kWp 
Efficiency issue [%] 12.5 0.6 5.1 1.5 0.9 5.9 4.0 0.7 2.9 0.4 1.0 1.5 3.3 7.8 
Equity issue [%]* 100 3.8 34.0 100 7.7 42.7 27.6 3.7 16.9 44.6 100 9.6 22.3 40.4 
PV active consumer 
[kWp] 
5 0.3 0 5 0.5 2.6 5 1.0 0 5 10 1.7 5 6.9 
Battery active 
consumer [kWh] 
0 0 2.2 0 0.4 2.3 0 0.1 3.8 0 0 1.9 4.1 9.5 
* An equity issue of 100 % (with 50% of active consumers) implies the grid charges for passive consumers are doubled because the active 
consumers are not paying any grid charges anymore. This can occur under volumetric charges with net-metering if active consumers export 
more electricity than they consume. It is chosen not to allow active consumers to have negative grid charges. However, the energy cost could 
become negative and results in a negative electricity bill when selling a high volume of electricity. 
Lastly, in Table B.4 results are shown which highlight the impact of seasonality on the results. Again, 
the technology cost of the maturing DER scenario is assumed. Seasonality is an important factor as the 
behaviour of a PV-plus storage system in the middle of winter can be very different from that same 
system in high summer. Two additional cases are investigated. Case 1, with increased seasonality in 
the reference 2-week solar yield profile and the reference demand profile. And case 2, with increased 
seasonality in the 2-week high solar yield profile and the high demand profile. No seasonality in the 2-
week randomised demand profiles is included as this is very dependent on hard-to-predict specific 
consumer habits and heating/cooling technologies in place. The results in Table B.4 indicate that 
seasonality does not impact TS1. As described before, with volumetric charges with net-metering PV 
adoption is over-incentivised and there is no business case for batteries, independently of seasonality. 
Under TS2 seasonality lowers the incentive to self-consume. In winter months the synergy between 
PV and batteries is weak, wherefore the investments in these technologies are slightly lower than in 
the run with lower seasonality.  
Table B.4: Results for the additional runs under the different tariffs structures to test for the 
impact of increased seasonality. Technology cost of maturing DER scenario. 
 Case 1: Reference demand/solar yield Case 2: High demand/high solar yield 
 TS1 TS2 TS3 TS1 TS2 TS3 
Seasonality Low/High  Low  High Low  High Low/High  Low  High Low  High 
Efficiency issue [%] 4.0 0.7 0.4 7.8 6.7 0.4 1.5 0.2 3.3 7.5 
Equity issue [%] 80 5.8 4.4 34.7 30.2 44.6 9.6 4.7 22.3 40.6 
PV active consumer 
[kWp] 
5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 5 1.7 1.25 5 5 
Battery active 
consumer [kWh] 
0 0.3 0.2 5.5 5 0 1.9 0.3 4.1 9.3 
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The most interesting results are observed for TS3, in case 1 the inefficiencies and equity issues 
decrease slightly with more seasonality in the solar yield profile. The opposite happens in the case 2. 
Snapshots of the dispatch of the active consumer under TS3 of both cases for 2 days (one summer and 
one winter day) under TS3 are depicted in Figure B.2 below. It can be seen in both cases that active 
consumers are incentivised to do peak shaving. In case 1, as the solar irradiation on winter days is very 
low, again the synergies between PV and batteries are slightly weakened. The reverse happens in case 
2. In the case 2, a consumer following his self-interest is willing to invest in more batteries capacity to 
limit its injection peak which could exceed its withdrawal peak to enjoy the very high PV generation in 
summer. Figure B.2 shows that especially for case 2, in which the active consumer installs a high PV 
capacity, the seasonality impacts the dispatch.  
 
 
Figure B.2: Snapshots of the dispatch of the active consumer under capacity-based charges for the 
reference demand/solar yield profile and the high demand/high solar yield profile (max. PV 
installed: 5 kW), both with increased seasonality. 
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C. Appendix Chapter 3 
C.1 The central planner model 
The central planner model is formulated as a linear programme (LP). The central planner formulation 
has the same objective and constraints as the upper-level regulator in the MPEC (A.1-A.7) plus contains 
the constraints of the lower-level problem (A.14-A.31).  
 
The main difference with the MPEC model is that there is no network tariff formulated in the central 
planner case, as the consumers do not need to be coordinated. As such, also no cost-recovery 
constraint (A.8) is included. Because of the same reason, also the lower-level objective function is 
removed. Instead of consumers reacting in their own interest, the central planner decides unilaterally 
about their actions. The central planner acts in the interest of all aggregated consumers. As there is no 
network tariff in place, also the notion of fairness, or redistributive effects, cannot be captured with a 
centralised modelling approach, plus the central planner is indifferent to which consumer installs what 
technology. As an example of the different results between the decentralised MPEC model and the 
central planner, the outcomes for the numerical example used throughout the paper is compared 
between both approaches in  
Table B.1. 
Table B.1: Comparison of the results for total system costs between the model applied in the body 
of the paper (Decentralised MPEC) and a central planner approach for the numerical case study 
presented in the body of the paper. 
50 % active consumers  
Total system costs relative to baseline case  
(=no DER & volumetric  network charges)  
 Decentralised MPEC 
(Table 3-4 plus Fig. 6) 
Central planner 
Perfect proxy, no fairness 
consideration 
100 % Sunk grid costs 0.0 % 0.0 % 
50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective -1.4 % -2.3 % 
100 % Prospective grid costs -6.8 % -11.3 % 
Imperfect proxy (WP=75%), 
no fairness consideration 
100 % Sunk grid costs 0.0 % 0.0 % 
50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective -0.3 % -0.5% 
100 % Prospective grid costs -4.0 % -6.6% 
Imperfect proxy (WP=75%), 
fairness consideration 
(Cap=10%) 
100 % Sunk grid costs 0.6 % 
No notion of fairness 50 % Sunk & 50 % Prospective 0.1 % 
100 % Prospective grid costs -4.0 % 
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It can be seen that in all cases except for the scenario with 100 % sunk grid costs, the central planner 
performs better than the decentralised model in terms of lowering the total system costs. This can be 
explained by the fact that the central planner is always (equally or) less constrained than the upper-
level regulator in terms of optimising its objective function.  
 
For example, regarding the result for 100 % prospective grid costs in the case we assume a perfect 
proxy for the network cost driver and do no fairness issues. In the central planner case, each active 
consumer ideally installs a battery of 6.2 kWh. By utilising this battery in an optimal way, the original 
system peak can be reduced with 58.3 %. This point seems to be the (theoretically) optimal trade-off 
between battery investment by consumers and a reduction of the needed maximum capacity of the 
grid. However, in the decentralised model outcome, each active consumer will install a battery of 3.7 
kWh, leading to a system peak reduction of 35.0 %. In this case, the optimal trade-off point between 
DER adoption and grid capacity is not reached, leading to a higher total system costs. The benchmark 
system costs could be reached if each active consumer would increase its investment in batteries to 
6.2 kWh. However, this does not happen as the regulator cannot design a network tariff by which a 
self-interest pursuing active consumer would reduce his individual electricity cost while increasing its 
investment in batteries. An active consumer will install DER until a point it is still profitable for 
him/herself. Possibly by applying critical (system) peak pricing, which is not implemented in this paper, 
the system costs could be brought closer to the system cost obtained in the central planner approach. 
C.2. Additional sensitivity analysis: consumer profiles, solar yield profiles and time-varying 
energy prices 
In order to extend the numerical results presented in the body of the paper, additional results are 
presented in this appendix. Sensitivity analysis is done regarding the consumer demand profiles, the 
solar PV yield profile and the energy prices. Results are run for three consumer demand profiles; in 
Figure C.1 the average demand profiles are shown. These average demand profiles are scaled so that 
the passive consumer consumers 2/3 of the annual electricity of the active consumer, the same 
proportion as in the consumer demand series presented in Section 4.2. 
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The different solar yield profiles are shown in Figure C.2. As in the solar PV yield profile presented in 
the body of the paper, also seasonality is included. The reference consumer demand profile and the 
reference solar yield profile have the same average annual demand, peak and respectively solar yield 
as the numerical example in the body of the paper. However, in contrast to the time series presented 
in the body of the paper, the time series in this appendix are longer, namely 336h instead of 48h which 
represent a year. This is done because the timing of consumption and solar PV output is critically 
important for the economics of solar plus storage (see for example Neubauer and Simpson (2015)).  
Next to consumer demand profiles and solar PV yield, additional sensitivity analysis is done for the 
(exogenous) retailer energy prices. In the body of the paper, a constant retailer energy price of 0.08 
€/kWh is assumed. In this appendix we introduce two alternative time-of-use (TOU) profiles. In Figure 
C.3 the different options are shown. The TOU1 profile is ‘solar PV friendly’ as during hours that solar 
PV is producing an energy price is charged which is slightly higher than the flat energy charge. The 
TOU2 profile charges relatively high prices during the evening, when consumer demand is expected to 
peak and charges a relatively low price during the hours that solar PV is producing a lot. The TOU2 
profile is less ‘solar PV friendly’ but might induce battery investment due to significant relative changes 
in the energy price during the day. These daily energy price patterns are deemed representative for 
the year. To be able to compare results among the three energy price profiles, the TOU1 and TOU2 
profile are scaled to make sure that in the baseline scenario (no DER) the weighted average energy 
price per consumer type is equal over the different energy price profiles. This means that the average 
energy price of the TOU1 and TOU2 profile will be slightly lower than 0.08 €/kWh. This is because 
Table C.1:  Summary additional time 
series 
Demand 
profiles 
Average 
yearly 
consumption 
[kWh] 
Average 
peak 
demand 
[kW] 
Low 3750 2.5 
Reference 6500 4 
High 11000 5 
PV yield 
profiles 
Yearly PV yield [kWh/kWp] 
Low    960 (LCOE: 0.100 €/kWh) 
Reference 1160 (LCOE: 0.083 €/kWh) 
High 1360 (LCOE: 0.070 €/kWh) 
 
Figure C.1: Three 2-week (average) consumer profiles 
Figure C.2: Three 2-week solar PV yield profiles (including 
seasonality) 
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consumers have a higher demand during the times that the energy prices are relatively higher for these 
profiles. 
 
Figure C.3: Three profiles for energy prices 
The results are shown in Table C.2-4. The grid cost scenario with 50 % sunk costs and 50 % prospective 
costs is assumed. Further, an imperfect proxy of the network cost driver is assumed (WF=0.75). The 
least-cost solution is computed. If multiple equilibrium network tariffs exist, the network tariff 
resulting in the lowest increase of network charges for the passive consumer is selected. The main 
findings of the sensitivity analysis are the sensitivity of results to how attractive solar PV investment is 
and that fact that TOU energy retail prices can interact with network tariff design. These findings are 
briefly discussed in Section 7.1 in the body of the paper. 
Table C.2: Results for the reference demand time series (336h). Sensitivity: solar yield and energy 
price profiles 
  
Results compared to baseline  
 (=no DER & baseline network tariff) 
Reference demand/  
low solar irradiation 
(expensive solar PV) 
Reference demand/ 
reference solar irradiation  
(medium price solar PV) 
Reference demand/  
high solar irradiation  
(cheap solar PV) 
Energy price (same baseline weighted 
average energy price per consumer) 
Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 
Flat 
(48h) 
Flat 
(336h) 
TOU 1 TOU 2 Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 
∆ total system costs - 0.4 % -0.7 % - 1.9 % -0.3 % -0.4 % -0.7 % -1.9 % - 0.5 % -1.2 % -1.9 % 
      ∆ total grid costs - 6.2 % - 6.2 % - 8.4 % - 7.5 % - 6.2 % - 6.2 % - 8.4 % - 6.3 % - 6.6 % - 8.4 % 
      ∆ total energy costs 0.2 % - 0.5 % - 4.3 % 0.7 % 0.2 % - 0.5 % - 4.3 % - 9 % - 49 % -4 % 
       PV active consumer [kWp] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9  4.7  0 
       Battery active consumer [kWh] 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.5 1.4 2.6 
∆ network charges passive consumer 3.8 % 4.4 % 2.6 % 12.2 % 11.9 % 13.2 % 6.6 % 15.2 % 15.2 % 13.1 % 
Fixed network charges 0.0 % 7.4 % 0.0 % 52.8 % 33.0 % 46.3 % 23.7 % 57.0 % 52.8 % 56.6 % 
Vol. network charges (net-purchase) 46.0 % 42.2 % 52.8 % 14.3 % 11.4 % 7.5 % 36.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 10.0 % 
Capacity-based network charges 54.0 % 50.4 % 47.2 % 32.9 % 55.6 % 46.2 % 40.0 % 43.0 % 47.2 % 33.4 % 
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Table C.3: Results for the low demand time series (336h). Sensitivity: solar yield and energy price 
profiles 
 
Table C.4: Results for the high demand time series (336h). Sensitivity: solar yield and energy price 
profiles 
 
 
  
Results compared to baseline  
 (=no DER & baseline network tariff) 
Low demand/  
low solar irradiation 
(expensive solar PV) 
Low demand/ 
reference solar irradiation  
(medium price solar PV) 
Low demand/  
high solar irradiation  
(cheap solar PV) 
Energy price (same baseline weighted 
average energy price per consumer) 
Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 
∆ total system costs -0.2 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.2 % -0.5 % -0.6 % -0.3 % -0.9 % -0.9 % 
      ∆ total grid costs - 5.0 % - 5.0 % - 5.0 % - 5.0 % - 5.0 % - 5.0 % - 6.1 % - 7.3 % - 7.2 % 
      ∆ total energy costs 0.3 % -0.5 % -0.6% 0.3 % -0.5 % -0.6% -10.1 % -25.1 % -13.8 % 
       PV active consumer [kWp] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 1.4 0.74 
       Battery active consumer [kWh] 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 
∆ network charges passive consumer 4.4 % 5.0 % 4.4 % 12.0 % 13.3 % 12.8 % 15.5 % 15.6 % 15.3 % 
Fixed network charges 0.3 % 25.1 % 23.3 % 32.8 % 60.1 % 58.9 % 65.9 % 68.3 % 50.8 % 
Vol. network charges (net-purchase) 35.7 % 43.9 % 46.8 % 4.3 % 11.7 % 14.2 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.6 % 
Capacity-based network charges 64.0 % 31.0 % 29.9 % 62.9 % 28.2 % 26.9 % 33.6 % 31.2 % 48.6 % 
Results compared to baseline  
 (=no DER & baseline network tariff) 
High demand/  
low solar irradiation 
(expensive solar PV) 
High demand/ 
reference solar irradiation  
(medium price solar PV) 
High demand/  
high solar irradiation  
(cheap solar PV) 
Energy price (same baseline weighted 
average energy price per consumer) 
Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 Flat TOU 1 TOU 2 
∆ total system costs - 0.2% -0.2 % -0.3% - 0.2% - 0.2% -0.3 % - 0.4 % -0.8 % - 0.7 % 
      ∆ total grid costs -1.6 % - 1.6 % -2.9 % -1.6 % - 1.6 % -2.9 % - 2.6 % - 3.0% - 3.8 % 
      ∆ total energy costs 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.3 % 0.1 % 0.0 % -1.4 % -10.3 % -30.3 % -17.7 % 
       PV active consumer [kWp] 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 1.7 5 2.9 
       Battery active consumer [kWh] 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.4 
∆ network charges passive consumer 5.2 % 7.6 % 6.4 % 13.1 % 15.4 % 14.9 % 14.8 % 15.4 % 15.6 % 
Fixed network charges 19.4 % 28.9 % 25.6 % 51.4 % 62.7 % 61.0 % 59.5 % 64.7 % 64.8 % 
Vol. network charges  (net-purchase) 33.3 % 30.8 % 33.9 % 2.3 % 0.5 % 2.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 
Capacity-based network charges 47.2 % 40.2 % 40.4% 46.2 % 36.8 % 36.3 % 40.5 % 35.3 % 35.1 % 
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D. Appendix Chapter 4 
D.1. Data sensitivity analysis 
To test the robustness of the results, an additional setup was evaluated. In the numerical example in 
the body of the text, only two consumer profiles are used. Each consumer type, active and passive, is 
represented by one profile, and the profiles are coincident. In reality, many individual profiles exist, 
and these will not be all coincident.  In this appendix, three different consumer profiles were used. 
These profiles are shown in Figure D.1. together with the proportion of consumers per profiles and 
type. 
 
D.2. Results sensitivity analysis 
The results for the battery investment costs are shown in Table D.1. All grid costs are assumed to be 
driven by the aggregated peak demand. Please note that now the average capacity of the batteries 
installed by the different active consumer groups is shown. Logically, the capacities installed differ to 
a certain extent from the results in Table 14 but the observations remain the same. 
Table D.1: Battery and solar PV investment per active consumer for the different network tariff 
designs under different investment cost assumptions for batteries and interaction with solar PV 
investments. All grid costs are assumed to be driven by the aggregated peak demand. 
Distribution network tariff design 
 
Benchmark – 
central 
planner 
Capacity-
based [€/kW] 
Volumetric 
Net-purchase 
[€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional 
[€/kWh] 
Investment cost batteries 
Average battery installed per active consumer [kWh]  
/ PV in brackets [kWp] 
No PV installed, 
only batteries can 
be invested in by 
the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
300 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
250 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.9 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
150 €/kWh 10.1 (0) 5.7 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
100 €/kWh 12.1 (0) 6.9 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
Batteries and PV 
can be installed in 
350 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0) 0 (4.9) 0.0 (0.6) 
300 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0) 0 (4.9) 0.0 (0.6) 
 Active Passive 
Profile 1 16.7% 0 % 
Profile 2 16.7% 50 % 
Profile 3 16.7% 0 % 
Figure D.1: Profiles and proportions consumers per profile and active/passive 
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by the active 
consumers 
250 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0) 0 (4.9) 0.0 (0.6) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (0) 3.9 (0) 0 (4.9) 0.0 (0.6) 
150 €/kWh 10.1 (0) 5.7 (0) 0 (4.9) 0.5 (0.6) 
100 €/kWh 12.1 (0) 7.3 (0.7) 3.6 (5) 1.7 (1.1) 
Active consumer 
has a 5 kWp solar 
PV, batteries can 
be invested in 
350 €/kWh 1.8 (5) 1.0 (5) 0.0 (5) 0.0 (5) 
300 €/kWh 2.1 (5) 1.4 (5) 0.0 (5) 0.0 (5) 
250 €/kWh 2.1 (5) 1.4 (5) 0.0 (5) 0.0 (5) 
200 €/kWh 6.2 (5) 1.8 (5) 0.0 (5) 5.2 (5) 
150 €/kWh 11.0 (5) 6.2 (5) 0.0 (5) 5.2 (5) 
100 €/kWh 12.4 (5) 7.4 (5) 3.6 (5) 11.7 (5) 
 
When comparing the results in Figure 19 and Figure D.2, it can be seen that for expensive batteries, 
the performance in terms of the reduction of system costs is overestimated with coincident consumer 
profiles. If batteries are cheaper and thus more batteries are installed, the individual peaks will be 
flattened over multiple time-steps thus possibly also during the time steps other consumers have their 
peak demand and as a result the aggregated peak will decrease. 
 
Figure D.2: Increase in total system costs for the three network tariff structures when compared 
with a central planner. Sensitivity for three different assumptions regarding solar PV adoption and 
the investment cost of storage. 
Table D.2 shows the result for the battery adoption under different TOU energy prices. Again, the 
capacities installed differ to a certain extent from the results in Table 15 but the observations remain 
the same. 
Table D.2: Battery and solar PV investment per active consumer for the different network tariff 
designs under different investment cost assumptions for batteries and interaction with solar PV 
investments. All grid costs are assumed to be driven by the aggregated peak demand.  
Distribution network tariff 
design 
 
Benchmark – central 
planner 
Capacity-based 
[€/kW] 
Volumetric Net-
purchase [€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional [€/kWh] 
Energy price TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 
Investment cost batteries Battery installed per active consumer [kWh] / PV in brackets [kWp] 
No PV 
installed, 
only batteries 
can be 
invested in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 8.6 (0) 1.2 (0) 3.7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
300 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 12.1 (0) 1.2 (0) 6.1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
250 €/kWh 3.5 (0) 12.7 (0) 2.1 (0) 7.0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
200 €/kWh 10.0 (0) 13.2 (0) 5.3 (0) 7.5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
150 €/kWh 12.1 (0) 15.0 (0) 6.6 (0) 8.1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
100 €/kWh 12.7 (0) 16.3 (0) 7.2 (0) 8.3 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Batteries and 
PV can be 
350 €/kWh 1.9 (0.4) 8.6 (0) 1.2 (0.4) 3.7 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.4) 
300 €/kWh 1.9 (0) 12.1 (0) 1.3 (1.4) 6.1 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.4) 
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installed in 
by the active 
consumers 
250 €/kWh 3.5 (0) 12.7 (0) 1.9 (1.3) 7.0 (0) 0 (5) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.7) 0 (0.4) 
200 €/kWh 10.0 (0) 13.2 (0) 5.2 (0.8) 7.5 (0) 0 (5) 0.1 (0.9) 0 (0.7) 0.1 (0.5) 
150 €/kWh 12.1 (0) 15.0 (0) 6.6 (0.7) 8.1 (0) 0 (5) 1.9 (1.5) 1.0 (0.9) 2.8 (1.4) 
100 €/kWh 
12.7 
(0.4) 
16.3 (0) 7.3 (0.6) 8.3 (0) 4.5 (5) 8.2 (3.1) 6.8 (2.8) 8.2 (3.2) 
Active 
consumer 
has a 5 kWp 
solar PV, 
batteries can 
be invested 
in 
350 €/kWh 2.1 (5) 8.5 (5) 1.3 (5) 2.6 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 5.2 (5) 
300 €/kWh 2.1 (5) 12.4 (5) 1.4 (5) 5.3 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 0 (5) 5.2 (5) 
250 €/kWh 4.1 (5) 12.4 (5) 1.5 (5) 6.3 (5) 0 (5) 3.7 (5) 4.8 (5) 5.2 (5) 
200 €/kWh 9.6 (5) 13.0 (5) 4.3 (5) 8.1 (5) 0 (5) 5.2 (5) 5.2 (5) 7.5 (5) 
150 €/kWh 12.4 (5) 14.9 (5) 6.0 (5) 9.2 (5) 0 (5) 5.2 (5) 5.2 (5) 7.6 (5) 
100 €/kWh 12.4 (5) 18.2 (5) 6.7 (5) 10.3 (5) 4.5 (5) 7.6 (5) 7.6 (5) 11.7 (5) 
 
Table D.3 shows the relative difference in system costs between flat energy prices and TOU energy 
prices for different distribution network tariff designs and investment cost of batteries. Again, the 
exact percentages differ to a certain extent from the results in Table 16 but the observations remain 
the same. 
Table D.3: Relative difference in system costs between flat energy prices and TOU energy prices for 
different distribution network tariff designs and investment cost of batteries. 
Distribution network tariff 
design 
 
Benchmark – 
central planner 
Capacity-based 
[€/kW] 
Volumetric Net-
purchase [€/kWh] 
Volumetric Bi-
directional [€/kWh] 
Energy price TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 TOU1 TOU2 
Investment cost batteries Difference in total system costs compared to a flat energy price [%] 
No PV 
installed, 
only 
batteries can 
be invested 
in by the 
active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh -0.4% -1.9% -0.3% -1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
300 €/kWh -0.4% -4.4% -0.3% -2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
250 €/kWh -0.5% -7.5% -0.3% -3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
200 €/kWh -2.0% -10.7% -1.0% -5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
150 €/kWh -3.1% -12.6% -1.4% -6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100 €/kWh -3.6% -14.5% -1.6% -6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Batteries and 
PV can be 
installed in 
by the active 
consumers 
350 €/kWh -0.4% -1.9% -0.3% -1.1% -1.0% -0.5% -0.1% 0.0% 
300 €/kWh -0.4% -4.4% -0.3% -2.2% -1.0% -0.5% -0.1% 0.0% 
250 €/kWh -0.5% -7.5% -0.4% -3.7% -1.0% -0.5% -0.1% 0.0% 
200 €/kWh -2.0% -10.7% -1.1% -5.3% -1.0% -0.2% -0.1% 0.5% 
150 €/kWh -3.1% -12.6% -1.5% -6.3% -1.0% 1.2% 0.4% 1.8% 
100 €/kWh -3.6% -14.5% -1.6% -6.9% -2.7% 0.1% 2.9% 0.2% 
Active 
consumer 
has a 5 kWp 
solar PV, 
batteries can 
be invested 
in 
350 €/kWh -0.9% -0.8% -0.8% 0.0% -0.4% 1.2% -0.1% 3.1% 
300 €/kWh -0.9% -3.1% -0.8% -0.9% -0.4% 1.2% -0.1% 1.7% 
250 €/kWh -1.0% -6.1% -0.8% -2.2% -0.4% 1.4% 1.7% 0.3% 
200 €/kWh -2.4% -9.0% -1.2% -3.8% -0.4% -2.1% -0.7% -5.2% 
150 €/kWh -3.3% -10.8% -1.6% -5.1% -0.4% -3.5% -0.7% -5.9% 
100 €/kWh -3.4% -12.9% -1.4% -6.0% -2.1% -8.4% -3.5% -2.0% 
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Summary in French – Résume en français 
La diffusion des panneaux solaires photovoltaïques à des prix abordables dans le secteur résidentiel, 
nous amène à repenser à la manière avec laquelle les coûts des réseaux de distribution sont récupérés 
auprès des consommateurs. Historiquement, les consommateurs étaient facturés pour l'utilisation du 
réseau de distribution principalement sur la base de leur volume (net) d'électricité consommé. Avec 
un tel type de tarif de réseau, les consommateurs qui installent des panneaux photovoltaïques 
contribuent beaucoup moins à la récupération du coût d’investissement réseau. Cependant, ces 
consommateurs (prosummeurs) dépendent autant du réseau qu’avant. Outre les systèmes solaires 
photovoltaïques, une baisse importante des coûts du stockage de l'électricité est anticipée dans le 
futur, avec pour effet potentiel, une augmentation des installations des batteries.  
 
La problématique abordée dans cette thèse est de savoir comment définir le tarif du réseau de 
distribution dans ce contexte changeant. La transformation à long terme d'un réseau de l'électricité 
passif en un réseau intelligent ne peut être atteinte que par le biais d'une régulation qui minimise les 
incertitudes et qui donne lieu à un environnement propice aux investissements. Les changements en 
cours dans le secteur de la distribution d'électricité exigent des pratiques de répartition des coûts 
économiquement justifiées pour récupérer la totalité des coûts de ces actifs. 
 
Des différents modèles de théorie des jeux sont développés pour faire cette analyse. Dans ces modèles, 
en plus des investissements dans l’énergie solaire photovoltaïque, des investissements dans les 
batteries du côté des consommateurs sont considérés. Plus précisément, des modèles formulés sous 
forme d'un problème d'optimisation avec des contraintes d'équilibre (MCP pour Mixed 
Complementarity Problem and MPEC pour Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints) 
sont développés. Ce modèle économique est basé sur les outils méthodologiques les plus avancés d'un 
point de vue académique. Pour étudier les effets de redistribution en terme de bien-être social, les 
interactions entre les décideurs sont représentées sous forme d'un équilibre hiérarchique utilisant des 
formulations basées sur la théorie de complémentarité. 
 
Ce rapport de thèse consiste en un bref aperçu suivi de quatre chapitres indépendants et d'une 
conclusion. Dans le premier chapitre, le contexte de la recherche est présenté, les principes généraux 
des tarifs de réseau de distribution sont discutés et le défi actuel est décrit. Le deuxième chapitre 
montre que l’adoption de systèmes solaires photovoltaïques et des batteries a une répercussion sur 
l’efficacité du tarif actuel d’accès au réseau de distribution. De plus, ceci se traduit par des effets de 
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redistribution. Les magnitudes des inefficacités et des effets de redistribution sont représentées en 
fonction des coûts d’investissement des systèmes solaires photovoltaïques et des batteries. 
 
Le troisième chapitre aborde la conception du tarif de réseau de distribution le moins coûteux, en 
tenant compte de deux contraintes auxquelles les régulateurs sont souvent confrontés dans la 
pratique. Les contraintes considérées sont la réflectivité des coûts dans les tarifs de réseau et l'équité 
dans la répartition de ces coûts. La conclusion principale est que dans le cas où la majorité des coûts 
de réseau est irrécupérable, il est difficile de trouver un compromis raisonnable entre la réflectivité 
des coûts dans les tarifs et l'équité dans la répartition de ces coûts parmi les consommateurs. D’autres 
outils à part les ‘’méthodes de tarification classiques’’ seront donc nécessaires. Un exemple est un tarif 
de réseau fixe différencié par consommateur.   
 
Le quatrième chapitre porte sur l’interaction entre les tarifs du réseau de distribution et les systèmes 
de stockage résidentiel de l’électricité. La mesure dans laquelle la conception de ces tarifs aligne la 
rentabilisation du stockage avec d’autres avantages plus larges est évaluée. On montre que dans le cas 
où une grande partie des coûts d’investissement dans le réseau devra être faite dans le future, des 
structures tarifaires avancées seront nécessaires pour aligner les intérêts des consommateurs avec des 
avantages plus larges. Enfin, une conclusion est présentée. 
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Titre : Les structures tarifaires des opérateurs de distribution et des consommateurs actifs : une 
analyse de la régulation économique 
Mots clés : tarifs d'accès des réseaux de distribution, économie de l’énergie, systèmes    
photovoltaïques, batteries, théorie des jeux 
Résumé : La diffusion des panneaux solaires photovoltaïques à prix abordables nous amène à 
repenser à la manière avec laquelle les coûts des réseaux de distribution sont récupérés auprès des 
consommateurs. Historiquement, les consommateurs étaient facturés pour l'utilisation du réseau 
de distribution principalement sur la base de leur volume (net) d'électricité consommé. Avec tel 
type de tarif de réseau, les consommateurs qui installent des panneaux photovoltaïques contribuent 
beaucoup moins à la récupération du coût d’investissement réseau. Cependant, ces consommateurs 
(prosummeurs) dépendent autant du réseau qu’avant. La question examinée dans cette thèse est de 
savoir comment définir le tarif du réseau de distribution dans ce contexte changeant. Des différents 
modèles de théorie des jeux sont développés pour faire cette analyse. Dans ces modèles, en plus 
des investissements dans l’énergie solaire photovoltaïque, des investissements dans les batteries 
du côté des consommateurs sont aussi considérés. Ce rapport de thèse consiste en un bref aperçu 
suivi de quatre chapitres indépendants et d'une conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
Title: Distribution network tariff design and active consumers: a regulatory impact analysis 
Keywords: distribution network tariffs, energy economics, solar PV, batteries, game theory 
Abstract: The uptake of affordable solar PV panels challenges the way in which costs of distribution 
networks are recuperated from consumers. Historically, consumers were charged for the use of the 
distribution network mainly according to their (net) volume of electricity consumed over a period of 
time. With such volumetric network charges, consumers installing PV panels contribute a lot less 
towards the recuperation of network costs. However, these consumers (prosumers) still rely on the 
network as much as they did before. The question investigated in this thesis is how to re-design the 
distribution network tariff in this changing context. Different game-theoretical models are developed 
to conduct this analysis. In the models, not only investments in solar PV but also investments in 
batteries at the consumer-side are considered.  The thesis consists of a brief overview followed by 
four standalone chapters and a conclusion.  
 
 
